

**THE EUROPEAN UNION’S PROGRAMME FOR NIGERIA**

**“Mid-term evaluation of the “Support to the Nigerian Electoral Cycle 2012-2015”**

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FINAL REPORT

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# **Abbreviations and Acronyms**

ACN Action Congress of Nigeria

ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution

ANPP All Nigeria Peoples Party

APGA All Progressive Grand Alliance

BRIDGE Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections

CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women

CEO Chief Executive Office

CIDA Canadian International Development Agency

CIRDDOC Civil Resource Development and Documentation Centre

CLEEN Centre for Law Enforcement Education

CONFAB National Conference

CPAP Country Programme Action Plan

CPC Congress for Progressive Change

CSO Civil Society Organization

DAC Development Assistance Committee

DEX Direct Execution

DFID UK Department for International Development

DFTAD Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

DGD Democratic Governance for Development Program for Nigeria

ECA Electoral Cycle Approach

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EFCC Economic and Financial Crimes Commission

EMB Election Management Body

EU European Union

EUEOM European Union Election Observation Mission

FCT Federal Capital Territory

FOI Freedom of Information

FOSIECON Forum of State Independent Electoral Commission

GTU Gender Technical Unit

HRW Human Rights Watch

ICT Information and Communications Technology

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems

INEC Independent National Electoral Commission

IPAC Inter-Party Advisory Council

IRI International Republican Institute

KOICA Korean International Cooperation Agency

LG Local Government

LGA Local Government Authority

LP Labour Party

M & E Monitoring and Evaluation

MB Middle Belt

MEND Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta

MMS Multimedia Messaging System

MRC Military Ruling Council

NASS National Assembly

NCP National Conscience Party

NDI National Democratic Institute

NERC National Election Reform Committee

NGO Non-governmental Organisation

NNPC Nigerian National Petroleum Company

NOA National Orientation Agency

NURTH National Union of Road Transport Workers

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PDP People Democratic Party

PLAC Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre

PM Project Manager

PMU Project Management Unit

PORIWAA Poverty in Africa Alternative

PRODOC Project Documents

PSO Procurement Services Offices

PTF Petroleum Trust Fund

PWDs Persons Living with Disabilities

RBM Result Based Management

REC Regional Election Commissioner

RERC Registration and Election Review Committee

SC Steering Committee

SIEC State Independent Election Commission

SMART Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time bound

SMS Short Message Service

TC Technical Committee

TMG Transitional Monitoring Group

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNARDC Women Advocacy Research Document Centre

UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UPP United Progressive Party

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USD United States Dollar

VEP Voter Education Programme

WACOL Women’s Aid Collective

WRAPA Women’s Right Advancement and Protection Alternative

YIAGA Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth and Advancement

# Executive Summary

The present mid-term evaluation assesses the Democratic Governance for Development Programme for Nigeria (DGD II) which was established in June 2012 and has an overall committed budget of approximately USD$53 million. To facilitate the funding of the project, a joint basket fund of four development partners namely, the European Union (EU), UK Department for International Development (DFID), The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFTAD) (Formerly CIDA) and the Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) together with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was established. To date, approximately 54% of the commitments have been received. UNDP is tasked with managing the basket fund. The project has four overarching outputs: 1). Promoting Credible, Transparent and a Sustainable Electoral Process; 2) Improving the Democratic quality of Political Engagement; 3) Enhancing Participation by Women, Youth and other Marginalized Groups; and 4) Strengthening Channels for Civic Engagement.

The overall purpose of this mid-term evaluation is to undertake a critical assessment of the **relevance**, **effectiveness** and **efficiency**, as well as the **sustainability** and **impact** so far achieved in the implementation of DGD II. The evaluation team used a mixed method approach based on qualitative and quantitative data. These included a comprehensive desk review, design of open-ended interviews and structured questionnaire. All key stakeholders were consulted during the process.

The political background to the project is complex and the three elections since the handing over of power to the elected government of Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999 have been held to largely be fraudulent and the elections in 2011 have been held to be the “bloodiest” elections in Nigerian History. Despite this, the appointment of Professor Attahiru Jega in July 2010 did provide the Independent National Elections Commission (INEC) with increased confidence and trust both among Nigerians and the International Community. The 2011 elections were held to be the “fairest yet” and subsequent to the elections an Election Review Committee was set up to compliment the Uwais report and map out the future for democratic elections in 2015 and beyond.

The second phase of the project 2014-2015 coincides with violent acts against civilians becoming increasingly prevalent. According to Amnesty International, since the beginning of 2014, more than 1,500 people have been killed amid fighting between the Nigerian security forces and Islamist armed groups. These groups have also been allegedly responsible for two big bomb explosions in the capital in April 2014, and the alleged abduction of over 200 schoolgirls in the North of the Country. In parallel to the deteriorating security, a national conference to explore the option of a national conversation so that the “voices of Nigerians could be heard” is ongoing. Many Nigerians place much hope in the Conference, however its establishment has meant that the essential electoral reform may be relegated to the back-burner and the foreseen amendments to the Constitution may not take place or happen too late to enable the project and indeed the electoral process to have the desired outcome.

With regards to the **relevance** of the project, recommendations emanating from the Uwais report and other reviews recognize that only a “combination of electoral, constitutional and economic reforms are needed in order to make the 2015 polls truly fair and to ensure they are not tainted by blood.” As a result, DGD II which was born out of a previous project which ended in May 2011 and thus was redesigned; acknowledging the diverse recommendations to improve the process and was reformulated into four thematic areas. The merging of certain areas emanated from the need to streamline the project to ensure a more focused approach and targeting key specific results whereby activities and results would not overlap with the efforts of other projects providing technical assistance to tackle the same issues. Gender, as well as other cross cutting themes such as reform institutional support and election related violence, were included to varying degrees. The project ensured consultation with key stakeholders to design the project and galvanized upon UNDPs wealth of experience in affording electoral technical assistance to Election Management Bodies around the world. The Electoral Cycle Approach which is deemed to enhance the continual strengthening of electoral governance as a whole and therefore establishing the mechanisms for engendering a democratic political culture is utilized as well.

DGD II takes into full consideration the key lacunas in the Nigerian Context and endeavors to link all of these areas by interconnecting them across all four components and does not merely view these issues as complementary activities but rather the catalyst to promote inclusive and democratic elections. Although it is unclear as to whether the project consciously ensured that many of the activities would correspond to the recommendations highlighted in the European Union Election Observation Mission Report 2011, many of them have been taken on board, and include activities or advocacy around electoral reform.

The **programme design** of DGD II emanates from the needs of the various beneficiaries of the project. The project has three overarching goals 1) To support broad based institutional and legal reforms, and 2) to conduct enhancement through training and professional development for the key institutions and processes during the pre-voting phase (June 2012-Dec 2013) and 3) during the voting period itself (Jan 2014-Dec 2015). A roadmap for the second phase and an accompanying work plan was also devised and approved at the beginning of 2014.

The key areas identified in order to improve the process include furthering the capacity of INEC and SIECs; mitigating election violence, participation of marginalized groups, including women, people living with disabilities and youth, building the capacity of civil society and the media to carry out effective and civic voter education; the weaknesses of political parties, poor legal framework and the ability to deal with all electoral complaints effectively and efficiently, amongst others. Given the fragility and weaknesses of the key institutions involved in the electoral process, one project alone is unable to tackle all of the issues successfully and individual strengths and technical and financial abilities from each contributing partner have been taken into consideration.

The adept use of the electoral cycle approach ensures that key institutions and stakeholders are strengthened long before the elections take place and enables them enough time to plan strategically and adopt innovative approaches for improving the electoral process as a whole, and even more importantly provides the ability to assess the situation to ensure maximum effectiveness.

Another important aspect of the strengthening and consolidating of democracy in Nigeria is the strengthening of the legal framework for elections in Nigeria and this has acted as the leitmotif of the project. DGD II has tried to galvanize support amongst key stakeholders and bring them together to promote and advocate for electoral reform prior to the next elections.

The **design of the project** is such that all four components are interlinked and activities can overlap positively and create strong synergies with key actors being specifically targeted under each individual component. In both the ProDoc and the DGD II work plan 2014/2015 each component has an intended output and output targets, although the intended outputs in the 2014-2015 work plan were reflected as the output targets in the original ProDoc. Phase I has 47 programmed activities and Phase II 50. At the time of the evaluation, some of the activities under phase I are deemed to be on track and as yet are not completely achieved. This will inevitably result in some confusion with regards to reporting, as new activities will commence while some activities from the original ProDoc will still need to be implemented/finalized which may be cumbersome to manage and monitor.

The overall baselines of the project are not always specific and many of the outcome indicators are considered to be ambiguous under some of the components. While this does not deflect from the important work the project is undertaking, it might be advisable to move the bar slightly in order to enable the project to be able to gauge the attainment of these indicators. Nevertheless, the majority of the target output indicators are attainable and are deemed to be on track.

The majority of the **validity of the assumptions** are correct; however it should be noted that a programme of its size cannot be expected to address all the issues especially with regards to the successful promotion of affirmative action on gender, reduction in electoral violence as well as mitigating key areas of conflict. Incidences of conflict are not mere assumptions, but are events, which will happen and will most certainly have a direct impact on the elections. Violence is embedded in Nigeria’s electoral culture and without more voter education, which penetrates down to the ward level and the capacity to engage in dialogue with the political parties and individual candidates at local level, there is always the risk of the projects’ impact being limited.

The project is considered by all beneficiaries to be flexible, reactive and responsive to their needs and is by and large **effective and efficient**. For INEC, the basket fund has added value as it allows a number of donors to contribute under one umbrella. The advantage of working with a broad range of beneficiaries as well as working on central issues essential to enhancing the electoral process provides the project with a distinctive advantage over other international partners’ projects as it is able to call on a wide range of expertise and bring them around the same table when the need arises.

The project has designed a risk log frame but it is not clear as to how this is used in the day-to-day work of the project and utilized in the monthly reports. Many of the key obstacles to achieving transparent and credible elections, and obtaining the goals outlined in the project are political. A strategic donor group made up of all the major contributors to Nigeria does exist and this goes somewhere towards flagging key political issues, which arise that have the potential to divert or derail the results of the project.

Within the framework for the new road map for 2014/2015, the project will undertake conflict analysis which can feed into their work, however it is essential that all sources are explored, and that said analysis is also carried out at the state and local government level as this will highlight any impending problems as the destabilization of the overall process is more than likely to emanate from State Level than at National level.

Overall management of each of the four components is being carried out by the Project Director with strategic, policy and technical guidance from the Steering and Technical Committees. Heads of components prepare monthly reports that outline the key activities undertaken in the period. Nevertheless, they fail to include proper oversight tools and do not necessarily flag key challenges or possible risk and mitigation strategies to ensure that results are being achieved. There could therefore be more results-based reporting at this level and the projects’ capacity could be enhanced as to measure at output and outcome level rather than primarily focusing on activities.

Overall the **impact** of the project is positive and it has lent support to various institutions, such as INEC, State Independent Election Commissions (SIECs), National Assembly (NASS), Inter-party Advisory Council (IPAC) and different members of civil society and the media. There is no doubt that without the project, many of these entities would have not been able to build their capacity and knowledge around the electoral process. Through the project they have been harnessed with the opportunity to not only make a potential positive impact on both the electoral process but also to “develop their institutions and processes that are more responsive to the needs of ordinary citizens, including the marginalized, built internal mechanisms to strengthen their respective mandates as well as promoting democratic institutional development.

The principle focus of an average election project is to deliver the elections and therefore not all elements of the project could be said to be **sustainable**. Nevertheless, this is where DGD IIs’ strength lies, as it is very much geared to building institutional capacity to promote credible and peaceful elections and encourages dialogue at all levels to build consensus and establish forward looking strategies to improve the process and to deepen democracy.

To evaluate the overall **sustainability** of a project, however, other factors need to be taken into account, these could include, policy support measures, choice of technology, socio/cultural matters, institutional approach and important external factors. All these factors do have an effect on the sustainability of the project and perhaps one of the most important lessons learned is for the gains to be sustainable, is that the project still has a daunting task ahead of it and must go down to the grass roots and activate programmes at the ward level. In order to have a deeper and the desired impact on the process and for it to be sustainable, more local interventions need to be made.

In conclusion, the evaluation deduces that in general the project is well designed and relevant. Key issues were taken on board and have contributed to the building of the varying institutions and beneficiaries’ capacities to impact on the electoral process. In developing its second work plan for the second phase, DGD II was cognizant of the importance of reaching out to grass root organisations and including a conflict analysis of the situation to facilitate the working of the project. Nevertheless it should be noted that although the project is aware of these two aspects, DGD II might be somewhat limited in what they can do in these two areas.

The evaluation highlights the importance of engaging more strongly in voter education and endeavouring to strengthen the already important gains in the area of gender. The importance of collaboration between all election stakeholders cannot be underestimated and it is essential to ensure maximum benefits are derived from all projects concerned. The efficiency and effectiveness of all projects concerned could all benefit from the diverse approaches and effective and cordial ways should be sought to enhance the best interests of deepening democracy in Nigeria.

The project was rated as responsive, reactive and flexible by all stakeholders and beneficiaries, nevertheless some of the international partners would like to see more results based managed reporting whereby the projects capacity to measure at the output and outcome level is enhanced. The establishment of an effective monitoring and evaluation framework is key. The project is on track to achieve the majority of the targets as outlined in the new work plan 2014/2015, and should still pay attention to assure that all those in the first phase are achieved. Nevertheless given the design of the outcome indicators, the evaluation team concludes that the project may not reach all the indicators proposed in the original ProDoc as there are external factors, such as electoral violence, reluctance to promote affirmative action due to patriarchal beliefs and the heavy influence of politics over the electoral process which is likely to skew some of the key results of the process.

To this end, the evaluation puts forward the following key recommendations:

**Project Management**

1. Ensure that a Monitoring and Evaluation Matrix is designed and that a monitoring and evaluation specialist is in-country under a permanent contract
2. Restructure the monthly and quarterly reports to reflect a more results based approach
3. Ensure that Risk Management is strengthened and coordinated with key stakeholders to the process
4. Strengthen collaboration and coordination between other international partners and the DGD Project
5. Ensure that the website is consistently updated
6. Create a Strategic Thematic Group on Voter Education led by INEC
7. Review the impact of cross cutting issues such as gender, reform and conflict analysis across all components and ensure that all component heads include how they are being mainstreamed in monthly reports

**Component I**

1. Ensure continued support to INEC in implementing their Strategic Plan and to devise a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation strategy
2. Strengthen the support to the gender desk to ensure proper and strategic implementation of the gender policy
3. Devise a voter education strategy with INEC and possibly the SIECs for conducting local elections and general elections and ensure that this is in line with other international partners’ programmes to ensure complementarity and maximum impact
4. Support INEC to build their legal capacity

**Component II**

1. Support IPAC in implementing its strategic plan as well as developing an M & E Framework
2. Support IPAC to increase its outreach at local level
3. Enable IPAC to participate in international for a both inside and outside of the country
4. Provide resources and support to aid in the dissemination of the code of conduct at local levels
5. Support the NLIS to develop a “welcome” curriculum for new parliamentarians which should include training on the role of a parliamentarian, legal oversight and budgetary oversight. It should also include how to draft and analyse gender sensitive laws.

**Component III**

1. Invest in more local support to women’s groups to promote affirmative action
2. Conduct various sensitization initiatives to engage religious and community leaders on the importance of female political participation.
3. Identify key female aspirants and provide training on how to conduct an effective campaign with both political parties and the general public
4. Conduct dialogues with different entities working on women to encourage support for the Women’s Trust Fund and to develop a locally based training programme around the country for female aspirants
5. Ensure sufficient dialogue between INEC and other women’s groups to ensure effective implementation and development of a gender strategy
6. Provide dialogue forums with different rights experts with political parties to encourage and promote affirmative action

**Component IV:**

1. Issue discretionary grants to small grass root CSOs as well as small groups to carry out voter education activities.
2. The project should develop mechanism to effectively monitor activities conducted by CSOs
3. The media should receive essential training on the code of conduct and be supported to conduct dialogues with political parties at local level
4. Media should be supported to increase their legal capacity and how to documents violations

# Introduction

## Political Background

Since the end of five years of military dictatorship of the Abacha Regime in 1998, Nigeria experienced a one-year interregnum under the Military Ruling Council (MRC) presided by Abdulsalam Abubakar, the handing-over of power to the elected government of Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, his re-election in 2003 and the election of a new President Umaru Yar’Adua in 2007, who died in 2010 and was succeeded by Goodluck Mbele Jonathan, the Vice-President. All the elected Presidents were members of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). This so called Fourth Republic was mainly based on the U.S. presidential model with a Federal Capital Territory (FCT) and a federal system of 36 states and 774 Local Government Areas (LGA).

The widespread irregularities in the first democratic elections in 1999 were for the bigger part overlooked by the international community since the new President Obasanjo was considered as a guarantor who was allegedly able to control the military and bring Nigeria back to the democratic orientated world. Unfortunately the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) released a statement stating that the elections were quite positive, however many other reports cited that the elections had been heavily rigged.

In 2003, however, this was not the case. All international[[1]](#footnote-1) (including the EU EOM) and national observer groups reported on the systematic rigging of the elections. This resulted in a number of unpleasant situations with the Independent National Election Commission (INEC) and other government officials, culminating in the threat to oust the EU EOM from the country.

According to the charter of the PDP, the presidential candidate of the party has to shift from a Southern (Christian) to a Northern (Muslim) nominee with a vice presidential running mate from the opposite regional (religious) area. While the 2007 elections were again seen as flawed due to a significant evidence of fraud - for some Nigerians the political change to a new President from the North illustrated that the agreement in the ruling PDP about a North-South change in the Presidency had worked. The late Yar’Adua initiated the so-called Uwais Report, which provided recommendations for improving the electoral process, although many of these have not yet been fully absorbed into the electoral law. In spite of desperate manoeuvres by President Obasanjo to obtain a third term, which would have meant a change to the Constitution - The Parliament and the Judiciary withstood, which subsequently gave way to a new political era.

Yar’Adua died in May 2010 and Vice President Goodluck Jonathan, who succeeded him, declared that he did not intend to run for the Presidency in 2011. This calmed the political atmosphere in the North since there was a general belief that the Presidency belonged to them, at least till 2015. To this end, Goodluck Jonathan’s announcement to run for the Presidency in 2011 was a surprise for Northern candidates in the PDP. Notwithstanding, when Jonathan won the primaries in January 2011, it was obvious that a large number of Northern delegates had actually voted for him.

The other main presidential competitors out of the 20 parties, which presented candidates, were: Muhammadu Buhari of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), Nuhu Ribadu of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) and the Governor of Kano State Ibrahim Shekarau of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP). The main contender to the incumbent President was generally considered to be Major General Muhammadu Buhari retired (rtd). He had experience as the Head of State (1983-85) after the 1983 coup ousting the second Republic, as Military Governor (1975-76 in Borno State), as Chairman of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) in 1978, as Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources (1976-78) and as a Chairman of the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) where he made a name for himself as not being “corrupt”. He lost the elections in 2003 to the incumbent President Olusegun Obasanjo and in 2007 against Umaru Yar’Adua hailing from the same home State of Katsina, but not from the same Emirate. In his preparation for the 2011 elections, he contested and lost in the primaries of ANPP and founded his own political party, the CPC. Muhammadu Buhari’s campaign in 2011 centred on anti-corruption and the removal of immunity protections for government officials.

Nuhu Ribadu, pioneer and former chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) between 2003 and 2007, returned to Nigeria in 2010, joined the ACN and was elected as their presidential candidate. Despite being a Northerner (Adamawa State), Ribadu obtained his main support from the South West where the party is traditionally based. A Northern candidate and the change in the party’s name with an addendum actually demonstrated that the party now had a wider, more national perspective as compared to being solely a Yoruba Party. In general, except the ruling PDP, all other political parties were tribally or regionally based, for instance ACN has its roots among the Yoruba people of the South West, while the party All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) is based in the Igbo areas of South East. The Governor of Kano State Ibrahim Shekarau was born in Kano State where he became Principal of a Government Secondary School. In 2001 he resigned from the civil service and went into private business. In 2003 he was elected Governor of Kano State and in 2007 he was re-elected. In 2011 Shekarau became one of the main contenders under ANPP in the North.

Political parties in general have programmes, which they call Manifestos, but they lack any ideology (exceptions may be the Labour Party (LP) and National Conscience Party (NCP) founded by the late ‘Human Rights Crusader and advocate Gani Fawehinmi) and unfortunately often serve as platforms for personal political ambitions and access to resources. As a result, there appears to be no loyalty of members towards any one particular party. Members do not necessarily vote for the party candidates and they defect from their party when they or their candidate loose the primaries in order to join another party or found a new one. This lack of substance in political parties results in votes to persons rather than to parties and swings of the electorate from one party to another in the different set elections.

The electoral code stipulates that in the first round of a presidential election the winner must not only win the majority of votes but must as well win 25 per cent of the votes in two thirds of the 36 states. This is aimed at guarantying a solid backing in the country. In a run-off (14 days later) the winner must obtain the majority of the votes regardless of other conditions. The relatively large number of political parties has a more state or local level relevance.

There is a strong tendency for Nigerians to vote along ethnic or religious lines. Other criteria may also play a role. Traditional criteria could be family ties, similar age group, same profession such as a carver or blacksmith, member of the “same secret society”: while modern criteria could refer to attendance at the same school or university or belonging to a trade or farmers union or market association. Traditional groups are organized in a vertical way while modern criteria are arranged in a horizontal way. These societies may overrule ethnic or religious criteria and play an important role in the election exercise. This may also explain the vote swinging in the different elections. The solidarity of a voter is not so much for the political party but rather to which group the political candidate is linked.

Traditional title-holders, such as the Sultan of Sokoto, primarily play a role in socio-cultural and religious life, but are supposed to form a politically neutral body. Usually, they are not involved in the political arena, but every political aspirant endeavours to get their blessing in the area he/she is campaigning for. Usually, they demonstrate via their behavioural allegiance towards a particular aspirant or party. Their position has not been finally fixed in the Constitution.

Although the presidential elections in 2011 were relatively calm with little violence, when the national results were announced, violence erupted in the North. While most of the observer missions reported much less violence compared to 2003 and 2007, Human Rights Watch (HRW)[[2]](#footnote-2) spoke of the “bloodiest” elections in Nigerian history. Most of their examples were taken from the North, the Middle Belt and Akwa Ibom. The official figures in the Eastern States and in most of the South–South States were questionable, nevertheless many reports including that of the EU EOM did not report on these inconsistencies.

The main opposition party CPC and its presidential candidate Buhari expressed their doubts about the results in 18 States and the FCT and went to Court. But more alarming perhaps is the political outcome: All the twelve Sharia States of the North voted for Buhari, the Eastern and South-South States for Jonathan. Most of the Middle Belt and South Western States predominantly voted for Jonathan but the results were more mixed in nature. In many of these States the results were again questionable. The Nigerian government set up an Appeal Court to deal with complaints and a commission to investigate the post-election violence (Lemu Report) which has not yet been made public. Unfortunately, since 1999 about 15 to 20.000 people have been killed in election related violence – yet no one has been held responsible though many perpetrators are thought to be known. Other areas of concern are “no go areas” for the opposition parties, the longwinded court procedures (Justice delayed means Justice denied!‘); the weak control over campaign finances by INEC; the overwhelming appearance of the ruling Party on the TV; the position of the Regional Electoral Commissioners (REC), which are appointed by the President; the undermining and use of traditional authorities; the lack of voter education and a missing level playing field amongst the political parties. The agreement in PDP to shift the presidential candidate from North to South or vice versa leads *a priori* or at least has a strong risk of dividing the country along religious and regional lines.

Despite these lacunas, the appointment of Prof. Attahiru Jega, former vice chancellor of Bayero University of Kano, as the new chairman of INEC in July 2010 did provide INEC with increased confidence and trust both among Nigerians and the international community, especially amongst the donor family. The elections were held to be the “fairest yet” and subsequent to the elections an Election Review Committee was set up to compliment the Uwais report and map out the future for democratic elections in 2015 and beyond. There is a general expectation that the forthcoming elections in 2015 may surpass the expectations of the 2011, and be heralded to be in line with international standards. Nevertheless, the international partners have shown more interest in technical aspects of the election while the political side has been side-lined. The results of the last election illustrate a clear North-South division. Many Nigerians see this as a threat to National Unity. Prof. Jega has pointed out several times that **elections should be seen from a broader perspective and it would seem that to date the donor community is slow to react.**

The divided political lines are not the only concern. Nigeria is experiencing internal strife amongst different factions and if these conflicts are not addressed they have the potential to threaten the impending success of the upcoming general elections. It appears that in some States (Bornu, Adamawa, Yobe, and the riveraine areas in the Niger – Delta) elections will not be able to take place. A number of other areas can be added such as the Southern part of Kaduna State, the area between Wukari and Takum in Taraba State, Local Governments (LGs) Jos North and Wase in Plateau State. The underlying causes of these conflicts have been largely ignored by the political class in power which is more engaged in their “own survival” than a peaceful future for the country. The Lemu Report, - paints an ugly picture of the withering of the political class in the country.

The lack of security and ensuing violence is not only election related; violent acts against civilians are becoming increasingly prevalent. According to Amnesty International, since the beginning of 2014, more than 1,500 people have been killed amid fighting between the Nigerian security forces and Islamist armed groups, which are based mainly in the north-east of the country. These incidents are progressively spreading to other areas, and Abuja has recently seen two deadly bomb attacks, which were allegedly committed by Islamic militants. 2011 also witnessed a devastating suicide bomb attack against the United Nations which resulted in 18 people being killed. Nigeria has also been firmly in the international news, with the outrage by both international and national media and human rights groups at the abduction and the apparent sale of over 276 school girls. The dreaded insurgent group Boko Haram, which claimed responsibility for the deadly explosion, is also suspected in the abductions.[[3]](#footnote-3) The public is discontented with the reaction by the government, is aware that the Government cannot provide security or – as many suspect – does not bother. Should no solution be found and the violence continues, this will inevitably impact on the electoral process.

In parallel to this insecurity, President Goodluck Jonathan announced in October 2013, that his administration had decided to explore the option of a national conversation so that the “voices of Nigerians could be heard.” Consequently, he set-up a 13-member Presidential Advisory Committee on National Dialogue with Senator Femi Okoruonmu as Chairman. The Committee embarked on a nationwide tour and met with various stakeholders at the end of which the recommendation for a National Conference was made. The Federal Government accepted this recommendation and the modalities for its convocation were released at the beginning of 2014. The Conference was inaugurated on 17 March by President Jonathan and calls to discuss the socio-economic and political challenges of the nation. The Conference which took place at the National Judicial Institute in Abuja is made up of 492 members and is composed of 20 committees headed by prominent persons (see annex IV). The conference has the following objectives:

***“Our sole motivation for convening this Conference is the patriotic desire for a better and greater nation; we are determined that things must be done in a way and manner that will positively advance that objective.”*** - **Jonathan**

**Objectives**

1. To examine long standing impediments to the nation’s harmonious development
2. To resolve impediments to our cohesion as a truly united nation
3. To enhance national cohesion
4. To promote national unity and integration
5. To discuss and resolve the character and nature of our economic system that will impact positively on the lives of the citizens
6. To remove all obstacles which have prevented the country from establishing an all agreeable political system
7. To deliberate on all grievances presented by citizens
8. To promote the indivisibility and indissolubility of the nation
9. To contribute towards the emergence of a people-oriented constitution; and
10. To examine the political and socio-economic challenges confronting the nation in order to resolve them in the best and most acceptable way to all the constituents of the Federation.

Many Nigerians place much hope in the conclusions emanating from the on-going National Conference (CONFAB) where delegates from all over the country represent different sectors of society. There is a common awareness in the country to address issues in public and find solutions for a better future. If this may find its expression in the 2015 elections is questionable since the political class has not changed. On the other hand, CONFAB just agreed to waive impunity for parliamentarians, which would enable EFCC (Economic and Financial Crimes Commission) to launch cases for example against a number of former governors who are now members of the Senate. **Decisions emanating from CONFAB may take some time to come into effect and may not have any impact during the lifetime of the project.** Nevertheless, whatever decisions CONFAB might agree on in the short and medium term the Project has to study them carefully and – if project related – must take them into consideration. Furthermore, given the fact that the National Conference is still on-going, essential electoral reform may be relegated to the back-burner and the foreseen amendments to the Constitution may not take place or happen too late in the process to have the desired outcome.

## Project Outline and Management

### Project Outline

Phase I of the Democratic Governance for Development (DGD) project which sought to improve the conduct of the 2011 General Elections ran from 2009 and ended in May 2011, with a Transition Period from June 2011 to May 2012. At the close of the project a lessons learned exercise and a Project Strategic Review was conducted and a second phase of the Project was developed (DGD II). In order to streamline the project and to ensure that there was no overlap with other international partners projects, the original six components were reformulated into four.

In December 2008, Justice Uwais who headed the National Electoral Reform Committee (NERC) submitted its report on electoral reform to the incumbent president. In response to the report, the government issued a white paper in March 2009 stating that it would implement some of the reforms ahead of the 2011 general elections. The 2011 General Elections were heralded to be the most credible in the history of Nigerian Elections since the establishment of independent rule in 1999, however challenges still remained. The EU EOM concluded that there was “*an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic elections in accordance with international principles ratified by the Federal Republic of Nigeria*,” however it noted that “*serious shortcomings still existed which affect the quality and credibility of the electoral process.”*

The new INEC leadership confirmed that more institutional reform and capacity building were required and DGD seeks to address some of these lacunas. Furthermore, the need for further constitutional and electoral reform provided an additional leitmotif for new programmatic opportunities and represents the backbone of DGD II.

On Wednesday 27 June 2012, the European Union signed a new Financing Agreement for Euro 20 million at the National Planning Commission. The project commenced its activities in July 2012 and will run until December 2015. The European Union provides nearly 50% of the funds. UNDP was identified as the project-implementing agent and also contributes financially to over 24% of the project.

**Figure 1: Percentage of contributions to DGD II per international partner**

To facilitate the funding of the project, four Development Partners namely, European Union (EU), UK Department for International Development (DFID), Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFTAD) (formerly known as CIDA) and Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) established a joint basket fund totalling approximately USD$53 million. To date, approximately 54% of the commitments have been received.

**The project has four overarching outputs:**

1. **Promoting Credible, Transparent and Sustainable Electoral Processes;**
2. **Improving the Democratic Quality of Political Engagement;**
3. **Enhancing Participation by Women, Youth and other Marginalized Groups and;**
4. **Strengthening Channels for Civic Engagement**

### Programme Design and Management

**Program Design**

To achieve the aforementioned outputs, the project subsequent to a comprehensive consultation of the different stakeholders was designed to provide technical and financial assistance to build the overall capacity of a variety of institutions and key stakeholders in the process (INEC, Political Parties, Civil Society, Media, the National Assembly and Women’s Groups and organizations working with youth and Persons with Disabilities).

1. **Promoting Credible, Transparent and Sustainable Electoral Processes;**

* Output 1.1 Strategic Planning, policy and operational capacities of INEC strengthened
* Output 1.2. INEC capacity to use ICT enhanced
* Output 1.3 Legal and Policy Framework for election Improved
* Output 1.4 Professional Capacity of INEC Staff and SIECs enhanced.

1. **Improving the Democratic Quality of Political Engagement;**

* Output 2.1 Capacity of Political Parties Strengthened
* Output 2.2 Improved Effectiveness of targeted NASS Committees and Processes

1. **Enhancing Participation by Women, Youth and other Marginalized Groups**

* Output 3.1 Legal Reforms and women’s empowerment initiatives to promote affirmative action and Women’s Empowerment in Politics
* Output 3.2 CSOs capacity to advocate for affirmative Action Enhanced.

**4**. **Strengthening Channels for Civic Engagement**

* Output 4.1 Civil Society Organizations’ Capacity Developed
* Output 4.2 Strengthening the capacity and voice of the media

**Program Management Strategy**

The coordination mechanisms for the 2015 elections were well designed, and mirrored similar UNDP projects in other countries implementing key electoral projects. A Steering Committee (SC) was set up which meets three times a year and a Technical Committee (TC) was also established which tends to meet on a monthly basis. Both committees (SC and TC) are inclusive of the key stakeholders.

The UNDP-housed Project Team is headed by a Project Director and supported by a team of approximately 20 persons. A stand-alone office was set up in the centre of Abuja. Additionally, a number of external consultants are utilised by the project as the need arises.

### Context

The project is now entering its second phase and ten months remain prior to the General Elections, which are currently scheduled for February 2015. An annual review of the project was finalised in June 2013 and a road map outlining the activities for 2014-2015 has been approved and a new work plan for the upcoming period has been finalised. Said documents were conceptualised with the full support and input of the key stakeholders including intensive consultations with DFID and USAID to avoid any overlap.

With such a short time to go before the holding of elections, an assessment of the project’s performance is being sought. This report will provide the EU and other partners with an assessment of the projects performance in terms of Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness and Sustainability of the support provided to INEC and other Key Stakeholders and its impact on the electoral process so far.

The Evaluation team comprised of two key experts who have ensured a comprehensive review according to best practices in evaluation using their international experience both as observers and knowledge of project management of electoral projects as well as expertise in Nigeria to determine if the Project is currently fulfilling its overall objectives and provides suggestions and recommendations to enable the project to realize its full potential.

# Evaluation

## Purpose of the Evaluation

The overall purpose of the evaluation is to undertake a critical assessment of the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency, as well as the sustainability and impact so far achieved in the implementation of the project. The report will endeavour to provide an in-depth analysis of the problems and recommendations to improve the implementation of the project. Each problem identified will have a corresponding recommendation.

## Scope of the Evaluation

Due to the short timeframe to conduct the evaluation, the evaluation is limited in its scope and will only touch upon the key issues, which can affect the project implementation, and its future success. It will nevertheless endeavour to guide the project in possible steps forward and where gaps and lacunas exist. It will also highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the project.

# Approach and Methodology

## Evaluation Approach

The evaluation adopted a mixed quantitative and qualitative approach. Subsequent to conducting an extensive desk review, the team developed a key set of questions, which were answered during the evaluation of the project.

Upon receipt of the key documents, the consultants undertook a comprehensive desk review of all available documents provided by the European Union Delegation. Nevertheless, some documents were not available and were provided by the Project Management Unit upon arrival and during the course of the evaluators stay. Based on the information gathered during the desk review, the consultants prepared specific interview questions for all the relevant stakeholders. Given the short timeframe of the mission, and the difficulty to travel to the States, the consultants also designed one questionnaire that was distributed to SIECS. The response was very positive, and the team received nearly half of the questionnaires back. The team was also able to receive 11 of the SIECS[[4]](#footnote-4) in the offices of the Project Management Unit (PMU) whereby they provided information on the project in person.

A second questionnaire was to be designed for the beneficiaries of components 2 – 4; however, the team felt that there was not enough time and thanks to the project, were able to hold focus group meetings with a wide range of stakeholders and beneficiaries. Some of those interviewed also kindly forwarded the team further information on their experience with the DGD project.

The interviews with the participants/beneficiaries followed a standard format, whereby the same types of questions were asked to all interlocutors. The quality of the information gathered was consistent with the results envisioned for each of the different beneficiaries as outlined in the project document. The interviews consisted of open-ended questions in order to allow for a more thorough analysis and to allow the participants to describe a full range of issues. Furthermore, where new key issues emerged, the questions were adapted where necessary. All interviews were held in English and a cross- selection of both direct and indirect beneficiaries of the project was ensured.

The consultants successfully held five focus group sessions, which included meetings with groups working on Women, persons living with disabilities (PWDs) youth, media, and general Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), as well as the aforementioned State Independent Election Commissions (SIECs). A meeting was also held with the Inter-Party Advisory Council (IPAC) where 6 different political parties were represented. The team was also able to meet with practically all the departments within INEC and had a brief introductory meeting with the Chairman and four of the Commissioners. The team was also able to have an intensive meeting with the Chief Technical Advisor within INEC. Unfortunately due to time constraints and the lack of availability, the team were only able to meet one representative from the National Assembly, which limited their assessment in this area. The focus groups allowed different interlocutors to exchange ideas and for the consultants to gauge a better understanding of the beneficiaries’ acquired knowledge, the coordination between different entities involved in the Project and the ability to access the cross cutting themes across the whole of the project.

The DGD Programme Management Unit and the component heads were also interviewed to get an overview of the Project and its success thus far and correspondence was maintained with the Project Manager and Component Heads upon departure of the evaluators.

Given the importance of coordination between key stakeholders involved in providing technical assistance and the importance of the project not duplicating efforts made by other entities, donors such as USAID, DFTAD, DFID and other electoral related groups such as International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI) were also consulted to ensure that there is sufficient coordination between the project and themselves and to ensure that there is no overlap between projects which are carried out by the respective organisations.

Taking into consideration the complexities of the country and the impact that possible security and political events can have on the project, a full depth analysis of the current situation and its risks have been included as well as an overview of the internal monitoring and evaluation (M & E) system in order to examine to what extent the M & E and its logical framework adapts to new and emerging needs and identifies any gaps should they exist.

Subsequent to the field visit to Nigeria, the consultants analysed all the information collected, and ensured that a cross section of beneficiaries’ opinions are reflected throughout the report. The report is a critical assessment of the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency as well as its sustainability and impact, which has been reached so far. A thorough analysis of the problems and recommendations (including analysing the problems and recommendations highlighted by key stakeholders and the EU EOM and others in the last elections), have also be taken into consideration. Each problem will be identified and will have a corresponding recommendation.

This Report endeavours to be as forward thinking as possible, and where implementation has been weak or found not to be relevant, solutions have been put forward and lessons drawn from other similar projects.

## Specific Objectives

The overall evaluation addresses the five main OECD-DAC criteria for EU evaluations: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and its impact on the electoral process.

The specific objective of the evaluation is to ascertain the following:

* Relevance of the Programme
* Programme Design and Input
* Validity of Assumptions
* Efficiency of the programme implementation
* Means and Costs
* Impact and
* Alternatives and Recommendations

## Limitations and Research Problems Encountered

The Evaluation Team encountered some problems in carrying out this assessment; the main difficulty being the limited time they had to carry out their tasks. The Team was in country for less than two weeks and during this time was able to see over 80 persons. Nevertheless, due to the wealth of information that was offered by the interlocutors, the team would have benefitted from a second meeting with some of the organisations. Furthermore, some of the documentation was only received in the last few days of the team’s visit and even some documents were received a week after they had left the country. The team still considers that they did not have access to all the available and relevant data, this was especially true for the monthly activity reports, they only received copies of the 2012 documentation one week after leaving the country and **did not gain access to the 2013 or 2014 monthly reports**. A copy of the Work Plan for 2014/2015 and Road Map for the last phase of the project were provided. The receipt of documents such as monthly reports is important in order for the team to ascertain how they reflect the results management based approach and whether reporting requirements were being adhered to and whether this amounted to an efficient system of monitoring and evaluation and mitigating any risks that may arise during the execution of the project. Furthermore, it was difficult to gauge the progress of some of the key activities due to a lack of documentation, and therefore had to rely on the project for their overall assessment on certain activities.

In addition, the team may have benefitted from visiting a few states where elections had recently happened, in order to gauge what type of impact the different activities had on the state level. The importance of outreach to the grassroots was a recurring issue and has indeed been identified by the project as important. To this end, the evaluation would have also benefited from a visit to some nearby states in order to ascertain to what extent grass root outreach is being attained, and whether the CSOs working on the given issues are able to tap into the resources of these groups in order to have the desired impact.

The team was offered the opportunity to be able to travel to meet the SIECs in Kaduna, but due to their busy schedule considered that it would not be appropriate to take over 1.5 days out of their work time. Finally due to the wealth of information the team did receive, especially during the interviews, the team would have ideally liked to have one extra week to carry out second interviews and to better absorb and analyse the information that has been fed into the final report.

## Structure of the Report

The report is organized according to the terms of reference. The evaluation commences with an **executive summary** outlining the main findings of the project including key recommendations. It is then subsequently followed by the **introduction**,which frames the **political background** and the **electoral landscape** of the years since Independence. The **project is then outlined** and a brief analysis of **programme design and management** is offered. The **context of the evaluation** then follows with a third chapter describing the **purpose of the evaluation, and its scope**.

The fourth chapter summarises the **approach and methodology of the evaluation**, outlines its **specific objections** and discusses the **limitations and research problems encountered** during the evaluation.

The Fifth Chapter presents the **key findings of the report**, which includes the examination of the **relevance** of the project. It discusses the importance of the *consultations with key stakeholders and International Partners, UNDP’s experience in providing electoral assistance to Election Management Bodies (EMBs), the mobilisation of donor coordination and resources under the basket fund* and finalises with the connect between the project and the *key recommendations emanating from the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) 2011*.

The sixth Chapter considers the **programme design and implementation** including its use of the *Electoral Cycle Approach (ECA),* and its *interconnectedness* across all four components. It then analyses the results based management approach towards its design of each component. Chapter seven reviews the **validity of assumptions** and identifies some of the key risks, which could potentially affect the success of the project.

Chapter eight considers the **efficiency and effectiveness of programme implementation**, *examining the* *management policy, internal control, risk management*, *timeframe*, and monitoring *and evaluation.* It further examines *indicators of efficiency* in general and by *individual component* as well as analysing *donor input and technical assistance.*

Chapter nine briefly looks at **means and costs** and examines the expenditure thus far.

Chapter ten considers the **impact** of the project, including its *overall impact, impact on the project on the wider democratic objectives, project design, impact of timelines, cross cutting issues, gender, capacity building and national ownership*. It subsequently analyses the impact on individual activities within the four components.

Chapter eleven, looks at the **sustainability** of the project, examining it in the context of *policy support measures, choice of technology, socio/cultural matters, institutional approach, and external factors.*

Chapter twelve provides the evaluations’ **conclusions** and chapter thirteen **the** **recommendations** for the future implementation of the project as well as the electoral process in general.

## Acknowledgements

The Evaluation Team would like to extend its appreciation to the European Union Delegation who was very responsive at answering any queries and questions the team had and to provide useful insights into the project. They would also like to thank Laolu Olawumi and Alan Monday for setting up the first meetings and always being on hand to provide directions to the numerous meetings scheduled. The evaluators would also like to thank the National Planning Commission for their comments and inputs to the report as well as the invaluable contribution they paid to ensuring that questionnaires were sent out to the SIECs and responded on time. The team would also like to thank UNDP Country Office, especially Bernardo Coco and Rose Plang for their time and providing useful comments to the report as well as ensuring that the questions on finances and procurement were answered. Much appreciation is also extended to all members of the DGD project who were particularly helpful in providing the information that was required. The evaluators would especially like to extend their warm appreciation to the component leaders who helped set up various focus groups, sometimes at very short notice, and would like to thank all those who promptly answered the teams requests, sometimes even very late at night.

The Evaluation Team would also like to thank INEC, especially the Chairman and his staff for being so open, and for providing all the information the team required, including documentation of interest. Furthermore, the team very much appreciated the establishment of the INEC focus group meeting with 20 participants at such short notice. The evaluators would also like to acknowledge the important input of all the focus groups, which came to the offices of DGD, sometimes at very short notice, and provided valuable insights and information both on the project and the election process itself. These included Civil Society Organisations, Groups working on Women, Disability and Youth and the Media. The team would also like to extend its appreciation to IPAC for their hospitality and for their comments and input to the report. The team would like to thank the 11 SIECs who despite their busy schedule were able to meet with the team in Abuja and many of these SIECS and others who took the time to reply to the questionnaire. Finally the evaluators would like to thank all the international partners including DFID and DFTAD for their time and the constant flow of information, and USAID, IFES, NDI and IRI for sparing the time to see the team and providing feedback on the DGD project and the subsequent requests for information. The team acknowledges wholeheartedly the wealth of information provided by all of the interlocutors and considers that their diverse and unbiased opinions have contributed to the quality and richness of the report.

# Main Findings

## Key Findings

### Relevance of the Programme

DGD I, which preceded DGD II, aimed to provide six key outputs: 1) Strengthening of the National Assembly; 2) Strengthening of Political Parties; 3) Improvement of the Electoral Process; 4) Increased Capacity and Performance of Civil Society; 5) Reinforcing the Role of the Media and 6) Empowerment of Women.This project ended in May 2011[[5]](#footnote-5) and its overall objective was to improve the conduct of the 2011 general elections. The General Elections were held in 2011 and the majority of the Observation missions including the EU EOM lauded the 2011 elections to “mark an important step towards strengthening democratic elections in Nigeria, but challenges remain”. The 2011 General Elections were broadly recognised as being the most credible in the History of Nigeria’s independence since 1999, despite being the “*bloodiest*”.[[6]](#footnote-6) It was noted however “*that shortcomings still existed which affect the quality and credibility of the elections*”.[[7]](#footnote-7)

In 2008, the Uwais reportconcluded that urgent reforms were needed in order to change the negative face of elections in Nigeria and on that premise some of the recommendations were adopted prior to the holding of elections in 2011. Nevertheless, many of the recommendations have yet to be taken on board, and after the relative success of the 2011 General Elections, **it was recognised that only “ a combination of electoral, constitutional and economic reforms were needed in order to make the 2015 polls truly free and fair and to ensure they are not tainted by blood”[[8]](#footnote-8).**

Upon closure of the DGD I, a strategic review was conducted in order to assess the project according to key OECD criteria. The review came up with a number of recommendations including to keep all of the aforementioned components (six). The project was redesigned acknowledging the recommendations given and the project was reformulated into four thematic areas. The merging of certain areas emanated from the need to streamline the project to ensure a more focussed approach and targeting key specific results whereby activities and results would not overlap with the efforts of other projects providing technical assistance to tackle the same issues. For example, DFID provides support to the National Assembly and therefore a more focussed approach was adopted whereby capacity would only be afforded to the standing committees that have strong linkages with the electoral reform process, political party development and support to Women Parliamentarians especially through the Gender Technical Unit (GTU).

Adhering to the current trend of supporting activities outside the conduct of elections, the project also adopted the concept of not only supporting the electoral institutions but also geared the project to help strengthen other democratic institutions whose role is just as fundamental to building and sustaining democracy. These included support to the media, civil society organizations, domestic observation, political parties and in recognition of the constitutional and electoral reform that was due to take place, affording support to strategic committees within the National Assembly. The project also included a component dedicated to strengthening the participation of Women, Youth and other marginalised groups, which is especially pertinent in Nigeria. DGD II aims to promote interconnectedness between the four thematic themes with gender and the reforms cross cutting over all four components. All four components are essential in the promotion of enhancing more credible elections in Nigeria and have the potential to create a more level playing field between the different actors, especially amongst marginalised groups.

The cross cutting theme of gender across all four components aims to tackle the prominent existing gender disparities in the political process. The National Gender Policy[[9]](#footnote-9) which was adopted in 2006 seeks to promote a 35 per cent affirmative action for women in all governance processes nevertheless the number of women elected in 2011 fell from nine to six per cent in the Senate and six to five per cent in the House of Representatives. To this end, the project endeavours to address this issue with the aim to promote enhanced female participation for the 2015 elections, and therefore seeks to include that gender is mainstreamed across all four components. Other cross cutting themes includes electoral and constitutional reform; institutional support and election related violence, however these are implemented to varying degrees.[[10]](#footnote-10)

#### Consultations with Key Stakeholders and International Partners

As was previously stated, a strategic review was undertaken in 2012, which came up with a series of fundamental recommendations. Furthermore, there were various reports emanating from the 2011 process which included the Election Review Committees’ report which highlighted the key problems encountered in the 2011 elections. The EU EOM also distributed a report with 50 recommendations. Prior to the writing of the Pro Doc for DGD II, the international partners were consulted. Various international partners have key programmes focussing on the overall electoral process and the deepening of democracy in Nigeria, it was therefore essential to design the project taking into account efforts already being conducted outside of the project. In-depth discussions with INEC and the recommendation that SIECs should be further strengthened as well as lessons learned emanating from DGD I were incorporated into the project document in relation to the type of assistance to be afforded to the Election Management Body (EMB). Furthermore, as is customary when shaping a project of this dimension, and to ensure inclusivity and interconnectedness throughout the project, key stakeholders were consulted. These included the relevant ministries, National Assembly, political parties, civil society, the media, women’s groups and other organisations from marginalized groups. The same process was also followed when drafting the road map for 2014/2015 and the accompanying work plan.

#### UNDP´s Experience in providing Electoral Assistance to EMBs

UNDP has a plethora of worldwide experience in affording electoral technical assistance to Election Management Bodies and electoral processes around the world. “UNDP’s former approach to electoral assistance which tended to place greater emphasis on the conduct of elections and less on long-term capacity-development”[[11]](#footnote-11) has now been replaced by a more inclusive approach. The Electoral Cycle Approach (ECA) is found to be far more effective than support to ‘one off electoral events”, as it allows overall capacity to be built and enhances participation and understanding of the electoral process. The importance to undertake an electoral cycle approach cannot be underestimated. The consolidation of democracy is not just about a one off electoral event but is rather the continual strengthening of electoral governance as a whole and therefore the establishment of mechanisms for engendering a democratic political culture is essential.[[12]](#footnote-12) This further ties in with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF )[[13]](#footnote-13) Outcomes 2 and Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP), which aim to build capacity for governance programmes including accountability and oversight in resource management and more specifically on Electoral Reform and Deepening Democracy.

In recent years, many of the UNDP Electoral Projects such as in Tanzania, Libya, and Afghanistan have largely provided operational and logistical support to elections, and on some occasions have added “complimentary” components to address other areas of the electoral process outside of the provision of the “nuts and bolts”[[14]](#footnote-14) of an election. Nevertheless, DGD II fully takes into consideration the key lacunas in the democratic process and endeavours to link all of these areas by interconnecting them across all four components and does not merely view these issues as complimentary activities but rather **the catalyst to promote inclusive and democratic elections. As a result, the beneficiary organisations yield from an overarching approach, which goes further than providing piecemeal support and is enabling key actors to come together around the table in order to provide the impetus for change.**

#### Mobilisation of Donor Coordination and Resources under the Basket Fund

Support to Elections is usually an expensive undertaking and many transitional democracies require assistance in this regard. Nigeria is unfortunately no exception. INEC estimates that the 2015 elections will cost approximately 120 billion Naira.[[15]](#footnote-15) However, unfortunately the state budget has only awarded 45 billion naira,[[16]](#footnote-16) which can only contribute to the bare essentials of an election in Nigeria. To this end, **support from DGD II is indispensable**. Its support will ensure that the EMB is able to go beyond merely executing the elections but will strive towards building an inclusive and participatory environment, which is conducive to enabling a more credible and transparent electoral process.

Outside of the support that DGD provides to INEC, various other international partners including IFES also support the EMB. In April 2014, IFES was awarded a USD$ 22 million grant for support for electoral reforms over a 5-year period. The three objectives of this particular award are the following**: 1) Improved, effective, professional and credible elections conducted by EMBs; 2) Improved professionalism and knowledgeable EMB staff administering credible elections and 3) Improved INEC-implemented voter education campaign.[[17]](#footnote-17)**

Despite two important agencies providing services to the same EMB, the work both agencies do is complimentary to each other. **IFES** responds to **specific and more technical and immediate needs** of INEC whereby **DGD supports in the conceptualization of ideas and builds fundamental capacity** to ensure INECs preparedness’ to undertake the electoral process.

To this end, UNDP can easily assume “a central role through its strategic position as a convenor of donor countries for external electoral assistance” and effectively mobilise and coordinate donor resources and share information on the electoral process. For beneficiaries such as INEC, this is particularly advantageous given that funds are funnelled through one project and facilitates coordination and allows INEC to express their needs to only one interlocutor.

#### Recommendations emanating from the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM)

The EU EOM final report submitted a series of recommendations pursuant to the 2011 Electoral process in Nigeria. It is unclear as to whether the project consciously ensured that many of the activities would respond to the 50 recommendations submitted; nevertheless many of them have indeed been taken on board, and included in activities or advocacy around electoral reform. Annex 3 demonstrates to what extent the recommendations have been implemented so far and what role, if any, DGD has played to addressing these concerns.

# Programme Design and Implementation

As was stated above, DGD II, which was born out of DGD I, made some fundamental changes to its design in order to address the recommendations from the strategic review that was completed by February 2012. Furthermore, a needs assessment and mapping of electoral assistance was also carried out in order to ensure an adequate design of the new project emanating from the needs of the various beneficiaries to the project. The project has three overarching goals; 1) To support broad-based institutional and legal reforms, and 2) To conduct enhancement through training and professional development for the key institutions and processes during the pre-voting phase (Jun 2012 – Dec 2013) and 3) during the voting period itself (Jan 2014 – Dec 2015). The project undertakes targeted activities to contribute directly to credible, transparent and peaceful elections in 2015. A roadmap for the second phase (voting period) and an accompanying work plan was also devised and approved at the beginning of 2014. This was subsequent to wide consultation with all the major stakeholders and followed up by a Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) conducted by the United Nations Electoral Affairs Division (EAD) from New York, which confirmed that DGD has adopted an appropriate approach to support elections in Nigeria.

In Nigeria, the electoral process receives technical assistance funded by three main donor entities.[[18]](#footnote-18) All three entities have established projects to strengthen the electoral process and to deepen democracy and all three donors have rightly identified the key aspects that need attention. The key areas identified in order to improve the process include furthering the capacity of INEC, and SIECs; mitigating election violence; participation of marginalised groups, including women, people living with disabilities and youth; building the capacity of civil society and media to carry out effective civic and voter identification; the weakness of political parties; poor legal framework; and the ability to deal with all electoral complaints effectively and efficiently, amongst others. **Given the fragility and weaknesses of the key institutions involved in the electoral process, one project alone is unable to tackle all of the issues successfully and individual strengths and technical and financial abilities from each contributing partner have been taken into consideration.**

To this end, although EU, UNDP, DFID and USAID have together identified more or less the same key components of the electoral process, which need strengthening. Each entity has endeavoured to take on activities where their individual strengths lie. In the design of DGD II, it consulted widely with these particular groups and as a result, the former component (under DGD I) which was dedicated entirely to strengthening the National Assembly (NASS) was streamlined whereby only standing committees involved in the electoral and constitutional reform process were targeted. This was to ensure synergies with efforts by DFID, which also provides capacity building to the NASS via CLEEN and PLAC. This avoided duplication of tasks and also ensured a more focussed approach and enabled issues such as electoral and constitutional reform to be mainstreamed across all four components.

## Electoral Cycle Approach

As aforementioned, the adept use of an electoral cycle approach ensures that key institutions and stakeholders are strengthened long before the elections take place and enables them enough time to plan strategically and adopt innovative approaches for improving the electoral process as a whole, and even more importantly provides the ability to assess the situation to ensure maximum effectiveness. UNDP is well placed to carry out such projects and in recent years has tended to adopt the electoral cycle approach[[19]](#footnote-19) in order to enable a more sustained impact on the electoral process itself.

In the majority of elections, civil society for example plays a key role in mobilising and advocating for effective political participation especially amongst the more marginalised groups. The involvement and building the capacity of civil society organisations, especially at the grass roots, is recognised as an essential tool in promoting democracy and transparent and credible elections. In many other similar electoral projects, civil society organizations are normally supported in the last few months prior to elections, which lead to a minimum impact on the elections. **The following of the electoral cycle approach allows them ample time to improve their capacity and gives them the ability to strategize especially with regards to encouraging mobilisation of voters and the dissemination of information on the elections.**

Another important aspect of the strengthening and consolidating of democracy in Nigeria is the strengthening of the legal framework for elections, as highlighted in the Uwais report, and other assessments subsequent to the 2011 elections. Although some of the recommendations pertaining to the electoral law from the Uwais report were taken on board prior to 2011, the disgruntlement surrounding the small number of reforms actually implemented prior to the elections, has acted as the leitmotif to further advocate for reforms prior to the next electoral cycle in 2015. It was stated that many of the reforms submitted by the report were not adopted simply due to lack of time, therefore **DGD II has tried to galvanise support amongst the key stakeholders and bring them together to promote and advocate for electoral reform prior to the next elections.**

## Interconnectedness

Electoral projects normally have separate components, which do not interlink, however DGD’s four components promote interconnectedness across the whole project. The design of the project is such that all four components are interlinked and activities can overlap positively and create strong synergies with key actors being specifically targeted under each individual component. This is especially relevant to electoral reform and also gender which in theory is a recurring theme across the whole of the project. The Project Document also talks about legal, institutional and operational reform; elections – related violence; as well as inclusive participation and empowerment of women, youth and PWDs. These themes cross cut across the project to varying degrees.

In 2013, a comprehensive annual report was presented which examined the project thus far. As was stated above the ProDoc was drafted after wide consultation. Given the fact that the project has two phases, ie the pre-voting phase 2012-2103 and the current phase (voting phase), which commenced in 2014, a roadmap outlining the key activities for this new period was designed. A comprehensive work plan accompanied this “road map”. The four components remained the same as did the intended outputs, however the indicative activities with the output targets have changed according to the activity which are now geared towards the elections and their success rather than the preparatory phase.

In both the ProDoc and the DGD II work plan each component has an intended output and output targets, although the intended outputs in the 2014/2015 work plan were reflected as the output targets in the original ProDoc. Despite this confusion it would be safe to assume that the baselines and indicators remain the same, as new ones were not provided in the new work plan. The 2014/2015 work plan clearly indicates the targets of each intended output according to the indicative activities.

Under usual RMB frameworks Indicators are normally quantitative or qualitative variables that permit the stakeholders to gauge changes that result from the activities planned. A number, percentage or ratio represents qualitative indicators. On the other hand, qualitative indicators strive to measure quality, and are more often than not, founded on perception, opinion or the level of satisfaction expressed by the beneficiaries.

The baseline is the status of the indicator at the beginning of the programme. The use of such tools is in line with standard results-based management (RBM)[[20]](#footnote-20) and their use facilities the project to illustrate where progress has been achieved and can also signal when things are not going according to the work plan. It is important to continually monitor the fulfilment or potential attainment of indicators in order to ensure the project is progressing towards its goals. As the word implies, indicators only indicate they cannot explain why a change in for example behaviour has changed or not. To this end, in order to carry out an evaluation, it is imperative to not only look at the indicators but the process itself and undue influences and the context that the project is working in. If a project is unable to attain all or some of the indicators originally provided, it does not mean that the project was not successful, but could however imply that the wrong indicators were used or were simply too ambitious or vague at the design stage of the project. To this end, this section, will, discuss whether the output targets and indicators are specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and trackable (SMART) as highlighted in the ProDoc and the Work Plan for 2014/2015.

Given the fact that the project has used varying terminology for the two phases, the evaluation will endeavour to determine whether the overall indicators are SMART, the evaluation will take the indicators illustrated in the original ProDoc to be outcome indicators and the output targets in the Work plan 2014/2015 to refer to targets/indicators of the originally intended outputs. Nevertheless it should be noted that the project has been divided into two phases. Phase I has a total of 47 pre-defined activities where as the new road map 2014-2015 defines largely different activities as part of the second phase of the project. Furthermore, the evaluation would like to highlight that not all of the activities under the first phase have been achieved[[21]](#footnote-21) although they are considered to be on track by the project. This will inevitably result in some confusion with regards to reporting, as new activities will commence while some activities from the original ProDoc will still need to be implemented/finalized, which may be cumbersome to manage and monitor.

### Component 1: Promoting Credible, Transparent and Sustainable Electoral Processes

Under this component, the assistance is principally directed at building the capacity of INEC and to a limited extent that of the SIECs. There are four intended outputs[[22]](#footnote-22) for this component. Due to a change in direction, the originally established output target 1.2 will now be implemented by IFES as they are better positioned to provide technical assistance to the voter registration and tallying of results through ICT and this will be replaced by support to voter education on the voter registration process instead.

“The violence was attributed to the perception of voters that the presidential elections were not free and fair. However, the violence could be traced to manipulation of voters by politicians. Because elective officers are very attractive, the candidates for the offices and their supporters would do anything towards the candidates winning the elections. This do-or-die attitude also tends to encourage defeated candidates to instigate post-election violence.” **Report of the Registration and Election Review Committee (RERC)**

The overall baseline is quite ambiguous, especially given the fact that the 2011 elections were heralded to be the bloodiest in recent history. The 2011 elections were lauded to be the most credible elections so far, however that did not necessarily constitute overall public acceptance of the results, especially given the amount of post-election violence that occurred.

The four indicators quoted are also not necessarily SMART, as although the project has rightly identified the main stakeholders that can contribute to making the elections more credible and transparent, many key aspects of the process such as security and the current status of treatment of electoral disputes lays outside the scope of the project. INEC repeatedly states that it is responsible for the technical implementation of the elections but the success of the elections is the responsibility of everyone and each entity has an important role to play to ensure a more transparent and credible electoral process.

“While the sole responsibility for the conduct of elections lays squarely on the shoulders of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), it is also to be clearly understood that we all have our part to play in making elections freer and more credible.” **Lessons from 2011 and looking to 2015**

Furthermore, many of the observer reports reflect that the majority of the problems during the elections emanate from outside of Abuja. **DGD II is mainly supporting INEC in Abuja and will have very little control over the Election Commissions in the States, therefore although INEC at policy level may have implemented adequate changes, the project cannot assure how these policies are interpreted outside of Abuja**. Therefore this particular indicator may not reflect the desirable change, i.e. INECs capacity strengthened and elections at the State Level may not be heralded as credible.

The EU EOM stated that the legal framework for the 2011 General Elections provided an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic elections in accordance with international principles and with the international instruments ratified by the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Nevertheless, challenges remained. DGD II has been working vigorously with INEC and other stakeholders to prepare submissions on the amendments to the Electoral Law. These have now been submitted however the review process is still on-going and it is not known yet whether the amendments will be accepted or will occur within a reasonable time limit[[23]](#footnote-23) in order for the changes to be implemented. This is outside of the scope of the project; therefore, this should be taken into consideration.

The third indicator is very SMART, and is on track to be achieved, although it does not state how this particular indicator will be measured, nonetheless it can be measured. With regards to the last indicator, once again this perhaps needs to more specific and some thought needs to be put into how this can be measured. Does this respond to Civil Society, or to the general public? The project will only be engaging in voter education on the voter registration process therefore perhaps this indicator needs to be more specific.

If on the other hand, we are to look at the targets as outlined in the Work Plan for 2014/2015, all the output targets appear to be SMART and some are already on track to being achieved.

**Table 1: Component 1: Promoting Credible, Transparent and Sustainable Electoral Processes**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Component 1: Promoting Credible, Transparent and Sustainable Electoral Processes** | | | |
| **Intended Output** | **Output Targets** | **Baseline** | **Indicators** |
| 1. Strategic planning, policy and operational capacities of INEC strengthened | Targeted INEC Departments achieve their performance benchmarks in accordance with timelines set in the Strategic Programme of Action 2012-2016  INEC articulates and adopts a comprehensive Election Road Map/Calendar for the 2015 elections by January 2014 and rolls it out thereafter in accordance with timelines set therein  There is increased vertical and horizontal communication, cooperation and coordination between and among INEC senior leadership, departments and Units – resulting into greater organizational efficiency effectiveness and teamwork  INEC’s capacity to communicate and share information with CSOs, candidates, political parties, media, election observers and other stakeholders at both the HQ and state level is considerably strengthened.  There is progressively higher satisfaction among stakeholders about the quality, depth and timeliness of electoral information. This improves credibility of the electoral process and overall public perception of INEC as a transparent entity.  INEC formulates/reviews electoral regulations and procedures in a timely manner and in accordance with the Electoral Road Map for 2015 elections  INEC formally adopts a Gender Policy by February 2014 and implements core provisions of the policy ahead of the 2015 Elections  Elements of the Gender Policy are mainstreamed into targeted INEC procedures, guidelines, training modules, voter education and public outreach materials/messaging. | Public acceptance of the 2011 elections | 1. INEC’s conduct of credible elections in accordance with national laws and international standards 2. INEC’s policies to promote credible elections 3. INEC cooperation with stakeholders   Heightened civic consciousness and engagement with the electoral process |

**Table 2: Component 1: Promoting Credible, Transparent and Sustainable Electoral Processes contd.**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Component 1: Promoting Credible, Transparent and Sustainable Electoral Processes** | | | |
| **Intended Output** | **Output Targets** | **Baseline** | **Indicators** |
| 1.2. Electoral systems (voter registration) and processes (Tallying and transmission) improved through ICT | Eligible women, youth and PWDs, receive adequate information and education which enables them to register as voters and collect their Permanent Voter’s Cards  The total number of voters registered and issues with Permanent Voters Cards is within 5% of the projected target.  Major political actors (candidates & political parties as well as voters view the 2015 voter register as more credible than in 2011. | Public acceptance of the 2011 elections | 1. INEC’s conduct of credible elections in accordance with national laws and international standards 2. INEC’s policies to promote credible elections 3. INEC cooperation with stakeholders   Heightened civic consciousness and engagement with the electoral process |
| 1.3. Legal and Policy Framework for Elections Improved | The amended constitution and the electoral law reflect most of the changes desired and outlined in the INEC and CSO position papers submitted to the Constitutional and Legal Reform Committees of NASS.  Political candidates view the electoral law, rules and procedures as fair and balanced.  Acceptance of electoral law, rules and procedures by candidates boosts credibility of the electoral process.  Electoral complaints that are filed through the EADR mechanism are adjudicated and concluded on time. Complaints accept decisions made on electoral complaints filed through EADR. |
| 1.4.2. Professional Capacity of and Collaboration between INEC and SIECs enhanced/Sub-output: Capacities of select SIECs including collaboration with INEC improved. | Increased vertical communication, cooperation and coordination between INEC and SIECs improve efficiency, effectiveness and public approval of electoral operations.  Staff who complete various training programmes are able to apply the knowledge and skills gained to ensure an efficient and professionally conducted electoral process.  Public approval and confidence in INEC and SIEC as a professional, impartial, and transparent national EMB increases |

### Component 2: Improving the Democratic Quality of Political Engagement

The output is SMART although the indicators are perhaps a little too ambitious. DGD II mainly affords technical assistance to IPAC which is proving to be a strong harbinger for change, nevertheless the reach of IPAC is somewhat limited as it mainly influences political party politics at the national level, and has to date had little influence over the parties at state and lower levels. IPAC through DGD is increasingly consulting with more of its state representatives and is considering presenting a proposal to DGD for more state support. A capacity assessment on the political parties, which was conducted by DGD, concluded different parties have varying degrees of capacity, which inevitably influences their working dynamics. DGD II is working hard along with other key actors from civil society and women’s groups to promote affirmative action amongst political parties, however it was stated that although many of the smaller parties do encourage women into their parties, many women are inevitably attracted to the bigger parties which do not necessarily encourage women to partake in the party but do have the bigger potential of yielding gains should they win in the primaries.

The political parties in the last elections had agreed to affirmative action, however very few actually implemented this policy. Therefore both the indicators and the first output target may be achieved at the general national level, however for it to be achieved nationwide, the project would have to adapt a more inclusive grass root strategy in order to have the desired impact.

**Table 3: Component 2: Improving the Democratic Quality of Political Engagement**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Component 2: Improving the Democratic Quality of Political Engagement** | | | |
| **Intended Output** | **Output Targets** | **Baseline** | **Indicators** |
| 2.1. Capacity of Political Parties Strengthened | Political parties have adopted open and transparent organizational structures and decision-making processes to enhance inclusive participation and reduce internal conflict.  The Inter-Party Advisory Council (IPAC) becomes more proactive and an increasingly recognized voice of constructive engagement with government and CSOs.  Political parties are able to clearly articulate issues and policies that define and organize their respective parties, giving themselves a better platform to contest for power.  Registered political parties have provisions for, and have facilitated youth participation. | Nigerian political parties are devoid of ideology and issue-based politics. They are under resourced and their bureaucracy is not career-based and professional | 1. 1. Democratic characteristics of political party governance and conformity with prevailing laws.   2. Adoption of measures by major political parties on internal democracy. |
| .2. Capacity of national and zonal CSOs to engage constitutional reform process enhanced | The “Calabar Dialogue” becomes a dynamic platform for closer and more constructive CSO engagement in reviewing implementation of the legislative agenda.  There is growing satisfaction among stakeholders that citizen groups have been given space to provide insights to improve implementation of the legislative agenda.  The efficiency of targeted NASS committees in both chambers of parliament significantly improves. There is evidence that, as a result of training, staff deployment, and other technical assistance, the targeted NASS committees have stronger consultative, information gathering, analytical, and reporting capacities.  The Oversight Model Guide is formulated and operationalized for both chambers of the house; and helps to inter alia: harmonize oversight processes and methods by the two houses, minimize duplication of effort, and improve coordination and information exchange on planned oversight processes.  An ethical regime (parliamentary code of ethics) for both chambers of parliament is adopted before the expiry of the current legislative term. |

With regards to the output targets for the second output, the majority of the targets seem attainable, however with regards to the third target whereby the efficiency of targeted NASS committees in both chambers of parliament significantly improves, the project needs to be cognizant of the fact that much of the support has not been provided to the secretariat of the National Assembly, but to the Committees themselves, and therefore may not be sustainable in the long term, should the individual representatives not be elected in the 2015 elections. The Project is currently endeavouring to tackle this by supporting capacity building of the National Assembly via the signing of a Letter of Agreement with the National Institute for Legislative Studies.

### Component 3: Enhancing Participation by Women, Youth and Other Marginalized Groups

Out of the four components, the indicators provided are perhaps the least SMART, although the majority of the output targets are tangible and will probably be achieved. Looking at the baseline which is very low, but accurate, the expected outputs and the indicators are very ambitious and perhaps out of the scope of a project this size and of such a short duration. Furthermore, the ultimate benchmark of 35% is overly ambitious and will probably not be met. The number of women who did candidate themselves in 2011[[24]](#footnote-24) did increase substantially (by 78%) as compared to 2007 (see table 10) and to this end there was much optimism surrounding the number of potentially elected female candidates. However, in 2011 the number of female elected candidates fell by a few points. Women face many challenges in both presenting their candidature as well as actually being elected. Various factors can be attributed to this (See table 4) and the project is addressing some of these issues through capacity development for the Women in Politics forum. Nevertheless, no concrete study has been conducted why the number of female candidates elected to office fell, despite an increase of over 78% more candidates as compared to 2007.

**Table 4: Factors influencing women’s participation in politics**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Idiosyncratic Factors** | **Effects** | **Covariate Factors** | **Effects** |
| Low level of education (especially in the North); requirement to have completed secondary education. | Up to 50% of aspirants failed to qualify for elections to State Assembly | Cultural attitudes: women need husbands’ permission to attend meetings or be involved in any activity outside the home (in some cases even to visit hospitals) | Candidates sacrifice their political ambition to avoid domestic problems. |
| Lack of capacity, in political and inter-personal skills and knowledge; organising and coordinating campaigns; advocacy and negotiation | Ineffective Campaigns | Political environment: fear of intimidation, physical assault and name calling; whisper campaigns and innuendos about moral standing. | Withdrawal of candidates who put their reputation before a political career. |
| Financial constraints: Candidates lack resources for registration fees, to establish campaign structures, etc | Ineffective Campaigns | Registration regulations are complex; candidates are required to submit tax declarations. | Many in the North lack bank accounts and fail to qualify. |
| Reproductive roles: women need to be home in the evenings and at night to feed and care for their children, etc | Aspirants cannot attend nigh and evening meetings and therefore cannot be considered | Lack of a quota system | Women aspirants fail to make party lists; only those who are active in male patronage networks are successful. |

**Source – Gender in Nigeria Report 2012 – British Council**

Although the project is working to achieve women’s political participation based on the overall framework of the National Gender Policy 2006, which promotes 35% affirmative action, in the new work plan under output 3.2, the output target highlights that “the proportion of women among elected officials at all levels should increase significantly compared with the 2011 elections.” To this end, the option of an increase is possible, but it is highly unlikely it would reach 35% and should present trends exist,[[25]](#footnote-25) the increase would not be expected to be significant. There are some incidences whereby parties in Lagos and Cross Rivers have more than 35% of women in decision-making positions, however at present this is the exception to the rule. Therefore, to measure the overall success of the project on gender and the increased participation of women in the political process by the stated indicators could prove to be naive and **failure to increase these numbers will not necessarily demonstrate all the gains that have indeed been made under this particular component.**

With regards to targets under the first output (3.1) which states “a gender responsive Constitution reflecting CSOs advocacy and recommendations” – this may be more difficult to achieve. DGD II has been working on this issue with the input from an array of stakeholders and they have been able to successfully submit their suggestions to the NASS. The NASS still seems reluctant to take on board some of the suggestions, although it would seem that four out of five (see 8.8.3) points in the Women’s Charter submitted and supported by DGD have been accepted. Nevertheless, should these changes not be reflected in the Constitution, it does not necessarily signify that the work was neither successful nor relevant.

The output target under output 3.2 has already been discussed above and under output 3.3, although it may be attainable, there are many factors which fall outside of the scope of the project and more work especially with the political parties at more grass root level would need to be carried out in order to make these targets more achievable.

Furthermore the final target (3.4) whereby female parliamentarians are trained and at least one substantive bill in Federal and State Legislatures before the end of the Current Legislative term is sponsored is not necessarily specific, as it does not refer to whether this bill should be gender centric or whether it can be any type of bill. Furthermore, whether a bill is sponsored or not, does not necessarily mean that the new skills and knowledge have not been attained. The sponsoring of a bill depends on many factors, women only represent six per cent of the NASS and therefore there are more barriers to them presenting a bill than just their technical skills.

Nevertheless, **the project to date has made great strides, and has been able to advocate successfully amongst different stakeholders to promote affirmative action for women including within INEC, the political parties and the Women’s organisations who developed a five point charter to advocate for more rights for women.** The project has also made important inroads in promoting positive agendas for youth and persons living with disabilities and for a creation of a manifesto outlining their requests. Only recently, the Disability Act has been approved by the Senate and various articles of the Constitution are likely to be changed due to the advocacy on this issue. Nevertheless, the affirmative action on women’s participation campaign has not been as successful as hoped, but this does not mean that gains have not been made, therefore, it would perhaps be important to “move the bar” slightly so that these successes are reflected in the results.

**Table 5: Component 3: Enhancing Participation by Women, Youth and Other Marginalized Groups**

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| **Component 3: Enhancing Participation by Women, Youth and other Marginalized Groups** | | | |
| **Intended Output** | **Output Targets** | **Baseline** | **Indicators** |
| 3.1 Legal Reforms and women’s empowerment initiatives to promote affirmative and women’s empowerment in politics and elections undertaken | A gender responsive Constitution and policies on women’s political empowerment reflecting CSOs advocacy and recommendations  A more gender responsive INEC and SIEC with improved provisions to ensure voter registration centers and polling sites are easily accessible to: women and PWDs  Voter registration centers and polling sites are easily accessible to:  a) women  b) PWDs  and with minimal structural and security challenges.  Availability and distribution of Outreach materials responsive to elections issues affecting underrepresented groups | Due to patriarchy and the zerosum nature of Nigerian politics, women continued to lag behind in terms of representation: 10% in NASS | 1. Measures adopted by government and political parties to reform laws to mainstream gender and women empowerment. 2. % of women nominated in party primaries and voted to public office 3. % of women participating in elections   Public perception on women in politics |
| 3.2.Pool of women aspirants for elective offices at various levels enlarged | The proportion of women among elected officials at all levels increases significantly compared with 2011 elections and with increased capacity development for the elected women for better performance. |
| 3.3.CSOs capacity to advocate affirmative action enhanced | There is increasing evidence of government responsiveness to CSO affirmative action demands reflected in policy and legislative review, government rhetoric and actions.  As a result of CSO advocacy, political parties increasingly become more inclusive and provide space for women participation as well participation of the youths and Persons With Disabilities. |
| 3.4.Capacity of women holding elected public office enhanced | There is widespread application of new skills and knowledge by trained elected women leaders. As a consequence, female parliamentarians sponsor at least one substantive bill in Federal and State legislatures before end of the current legislative term. |

### Component 4: Strengthening the Channels of Civic Engagement

Despite some administrative problems expressed by the various CSOs engaged in the project, component IV has thus far been very successful in achieving its objectives. The indicators set out in the ProDoc are viable and the capacity will more than likely be improved. With regards to the indicators under the media, this is far more ambiguous as politics pay a heavy role in the media and “money politics” can undermine the equality of the media coverage. Furthermore, it is important that there is buy-in from all actors especially at the state levels and below, therefore more is to be done for these particular indicators to be achieved.

**Table 6: Component 4: Strengthening the Channels of Civic Engagement/Sub Component:**

**Civil Society Capacity Development**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Component 4:Strengthening the Channels of Civic Engagements/Sub Component: Civil Society capacity development and Strengthening the capacity and voice of the media** | | | |
| **Intended Output** | **Output Targets** | **Baseline** | **Indicators** |
| 4.1: Zonal Networks and Individual CSOs strengthened | A more diverse range of CSOs engage in democratic governance, at zonal level compared with 2011 electoral cycle. | UNDP baseline study shows CSOs as under-resourced, underdeveloped, lacking strategic focus and direction, elitist and urban-based, and therefore limited in its capacity and credibility to be an effective watchdog and defender of democracy and good governance. | CSOs performance in democratic reform processes; % of CSOs undertaking election observation, civic and voter education, and conflict management tasks during elections; Extent of CSO cooperation with state and non-state actors |
| 4.1.2. Civil Society engagement in Democratic Reforms and Monitoring Supported | CSOs remain proactively engaged in informing, critiquing, and providing alternative vision for the legal, policy and regulatory reforms ahead of the 2015 elections. |
| 4.1.3. Public Awareness and Implementation of Freedom of Information Act (FOI) facilitated | A more diverse range of CSOs engage in domestic election observation at zonal level compared with 2011 electoral cycle.  CSOs are present in all 6 geopolitical zones and adopt a rigorous methodological approach that ensures that observation reports are credible, independent and effectively harmonized |
| 4.1.4. Civil Society capacity to carry out election observation enhanced | A more diverse range of CSOs engage in civic education at zonal level compared with 2011 electoral cycle. |
| 4.1.5. Civil Society capacity to carry out civic education enhanced | There is increased satisfaction with access to information by CSOs, from targeted Ministries, Departments and Agencies |
| Sub Component 4: Strengthening Capacity and voice of the Media | | | 1. UNDP media capacity assessment public perception about the credibility and capacity of media to engage in effective democracy and election monitoring. The campaign agenda of politicians is influenced by media reports and opinion surveys that reflect opinions at the grass roots; increase in % of balanced and fair reporting |
| 4.2.1. Capacity of Media to monitor and report on democracy and election related issues strengthened | A code of professional media conduct in elections is established ahead of 2015 elections in collaboration with professional media organizations, including the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ) and INEC  The media (print and electronics as well as the social media) professional conduct t strengthens public perception and confidence that media coverage of the electoral process is fair, rational, and independent.  ICT, new media and community-based media assume a more prominent role in disseminating awareness on democracy and electoral matters, compared with the previous electoral cycles. | UNDP media study has shown that Nigerian Media lacks capacity to engage in fair, equitable and professional reporting, and most media houses are under-resourced and have under-qualified staff |
| 4.1.2 Capacity for Media Monitoring Strengthened | All private and public media outlets, including new media are closely monitored for hate speech, incitement, political slandering, deliberate misinformation, and other issues.  Media monitoring reports are compiled in a timely manner and disseminated widely to the public and responsible duty-bearers. |

# Validity of Assumptions

The creation of the DGD Project in itself has the advantage of avoiding the else unavoidable overlapping of programmes and geographic areas of performance by the different donors. It has established a strong position in dealing with the authorities where many politicians and civil service members are aware of the project and its activities.

The main aim of the Project is to improve good governance in the area of electoral processes and democratic participation and has now – after a strategic review – reached its second phase, which comprises four components. The question is therefore: can the different programmes in the four components deliver results in accordance with the assumptions to which they have been formed?

The overall litmus test for the impact of the project on the electoral process will be the election itself. The ProDoc identified key priorities for the country as it prepares for the 2015 elections which included the promotion of female representation in political structures, enhancing capacity for INEC and SIECs independence, improving the quality of the voter register, reviewing the electoral system and improving procedures for prosecuting electoral offences and impunity. The DGD II Road map has further identified peace and conflict mitigation as a new cross cutting theme.

The latter is important, especially with 2011 being considered the bloodiest elections in Nigeria’s recent history.[[26]](#footnote-26) As of yet it is unclear as to how the project will ensure that this is a cross cutting theme across the project, however **the need to further and strengthen dialogue with the key electoral stakeholders, especially youth and political parties, is essential to address the issue of violence, especially post election violence.**

**Nevertheless, as well as strengthening dialogue and collaboration between key actors, dissemination of information, especially at the Local Government and ward level, is of optimum importance.** DGD II’s road map has indeed recognised the pertinence of ensuring that state CSOs are more involved in the process, however given the stringent UNDP procurement rules,[[27]](#footnote-27) it is doubtful as to whether all the key grass root organisations will be able to benefit from the project. At present, approximately 600 CSOs are allegedly[[28]](#footnote-28) on the roster. All CSOs have been provided with essential training on the procurement process and capacity training on programming, financial and organisational development. Nevertheless, in order to be considered to be part of the roster, the CSOs have to fulfil certain criteria, including with regards to their overall financial management. Unfortunately, many of the smaller grass root CSOs are unable to fulfil these criteria and even if selected would struggle with the reporting requirements, and therefore are limited in their ability to apply for such funds. The project does nonetheless have some linkages with certain smaller and more localised CSOs through the implementation of projects through larger CSOs.

Furthermore, throughout the evaluation, voter education was highlighted as key in preventing violence and for creating an atmosphere conducive to credible and transparent elections. **The dissemination of information - at the grass root level and the identification of persons who risk being disenfranchised, including women, PWDs and youth, but also IDPs and ethnic minorities - is essential, therefore a comprehensive voter education strategy needs to be developed which is able to filter down to the ward level and does not merely touch the State level.**

DGD II has already had the experience of working on different elements conducive to enabling a credible and transparent election in a number of gubernatorial elections. Nevertheless, the extent of the provision of services to voter education has been weak. INEC is currently devising an ambitious strategy to tackle this problem. Due to the inability of the evaluators to travel to the states, the evaluators were unable to interview the State INECs in order to obtain their view in this regard; nonetheless all SIECs [[29]](#footnote-29)interviewed stated this is where they lacked the most capacity and stated that voter education is key to reducing electoral-related violence. With only 10 months to go prior to the general elections, the developing of a comprehensive voter education strategy in the coming months already comes too late to have a profound impact**. Voter and civic education should be a constant throughout the electoral cycle and should not be limited to one or two town hall meetings just prior to the elections. The television can especially play a positive role, however rules need to be in place to ensure a level playing field amongst all candidates. Furthermore, the tracking of campaign finances needs to be encouraged and strengthened.**

The assumption to include CSOs in the equation and to target more state owned organisations is correct. The inclusion of training and capacity building of CSOs can only be positive, especially if many of these organisations are spread across the 6 geopolitical zones. The roster of approved CSOs can also have the potential of improving collaboration and better coordination across the states and has the potential to reach out to smaller grass root organizations.

The project rightly identified the weakness of the involvement of marginalized groups in the process and the importance of enhancing their participation. Although important efforts have been harnessed to improve and promote their inclusion, the true impact of the activities may not show on the surface and may not result in the indicators foreseen in the ProDoc. As long as money politics is determining who will win the primaries, all groups, especially women, will be disadvantaged and their participation will probably not improve much on the last elections, or perhaps not at all. Money dictates who will be a candidate of the Primaries. The Trust Fund sponsored in the last elections was seen to be vaguely successful and at present is on the verge of being rendered extinct, as there is allegedly no availability of funds to currently support female candidates in their campaigns.

Furthermore, one must also be cognizant of the fact that the women elected into the Senate or House of Representatives have not been elected because of their engagement for their support of gender issues but more due to their internal political connections. DGD IIs work plan does include advocacy activities targeted at the political parties, which is designed to tackle this issue. Therefore, **it is essential to exert more pressure on the constitutional review and electoral reform to force both the political parties and the National Assembly to provide space for female representatives and candidates**. Nevertheless, although a gender quota is an important step, it would perhaps be equally important to also concentrate on ensuring women are represented and trained at the local government level and building their capacity from thereon. It is equally fundamental to concentrate efforts in certain areas, as many areas in the north are hardly represented by women as compared to other areas. (See table below)

**Table 7: Women Elected to Political Office By Region, Nigeria**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **2011** | **Governor** | **Senate** | **House of Reps** | **State House of Assembly** |
| **North-Central** | 0 | 1 | 2 | 15 |
| **North-East** | 0 | 1 | 4 | 4 |
| **North-West** | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| **South-East** | 0 | 2 | 6 | 21 |
| **South-South** | 0 | 1 | 4 | 12 |
| **South-West** | 0 | 1 | 8 | 15 |

**Source – Gender in Nigeria Report 2012 – British Council**

Furthermore, there are various on-going conflicts in Nigeria, which could have the potential of influencing the outcome of the project. These vary from religious conflicts to inter/intra ethnic conflicts. The following examples below could potentially hinder the process; some with nationwide effects while others could even spill over to the rest of the region. In order to ensure peaceful and transparent elections, the project needs to be cognizant of these areas of conflict and although may not have the power to directly address them, the project needs to recognise that these concerns could affect its

overall outcome of the project and potential conflict with the overall goal of the project should be mitigated.

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**Religious Conflicts**

The Boko Haram uprising in the North East of the country centred in Borno State, Yobe and Adamawa State has a religious face. It is currently spreading to other states and the movement has created offshoots in Kano and Niger states. Apart from a spill over to neighbouring states, more recently Abuja has also become a target and has witnessed several devastating attacks in the month of April 2014. The Spokesman for Boko Haram has announced several times that they will fight against democracy. Whether elections in the three aforementioned States can take place is questionable. In the Southern part of Kaduna State (Kafanchan area) Christian militias have been established and are openly engaging the Muslim society in fights razing Muslim villages and killing the inhabitants.

**Figure 2:** Political Map of Nigeria 2011[[30]](#footnote-30)

It was obvious in the 2011 elections, that the CPC won all the Sharia States of the North while PDP with its Christian presidential contester Jonathan was more centred in the Christian dominated South. This led to a **clear political divide of the country. The unity of the country is at stake.**

**The Niger-Delta area**

The conflicts in the Niger Delta are not new and have a long history. The different State Governments and the Federal side have not been able to pacify the region with for example creating jobs, tackling poverty and creating a congenial environment. **The question needs to be asked as to what position MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta), the leading opposition organization, might take regarding the elections? In some parts of the Niger Delta, the Government has lost complete control.**

**The Settler – Indigenes Problem**

The Settler Taraba problem is especially apparent in the Middle Belt in Plateau, Kaduna and Nasarawa States. This problem has its roots in the general North South movement in the Sahel zone caused by the spread of the Sahara to the South and famine and poverty in the Northern Region. The scarcity of land in these new areas and having no right to land is resulting in fights with the indigenous population. An additional problem is that this movement changes the demographic picture of the new area including the political landscape and – according to the size of the settler population – they may soon demand their presence in local government institutions in order to partake in local decision-making. The settlers are devotees of Islam but their new settlement area is divided in their beliefs. Conflicts are brewing and could implode at any moment. The Government has steered clear from this burning issue and has not drafted a law with regards to the status of settlers nor land ownership. Such a constellation is the underlying cause for many of the conflicts in the Middle Belt.

Considering voting is mainly done along ethnic lines, political aspirants have a tendency to make use of such a constellation. There are numerous examples of “election cleansing” in the different states of the Middle Belt, often linked to violence and killings. The Eggon settlers in 2006 in Asakoiya area in Nasarawa State were chased away by the indigenous Alago people, whom they formerly had allowed to settle down and farm. The background was the gubernatorial election, when the Alago suspected the Eggon in their area of voting against the Alago candidate. Many people were killed and a large number of IDPs found their way to their traditional area. The revenge came in 2013, when members from the Eggon Ombatse cult raided several Alago towns and villages and killed many of them. Since 1999, some local gubernatorial elections have not taken place, nonetheless results were announced. **It is highly likely that such scenarios will be repeated.**

**Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)**

According to INEC the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (more than 100.000) are supposed to vote at the place, where they reside. In some areas they have changed the demographic picture and may have a strong voice in the elections, which may not necessarily be in line with the political view of the indigenous population. This may lead to conflicts. Election Expulsion is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria but rather a common feature. IDPs can either vote at their place of origin or at their new temporary settlement. **Certain areas will need to be screened for security reasons.**

**Ethnic Minorities**

In Nigeria more than 500 languages are spoken, which means more than 500 different peoples, of which the minorities account for about one third of the overall population. Nigerians predominantly tend to vote along ethnic lines, and therefore minorities are more often than not excluded from political life. Their votes are usually sold to the highest bidder. **The common belief that independence and democracy will render tribalism extinct is a fatal misconception. Tribalism is part of life and politics and has a profound disadvantage on the minority peoples.**

**The transhuman population**

The Fulani are cow rearers and are by far the biggest nomadic group in Nigeria, although they are not the only one. They comprise of over 100.000 people and are the major cause for many of the conflicts within farming societies. With the immense growth of the Nigerian population, land is becoming scarce and State Governments have generally not created enough cattle tracks and grazing reserves for them. To this end, it would seem that the Fulani have established a militia-fighting regime and are destroying farmers‘ settlements and villages under the banner of Islam. The fact that their cows are vaccinated against malaria and sleeping sickness has enabled them to travel further into the South in the dry season. Farming societies in these areas are not used to a nomadic life style and are often helpless when the Fulani arrive. This again leads to resistance. It is a fight for land and for the survival of a traditional lifestyle. **It is doubtful therefore that elections in certain wards will be able to take place.**

**The fight for land**

Land is becoming scarce with a fast growing population. This leads to constant feuds amongst different groups, which may not necessarily have an ethnic background**. Nevertheless such feuds have the potential to lead to forced removal of other groups with the constant fear that they may come back one day and demand the land from their forefathers.**

**Poverty and lack of jobs**

Poverty, especially in the North – and the lack of jobs particularly for the younger generation leaves them with no perspective for the future and is not a good basis for democratization. This may destroy all efforts for the building of a democratic society. The key to addressing these problems lie with the politicians. The Lemu Report describes these phenomena in detail. **There is a strong belief in the “dividends of democracy” i.e. especially better living conditions. But rather the opposite occurs. A large part of the population therefore feels that they have been cheated. To this end, this frustration and disappointment may spill over during the elections and cause violent outbursts.**

**Election cleansing**

Since there is a strong tendency in Nigeria to vote along ethnic lines; any other group in the area is seen as suspicious and may destroy the intended result by the indigenous population and cause a loss of advantages promised by their candidate should he emerge as the winner of the election. Electoral cleansing took place in several areas before the elections in 2003, 2007 and 2011. Settlers from other areas who had been allowed to rent land were chased away by the dominant indigenous population for fear that the settlers may not vote according to the interest of the indigenous people. This happened for example in Sarakoiya in Nasarawa State in 2007. In Takum (Taraba State) the indigenous Kuteb people were chased away before the election because other groups like the Chamba, Jukun, Fulani and Hausa wanted the political power. Both examples caused a lot of killings of IDPs.

In conclusion, the majority of the assumptions are valid; however a programme of this size cannot be expected to address all the issues especially with regards to gender and electoral violence and the areas of concern highlighted above. Such incidences are not mere assumptions, but are events, which will happen and will most certainly have a direct impact on the elections. DGD II can impact on some of the symptoms of patriarchal practises but more efforts need to be made to tackle the causes of this social ill and to mitigate the negative impact of the areas of conflict. Violence is imbedded in Nigeria’s electoral culture and without more voter education, which penetrates down to the ward level and the capacity to engage in dialogue with the political parties and individual candidates at local level, there is always the risk of the projects’ impact being limited.[[31]](#footnote-31) **One important strength of the DGD II project is its capacity to bring different actors around the table; if this coupled with renewed and strengthened collaboration and coordination with other actors working in the field of deepening democracy could be upheld, the various programmes together could have a far more reaching impact over the overall process.**

# Efficiency and Effectiveness of Programme Implementation

## Management – Policy and Operational Levels:

The Project Steering Committee (SC), Technical Committee (TC) and Project Management team along with key external experts worked closely with representatives of relevant agencies including INEC, CSOs, Women’s and Youth Groups and that of persons living with disabilities, NASS, media and political parties to provide policy, strategic and technical direction and operational guidance. The involvement and ‘buy-in’ of the election commission along with key members from IPAC and civil society in all policy decisions encourages ownership of the project between INEC and the other key stakeholders.

The Steering Committee has overall responsibility over the project (see annex II for terms of reference) and the different members have varying responsibilities. The executive is comprised of the National Planning Commission and the UNDP Nigeria Country Office. They have the overall responsibility of the project supported by the Senior Beneficiary and the Senior Supplier. The Senior Suppliers are the EU, DFTAD (CIDA), DFID and UNDP. Their primary function is to provide guidance regarding the technical feasibility of the project. Finally the Senior Beneficiary, INEC works with the other beneficiaries to 1) Validate the needs of the project; 2) Monitor and ensure that the solution will meet those needs within the constraints of the project (quality standards, time and cost) and 3) Monitor progress against targets and quality criteria.

The project is considered by all beneficiaries to be flexible, reactive and responsive to their needs. For organizations, especially INEC, the basket fund has added value as it allows a series of donors to contribute under one umbrella. This means that the reporting requirements are streamlined and reduced to one report and also allows cross cutting issues across all the components as the project deals with a wide range of issues from capacity building of INEC to support of CSOs. The project also has a unique position working with such a plethora of different agencies working on issues pertaining to elections, as it enables DGD II to call key actors together and galvanize their mutual support around specific key concerns. The advantage of working with a broad range of beneficiaries as well as working on central issues essential to enhancing the electoral process provides the project with a distinctive advantage over other international partners as it is able to call on a wide range of expertise and bring them around the same table when the need arises.

## Internal Control

There is adequate oversight of implementation with the ATLAS system ensuring the first level of internal control. Beyond the first level, the project manager is required to refer all major decisions to the senior management team of the Country Office, SC and TC as specified. The Project Manager (PM) applies quality control with the support of a part-time monitoring and evaluation specialist and the oversight of the procurement desk in the country office based on the application of relevant UNDP documentation and procedures as required. The nature of the procurement process ensures appropriate and best quality of inputs, at the best price. Financial Management is in accordance with UNDP guidelines and in conformity to conditionalities of development partners. Nevertheless some CSOs complained of late payments and delay in starting up the activities (this was generally outside the control of the project – see under Impact).

## Risk Management

Several risk management measures are being applied, at the levels of the Steering Committee, Technical Committee and project manager to mitigate against critical risk factors by taking major decisions to avoid unnecessary delays in the implementation of the project and if needed to consider a new direction or engaging in innovative strategies should the project need to take a new direction.

A risk log for the project was presented within the Project Document[[32]](#footnote-32) which has identified the key risks that the project may be subject to. The project identified three types of risks: 1) Political and Security Risks; 2) Technical – Electoral Risks and 3) Management Risks.

**Table 8: Risk Management Table**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Political and Security Risks** | **Technical – Electoral Risks** | **Management Risks** |
| Prevailing political-economy structural forces inhibit meaningful progress on democratic governance and democratic and electoral reform processes | The timing of constitutional & electoral reform; adjusting to these changes | Inadequate capacity within key institutions of democracy: INEC, political parties, media, and women’s organizations. |
| Uncertainties relating to the Electoral Reform Process | Voter Registration | Inflexible UNDP management systems and capacity |
| Political, social and economic volatility |  |  |
| Traditional politics continue with ‘business as usual’ and dominant powers resist pro democratic change |  |  |
| Lack of consistency and dysfunctional interventions by international community |  |  |
| The stigma of foreign aid in a democratic governance project |  |  |

The project has designed a risk log frame but it not clear as to how this is used in the day-to-day work of the project and utilised in the monthly reports. Many of the key obstacles to achieving transparent and credible elections, and obtaining the goals outlined in the project are political. These include the impetus to adopt electoral reform as well as the willingness of the government and the political parties to seriously tackle election violence as well as ensure that females are afforded the same opportunities as men. UNDP, unlike other international contributors of the process, largely focuses on development, and does not have a political mandate. The perception of its neutrality is fundamental and enables stakeholders to put their trust in such a project, as they are cognizant of the fact that it does not have political motivations behind its support. Nevertheless, this neutrality can sometimes hinder progress, as unfortunately elections, especially in somewhere like Nigeria, are heavily influenced by the politics of the country. UNDP as a development agency promoting good governance does not always have the clout or know-how to intervene in politically driven situations. This can have the effect of placing it at a disadvantage, and some international partners consider that the political situation could have a profound effect on the project and UNDP is not in a strategic position to influence or to provide strategic advice. This is contrary to other similar projects such as in Afghanistan and Libya whereby the UN Political Arm works side by side with UNDP in order to endeavour to deliver a credible electoral process. **A strategic donor group made up of all the major contributors[[33]](#footnote-33) to Nigeria does exist and this goes somewhere towards flagging key political issues which arise that have the potential to divert or derail the results of the project.**

**Within the framework of the new road map for 2014/2015, the project will undertake conflict analysis which can feed into their work, however it is essential that all sources are explored, and that analysis is also carried out at the state and local government level as this will highlight any impending problems as the destabilisation of the overall process is more than likely to emanate from State level than at national level.**

## Timeframe

“We have learnt quite a number of lessons. We will ensure that we have enough time to prepare. Luckily, we now have that time to prepare towards 2015. Efficient utilisation of time is absolutely necessary, and this is something we have taken on board.” **Lessons from 2011 and looking to 2015.**

The Electoral Cycle Approach that has been adopted by the project has a distinct advantage and has used its time well to prepare for the upcoming elections. Although the overall impact on the process cannot be gauged yet. The project has two phases - the pre-voting phase (June 2012 to December 2013) and the voting phase (Jan 2014 to December 2015).

**The first phase has been predominantly dominated by the preparation of the contributions to the Constitutional and Electoral Reform which to date has not yet been finalised.**[[34]](#footnote-34) Nevertheless, important documents have been produced such as the Code of Conduct for the Political Parties and preparations and submission papers for the constitutional and electoral reform that have allowed for key partnerships to be established and galvanised upon. Furthermore, INEC has recently undergone a restructure of its organisation, which was one of the key recommendations from the Uwais report, and this has been supported by DGD II. A strategic plan has been drafted as well as a gender policy, which has the potential to impact on many aspects of the electoral process. Nevertheless, INEC is struggling to implement some of the activities on the strategic plan due to the restructuring process and the fact that many of those who led the plan are no longer in the same leadership positions. Furthermore, due to the restructure of INEC, many persons have either undergone early retirement or have been shifted to the states or to the electoral institute and this has further disrupted the implementation of the aforementioned strategic plan.

**With only ten months to go before the next elections, it is essential that key structures are in place to ensure that all beneficiaries of the project are well placed to make the desired impact on the electoral process and time is not lost over the next few months.**

The project has designed a risk log frame but it not clear as to how this is used in the day-to-day work of the project and its use is not necessarily reflected in the monthly reports. Nevertheless, the Project team under the leadership of the Project Director does monitor the risks and respond to the risks in due time. The flexibility of the project also assists this process. For instance, the Project was able to bring a team of procurement experts from the Procurement Services Offices (PSO) to respond to issues associated with Inflexible UNDP management systems and capacity. Another example is the delay of the constitutional review process and the emergence of the idea of the National conference to which the DGD is also responding within the limits of the approved work plan.

The decision in 2010 by UNDP to not pre-finance the total costs of activities has meant that many CSOs have to find the money prior to activities taking place and this has meant that other key activities in the respective CSOs have been pushed to the backburner due to lack of funds and sometimes human resources to carry out these activities. This also puts some CSOs in an awkward position, and many CSOs struggle to fund the activities and this sometimes deflects some CSOs from implementing their activities properly or means that other aspects of their activities outside of the project suffer. Under normal circumstances, the CSOs can ask for 20% of the finances upfront, nevertheless some of the CSOs interviewed stated that it was months after the completion of the activities before they received any money for the activities implemented. It is difficult to ascertain whether CSOs are simply not aware or do not understand the procedures, however it is recommendable to provide the standard of information so that CSOs are clear that they will not receive money until the reporting requirements are complied with. **It is essential that all CSOs are aware of the rules prior to the commencement of the activities, and are instructed on how to obtain the 20% upfront.**

**The project is nevertheless responsive to these concerns and will provide further training to all CSOs on the roster where all the relevant issues raised by the individual CSOs will be addressed.**

In anticipation of the elections and the time bound activities which are due to take place in the lead up to them, the project has foreseen the recruitment of a designated procurement officer who is expected to come on board in the coming months, will be able to provide further efficiency to the project and ensure that due diligence is applied. In the interim, a procurement officer is in place backstopping the procurements needs of the project, in coordination with the UNDP Service Centre.

## Monitoring and Evaluation

Work plan preparation and specified reporting are submitted regularly. Management of the project sought, most of the time, to adhere to stated deadlines for submission of work plans and reports to the SC, TC and Development Partners, although international partners agreed to receive only one annual report instead of the official quarterly reports that UNDP normally produce. Steering Committee Meetings have typically taken place three times a year, however in 2014[[35]](#footnote-35) a SC meeting has yet to occur. It is important that such a meeting should happen as soon as possible especially given the fact that USAID has now been awarded two grants and the project is now entering its busiest time yet. The project produces monthly and quarterly reports as well as the statutory annual report, which allows the project and its implementation to be tracked. The UNDP Country Office also exercises its oversight role for project quality assurance.

Overall *management* of each of the four components as has been stated above is being done by the Project Manager with strategic, policy and technical guidance from the SC and TC. The heads of components are guided by the project manager and supported by short-term consultants and contractors to facilitate the day-to-day management of the components. A high *quality of inputs* for each component are procured and ensured through the procurement process of UNDP the best quality at the best price for all inputs procured for the project. The Head of the Component prepares and submits monthly reports, which outline the key activities undertaken in the period. Nevertheless, they fail to include proper oversight tools and do not necessarily flag key challenges or possible risk and mitigation strategies to ensure that results are being achieved. The same is to be said for the project’s quarterly reports which are also merely informative reports and do not highlight key challenges and also do not identify where results have been achieved according to the results and input framework. **There could be more result-based reporting at this level to ensure the link among the work plan, results and input framework and the subsequent annual report.**

To date, the activities of the project have been conducted in accordance with accompanying cost estimates of work plans. The work plan of DGD II was recently revised where a road map for phase II (Jan 2014 – Dec 2015) has been drafted. This was done in close consultation with other development partners to ensure that there was no overlap between other similar targeted projects.

To the evaluation team’s knowledge, an official monitoring and evaluation framework has not been produced however in the original project document a risk analysis and mitigation measures log was included. Some of the international partners have expressed a wish for the M & E framework to be strengthened and one in particular would like to see the enhancement of the project’s capacity to measure at output and outcome level rather than primarily focusing on activities.

A Monitoring and Evaluation Officer is contracted on a part time basis, although the evaluation team was unable to speak to him due to time constraints and him not being available at the time of the field visit. There are plans from June 2014 to bring him permanently to Nigeria whereby he will work part-time with the project and part/time with INEC on their monitoring and evaluation strategy. As the project enters the final phase before elections, where tensions will rise and many of the gains to date risk being lost in the high paced atmosphere of electoral preparations, **it is essential that there is a detailed monitoring and evaluation plan in order to allow the project to make important and quick changes should the need arise.** Monthly and quarterly reports should reflect the compliance to said plan.

The project has also undertaken various capacity assessments of CSOs, Political Parties and the NASS. These capacity assessments have guided their work and have been extremely beneficial. In the case of the CSOs, an in-depth assessment was conducted in 2012 and more recently whereby over 600 CSOs[[36]](#footnote-36) were assessed and put on a roster. The establishment of the roster has been beneficial both to the actual CSOs assessed and to the project. The procurement time has been cut as requests for proposals are simply sent only to those CSOs, which have already been assessed by the Project, and thus allows the project to quickly respond to needs in certain areas when required. The benefit to the CSOs has been well documented during the evaluation team’s field visit as it also enables the individual CSOs to assess their own internal structures and make the relevant changes when necessary.

The project’s strategy to target CSOs, which are based in the States, is welcome and will enable the project to both gather and disseminate information to places where it is needed. This decision to target the lower echelons of society is important if the project is to have its desired impact and should in the future prevent the “donor darlings” from always being recipients of financial and technical benefits. The training of CSOs in how to make a bid has also been warmly appreciated and has enabled the CSOs to build their capacity in bidding for tenders as well as making the process more competitive but at the same time endeavouring to enable the CSOs to have a level playing field when it comes to presenting proposals.

From 2012 to 2014, 18 CSOs (including 6 women’s groups) were awarded grants for an approximate amount of USD$1,336,000[[37]](#footnote-37). The recipients of the grants had stringent reporting requirements, which in some cases proved to be cumbersome and took away essential staff from other activities. These group activities were monitored. The importance of monitoring cannot be underestimated, as it is important to examine to what extent which activities of the Programme have benefited the beneficiaries, particularly at the grassroots level. While there were benefits, CSOs and other beneficiary organisations, for example, are yet to establish a mechanism to measure the true extent of benefits at the grassroots level.

After the review in 2012 and according to the DGD II roadmap, the project has decided to extend their reach to CSOs at the grassroots. Nevertheless, due to the fact that financial awards are only given to those who have been assessed and are indeed subject to a certain criteria, there is the danger of excluding many CSOs that may not have the financial and institutional capacity but are better placed to carry out the activities and influence the process and can better access those groups who have until now been traditionally disenfranchised from the process. This is particularly pertinent in the more rural areas of the country. Notwithstanding, the roster is being constantly updated and may provide an opportunity for other CSOs to access it, however this would be contingent on said CSOs complying with the evaluation criteria.

As was aforementioned, one of the key strengths of the project is to mobilise key actors involved in the process and to bring these together to promote and advocate for certain strategies. This capacity has been paramount in the constitutional and electoral reform process as well as the dissemination of the Freedom of Information Act[[38]](#footnote-38) and has enabled more marginalised groups including women, PWDs and youth not only to be part of this process but has enabled them to access the key actors in the process, including INEC and political parties. **The added value of these links cannot be underestimated and these groups including the political parties and indeed INEC have fed the NASS with their recommendations for the upcoming constitutional and electoral reform.**

## Indicators of Efficiency

**Indicators of efficiency** were appropriate; however, some were vague and/or ambitious. The drafting of the indicators and in some instances the baselines has meant that especially in the area of gender, some international partners have been disappointed with the results so far despite the huge efforts and small gains provided by the project. Furthermore, the indicators of efficiency for INEC may also be over ambitious as the result to have credible elections not only relies on its technical ability to perform but can be influenced by many external factors such as electoral violence, disgruntlement of the results by the political parties and/or public, an unequal level playing field amongst candidates and various other aspects which cannot be entirely controlled by the project.

“…while the sole responsibility for the conduct of elections lay squarely on the shoulders of the INEC, it is also to be clearly understood that we all have our part to play in making elections freer and more credible.” We can deploy all the structures, processes, personnel and technology towards credible elections; we will still need the collective support of all stakeholders – political parties, civil society organizations, security agencies, professional bodies, and the general public to enable our systems and personnel operate maximally.”

**Attahiru M Jega 9th July 2013**

## Donor Input and Technical Assistance

Donor inputs for implementation of the programme were proposed to follow the UNDP partnership approach, with mobilised resources combined in a ‘basket fund’. The basket is made up of four international partners, the European Union, Canada, UK and KOIKA. UNDP is also a key contributor to the project. The EU, Canada and KOIKA contribute solely to DGD II and are not supporting any other activities related to the electoral process outside of the basket. The project has enjoyed a decent flow of funds; however, **46% of the funds are still to be poured into the basket with only 10 months to go to the election**. DFID runs similar projects with mostly national partners, however it is unclear to what extent work plans and activity outcomes are shared in practice. The fact that partners such as DFID and USAID have similarly targeted projects makes it very important to ensure effective coordination and collaboration by all members. At present, although both sides claim (UNDP and other International Partners) that they are sharing information, there is a disjoint in the information provided which has led to an underlying tension between some partners and UNDP DGD II. **Both parties need to engage in dialogue to iron out the creases and to ensure maximum collaboration between all the entities in order to ensure maximum benefits are derived from all projects concerned.** Despite this tension, the evaluation team could not find duplication of efforts, but more duplication of ideas but tackled at from different perspectives. **The efficiency and effectiveness of all projects concerned could all benefit from these diverse approaches and effective and cordial ways should be sought to enhance the best interests of deepening democracy in Nigeria.**

Many of the fliers, brochures and booklets supported by the project do not always reflect the donor’s support, and as a result very few of the products highlight the logos or acknowledge the support by the international partners. Although it is sometimes not required to acknowledge the donors support, in the case of the EU, this is stipulated in the contracting agreement, and in the majority of cases, banners are the places where their support are most acknowledged. Some produced booklets do highlight the donors’ logos; however in the majority of the material that the evaluation received, this was not the case.

## Efficiency by Components

The project is split into four components and is budgeted at a total of $ 53,210,641. The following graph illustrates how the funds are divided up between the four components and the project management between the two phases (Phase I – June 2012 – December 2013 and Phase II – January 2014 – December 2015).

**Figure 3: Output Budget per Component over the two phases**

**The project has two phases with a total of 47 activities under Phase I and 50 under Phase II. An overview of the attainment of Phase I is given below. Phase II has only started in January 2014, therefore the evaluation will provide information where it can.**

### Component 1: Promoting Credible, Transparent and Sustainable Electoral Processes

Component 1 has 5 main outputs: 1.0 Technical Assistance 1.1. Strategic Planning, Policy and Operational Capacities of INEC & SIECs Strengthened; 1.2. Electoral Systems and Processes improved voter through ICT; 1.3. Legal and Policy Framework for Elections Improved; and 1.4. Professional Capacity of INEC and SIECs enhanced. A total of **€**21,145,036.97[[39]](#footnote-39) is designated for this component, which accounts for nearly half of the funds.. The percentage of funds per output is shown in the graph below.

**Figure 4: Output Budget for Component 1 over the two phases**

Upon meeting with INEC, they describe the **project as responsive and flexible** and are satisfactory that DGD II is **driven by their needs** rather than the project dictating to them. INEC has recently highlighted to the EU and to the evaluation team that it is still lagging behind in key activities and now puts the following activities at the forefront of its priorities:

* Perfection of the Voter Registration
* Election Logistics
* Voter Education
* Prosecution of Electoral Offences
* Legal Framework
* Constitutional Delimitation
* Relationship with Political Parties
* Improving Internal practises
* Election Management System and
* Security of the Elections

The project without going outside of its remit is or will take on some of these activities such as logistics and the relationship with political parties and has already done much to advise INEC on advocating and developing recommendations for electoral reform. Other activities such as the election management system and prosecution of electoral offences, as well as the voter registration, will be taken on by other international partners.

A logistics position has recently been advertised, as INEC has felt that logistics and the delivery of materials has not always been smooth in the past and has led to delays and consequent frustrations with material arriving late in the field. A logistics expert should be able to flag major issues and devise an orientated plan to tackle some of the issues experienced in the field. Nevertheless, INEC commented that some of the logistical problems they had encountered may be somewhat out of the scope of the project. For example many of the delays are due to planes not leaving on time, and this is something that the project might not be able to mitigate. **The logistics person should be brought on board as soon as possible to enable his/her mandate to be as efficient as possible.**

Component 1 has five output targets although as aforementioned output 1.2 has now been transferred to IFES and DGD II will support voter education around the voter registration process instead. As can be noted from the graph above activity 1.2 has been allocated with the highest proportion of funds (over 26%) of Output 1 as it was originally foreseen to procure equipment to do the voter registration. It is now unclear as to whether any of this money will be distributed to other budget lines, as the overall budget for this particular output has been reduced by approximately USD$ 5 million according to the new Work Plan 2014/2015.

In effect, the activities under this component have taken a three pronged approach: *provision of technical assistance towards developing the 5 year strategic plan, technical assistance towards the development of the legal and policy framework for electoral reform and provision of capacity building initiatives and collaboration for INEC and SIECs.*

#### Strategic planning, policy and operational capacities of INEC strengthened

The Uwais report recommended structural changes to INEC and these were implemented in 2012 whereby the 19 former departments were whittled down to nine. The Commission is now made up of nine departments, ten directorates and four Autonomous Units at Headquarters; State offices have six departments and two autonomous Units, while Local Government Offices have two or three Units depending on the number of registered voters in each Local Government Area. The restructuring of the organisation meant that many of the staff have consequently left. Much of the staff took early retirement or were transferred to the States or the Electoral Institute. The streamlining of the directorates has made the work more relevant and there is now no overlap between departments and there are clear chains of command.

An electoral expert contracted by DGD has been assigned to work with INEC in January 2014 and a single Letter of Agreement has been signed with INEC enabling the project to provide three imbedded experts to the Chairman’s office that has been further strengthened.

DGD II also helped the Commission to devise a strategic plan. The Plan identified five strategic directions: These include:

1. Providing electoral operations, systems and infrastructure to support delivery of free, fair and credible elections;
2. Improving voter education, training and research;
3. Registering political parties and monitoring their operations;
4. Interacting nationally and internationally with relevant stakeholders; and
5. Re-organizing and repositioning INEC for sustained conduct of free, fair and credible elections.

INEC launched its Strategic Plan at the end of June 2013, although the recent restructuring of INEC has meant that some of the momentum has been lost and key drafters of the strategic plan have been removed or given new positions thereby weakening the implementation of the strategic plan somewhat. INEC admits that they are somewhat behind in preparing for some of the activities in the Strategic Plan. Furthermore, **INEC has yet to develop a monitoring and evaluation plan for the strategic plan** and therefore **tracking its successful implementation is still cumbersome and needs to be addressed urgently.** DGD is currently working with INEC to work out the modalities for a M & E framework. While the development of the Strategic Plan was assisted by DGD II, the plan goes beyond the full scope of the project and INEC is therefore looking towards outside sources to aid in the implementation of the plan. The development of a plan is important; however it is equally important that the strategic plan is implemented and those activities which are in line with the activities under the scope of the project need to be assisted in order to ensure that maximum efficiency both of the project and INEC are assured.

#### Output 1.2 - Electoral Systems (Voter Registration) and processes (Tallying and transmission) improved through ICT

After discussions with IFES, it has been decided that this component will be provided by IFES who have a better technical grasp of systems for developing and perfecting the current voter registry. The project instead will allegedly use the allocation of funds to disseminate information on the voter registration process. The target of the project will be to ensure that eligible women, youths and PWDs receive adequate information and education that enables them to register as voters and collect their permanent voters’ cards.

#### Output 1.3 - Legal and Policy Framework for Elections Improved

This component has a total of €2,412,000.00[[40]](#footnote-40) allocated to it which amounts to a little over 11% of the component. In general terms, this output has been very effective in yielding results. The collaboration between the project and the improved access to key stakeholders such as the CSOs, Women’s Groups etc. has enabled INEC to strengthen its relationship with them, and more importantly allowed the individual organizations have better access to INEC and provide essential inputs to the legal and policy framework. INEC has submitted a series of recommendations to the National Assembly, including the establishment of an electoral offences tribunal as recommended by the EU EOM 2011 and the Uwais Report.

#### Output 1.4.1 Professional Capacity of and collaboration between INEC and SIECs enhanced/Sub-output: Capacity of Electoral Institute and INEC improved and Output 1.4.2. Professional Capacity of and collaboration between INEC and SIECs enhanced/Sub output: Capacities of select SIECs including collaboration with INEC improved

Output 1.4.1 has an overall budget of USD$460,627. During the in-country field visit, the Evaluation Team was able to meet with 11 Chairperson of SIECs and received 15 questionnaires back from the different states.[[41]](#footnote-41)

The Following are some of the events that have taken place to enhance the capacity of the SIECs.

* Capacity and needs analysis for SIECs
* INEC-SIEC cooperation to develop and adopt norms and standards for democratic elections.
* Strengthen existing collaborative platforms and networks for SIECS through the Forum of State Independent Electoral Commission (FOSIECONs) to enhance inter-state election mentoring (peer review system)
* Pre-Election Study Mission to Anambra 2013.
* INEC/SIECs Knowledge and Experience Sharing on the Voter Register and Continuous Voter Registration (CVR) 2013
* UNDP Workshop to validate the report of the Capacity Assessment of SIECs 2013.
* INEC/SIECs Interactive Session 2013.
* A Step Down Bridge Gender and Election Module Workshop 2013.
* One day INEC/SIEC Committee Meeting 2013.
* INEC/SIECs Experience Sharing Conference 2014.

The SIECs all rated the capacity building as very effective and as having enhanced their knowledge. There were a few States, who claimed not to have received any training from DGD, and therefore could not rate its effectiveness. Given the many problems in Northern Nigeria, many of the meetings could not take place in the North[[42]](#footnote-42), and alternative venues were sought. This however did not impact on the attendance, and all of the states were represented at the majority of the events. As a result of the Gender Policy being established, gender desk officers were also established in all of the states, the project helped trained all the relevant persons from each State however it is unclear whether further training has been given to the other staff in order to mainstream gender throughout the SIEC and to obtain buy-in from all staff to ensure all activities take on board gender concerns.

The States that will be conducting elections over the next months, requested additional help in conducting elections, especially with regards to voter education.

**Figure 5: Percentage of outputs achieved per component 1 during Phase I.**

**Table 9: Status of the Intended Results for Phase I– Component 1**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Intended Results** | **Results status** |
| **Output 1.1. Strategic Planning, Policy and operational capacities of INEC strengthened** | | |
| 1.1.1 | Support development of multi-year strategic plan | Achieved |
| 1.1.2 | Develop and implement operational plan and internal business policies and process | On-track |
| 1.1.3 | Strengthen capacity for timely and transparent procurement of elections materials | No longer in the scope of the project |
| **Output 1.2 Electoral Systems (Voter Registration) and processes (Tallying and transmission) improved through ICT** | | |
| 1.2.1 | Support improvement and regular updates of electronic voter register | IFES will carry out this activity |
| 1.2.2. | Develop and operationalize a transparent, efficient and effective election results management system including tallying and transmission. |
| **Output 1.3. Legal and Policy Framework for Elections Improved** | | |
| 1.3.1. | Support INEC to promote and facilitate electoral reforms in collaboration with NASS – improving on the experiences and lessons learned from the implementation of the 2010 Electoral Act | Achieved |
| 1.3.2. | Strengthen INEC’s capacity to engage and communicate with Political Parties on registration, regulation, IPAC, and dispute resolution (ADR) | Partially Achieved[[43]](#footnote-43) |
| 1.3.3. | Support INEC’s capacity to effectively engage with CSOs, Media, and other key electoral stakeholders in promoting civil and voter education and election observation | Achieved |
| 1.3.4. | Facilitate public consultations of NASS and ad hoc Committees on Constitutional Reform at the National and State levels | Achieved |
| **Output 1.4.1. Professional Capacity of and collaboration between INEC and SIECs enhanced/Sub-output: Capacity of Electoral Institute and INEC improved** | | |
| 1.4.1.1. | Support institutional development for INEC Electoral institute – knowledge resource and curriculum development support and staff exchanges | Achieved |
| 1.4.1.2. | Develop INEC’s capacity for the conduct of training of trainers – using BRIDGE and other programmes | Achieved |
| **Output 1.4.2. Professional Capacity of and collaboration between INEC and SIECs enhanced/Sub output: Capacities of select SIECs including collaboration with INEC improved** | | |
| 1.4.2.1 | Facilitate capacity and needs analysis of select SIECS | Achieved |
| 1.4.2.2 | Facilitate INEC/SIEC cooperation to develop and adopt norms and standards for democratic elections | Achieved |
| 1.4.2.3 | Convene national conference on improving the legal and institutional frameworks for SIECS | Not yet taken place |
| 1.4.2.4 | Develop and disseminate advocacy tools and instruments on normative standards (model laws) for SIECS | On Track |
| 1.4.2.5 | Strengthen existing collaborative platforms and networks for SIECS such as the Forum of State Independent Electoral Commissions[[44]](#footnote-44) to enhance inter-state election monitoring[[45]](#footnote-45) | Achieved |

**Table 10: Status of the Intended Results for Phase II - Component 1**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Intended Results** | **Results status** |
| **Output 1.1. Strategic Planning, Policy and operational capacities of INEC strengthened** | | |
| 1.1.1 | 1.1.1 Support the Planning and Monitoring department at INEC to monitor and evaluate and coordinate implementation of the Strategic Programme of Action | On-Track |
| 1.1.2 | 1.1.2 Support INEC to formulate, implement and monitor the Electoral Road Map/Calendar for the 2015 elections | On-track |
| 1.1.3 | 1.1.3 Support INEC to actualize its organizational restructuring objectives | On Track |
| 1.1.4 | 1.1.4 Support INEC on External Relations and strategic communications with CSOs, media, and other major political actors (candidates & political parties) | On-Track |
| 1.1.5 | 1.1.5 Support INEC to formulate/review electoral regulations, procedures and manuals | On-Track |
| 1.1.6 | 1.1.6 Provide targeted assistance to enable INEC design and roll-out voter education initiative | On-Track[[46]](#footnote-46) |
|  | 1.1.7 Support INEC to operationalize its Gender Policy and Strategic Plan | On-Track |
| **Output 1.2 Electoral Systems (Voter Registration) and processes (Tallying and transmission) improved through ICT** | | |
| 1.1.7 | 1.1.7 Support INEC to operationalize its Gender Policy and Strategic Plan | Not yet Started |
| **Output 1.3. Legal and Policy Framework for Elections Improved** | | |
| 1.3.1. | 1.3.1 Support engagement platforms to optimize stakeholder (INEC, CSOs, Political parties) advocacy and input into legislative and constitutional reforms for 2015 elections | Achieved |
| 1.3.2. | 1.3.2 Provide targeted assistance to the EADR mechanism and processes | On-Track |
| **Output 1.4.1. Professional Capacity of and collaboration between INEC and SIECs enhanced/Sub-output: Capacity of Electoral Institute and INEC improved** | | |
| 1.4.1. | 1.4.1 Support INEC and SIECs to effectively engage and communicate between themselves | Achieved |
| 1.4.2 | 1.4.2 Support targeted technical training and skills development for SIEC Commissioners and staff | On-Track |
| 1.4.3. | 1.4.3 Support targeted technical training and skills development for INEC Commissioners and staff | On-Track |

### Component 2: Improving the Democratic Quality of Political Engagement

Component 2 has three outputs – 2.0) Technical Assistance; 2.1) Capacity of Political Parties Strengthened and 2.2) Improved Effectiveness of Targeted National Assembly Committees/Processes. It has an overall budget of €5,606,219.06[[47]](#footnote-47).

**Figure 6:** **Output Budget for Component 2 over the two phases**

**Overall the effectiveness and efficiency of this component has been quite successful** given the limitations that the project has to work in, and that most of the technical assistance afforded is at National Level. **In order for some of the outputs to be more effective, such as promoting affirmative action, a more state centred approach will need to be taken**. Although many of the parties state that they have a gender and youth focussed agenda, in practice this does not necessarily translate into women and youth being accepted within the party (especially at state level) and ultimately for a greater number of these candidates being put forward for the primaries. Nevertheless, in 2011, a significant increase in female candidates was experienced, however in percentage terms and in numbers, less women were elected than in 2007.

As there is no effective tracking system on candidates and political party finances, many women and youth and indeed PWDs find themselves with no support network and unable to finance costly campaigns. The Women’s Trust Fund was set up in 2011, however the money did not trickle down to all candidates and this particular fund is in danger of becoming extinct as it currently has no funds or support. Furthermore, although some of the parties do embrace the idea of affirmative action, this is not translated into action especially at the state and local levels.

A capacity assessment of the political parties was undertaken and the following weaknesses were found, especially amongst the larger parties:

* 1. Human resource capacity at the state and local level;
  2. Lack of effective internal communication between their national and sub-national branches;
  3. Parties’ limited abilities in use and application of technology;
  4. Lack of national, data-rich, and computerized membership databases;
  5. Lack of a uniform, consistent and accessible way of recruiting, admitting, and managing members; 6) limited competence in research and analysis that looks at their own performance and supports clear plans and strategies for building the party;
  6. Lack of an inclusive and research-based policy and manifesto development process that provides a clear policy framework for them to govern;
  7. Lack of ideological or institutional identities outside their ethno-regional or religious affiliations, or the personalities of their leading figures of larger parties.

Despite the capacity assessment, many of these issues remain untouched by the Project as many of them are either outside the scope of DGD II, or require far more resources than the project can offer. The indicators that this particular component wishes to achieve, i.e. 1) Democratic characteristics of political party governance and conformity with prevailing laws and 2) Adoption of measures by major political parties on internal democracy etc. are perhaps a little too ambitious as many of the measures adopted at headquarters do not necessarily trickle down to the State and ward levels and are therefore not implemented.

For example, a code of conduct has been elaborated; however it now needs to be disseminated not only amongst the parties in the capital but also at the local level whereby it is more likely to be violated. IPAC and the political parties do not have the resources to disseminate it, and would require support in doing so. A similar approach that was utilised to sensitise the media on the FOI Act could be repeated. As was stated above, to date the affirmative action to promote more women has not yet been successful to the point whereby there is agreement to have at least 35% of women as candidates, and at the moment it would seem unlikely that this will be achieved. Furthermore, one of the weaknesses that the political parties cited was the lack of a level playing field due to the lack of capacity amongst the smaller players and to some extent the fact that other international partners were only affording support to the “big four” political parties which tended to hamper the ability of other political parties to improve their capacity.

On the other hand, DGD II has built up the capacity of IPAC and thanks to the project, IPAC is now able to bring together all the political parties around the table to discuss issues however their outreach is limited as they require further outreach to the States and the lower levels. Furthermore, the members of IPAC feel that they need to build their capacity by being exposed more to international best practices both by undergoing training in-country but also being funded to visit international conferences that at present are allegedly poorly attended by Nigerian political parties due to a lack of funding. To this end, **although DGD has been able to be effective with the activities they are carrying out, in order to really have the desired outcome; more will need to be done at the grass root in order to make a deep impact on the process.**

**Figure 7: Status of the intended results for Phase I – Component 2**

**Table 11: Status of the Intended Results for Phase I– Component 2**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Intended Results** | **Results status** |
| **2.1. Capacity of Political Parties strengthened** | | |
| 2.1.1. | Assess political party capacity requirements for professional development and institutional strengthening with a focus on political party internal structures, management, policy and communication | Achieved |
| 2.1.2. | Develop a political party leadership program, to be hosted by appropriate institutions including select Nigerian universities, and establish a board to oversee the program | On Track[[48]](#footnote-48) |
| 2.1.3. | Develop the capacities of political parties to constructively engage with the electoral process and stakeholders (including CSOs) | Achieved |
| 2.1.4 | Support political party internal mechanism for promoting affirmative action and support to women, youth and PWDS | On Track |
| 2.1.5 | Develop and implement mechanisms for inter-party dialogue and cooperation | On Track |
| 2.1.6 | Support review of mandate of IPAC and implementation of recommendations | On Track |
| **Output 2.2 Capacity of national and zonal CSOs to engage in constitutional reform enhanced** | | |
| 2.2.1 | Support to national and zonal CSOs to hold stakeholders consultations and collate input into the Memoranda for NASS and ad hoc committees on constitutional reform | Achieved |
| 2.2.2 | Facilitate CSOs participation in national and zonal hearings of the NASS ad hoc committees on constitutional reform | Achieved |
| 2.2.3 | Provide technical and management skills, GE analytical skills, access to technical expertise and support to research | On Track |
| 2.2.4 | Support broad based citizen participation in the constitutional review exercise | Achieved |

**Table 12: Status of the Intended Results for Phase II– Component 2**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Intended Results** | **Results status** |
| **2.1. Capacity of Political Parties strengthened** | | |
| 2.1.1. | Support targeted capacity and skills development for political parties (particularly for party leaders and party managers) through the IPAC and the PPLPDC platforms | On-Track |
| 2.1.2. | Promote platforms for inter-party dialogue | On Track[[49]](#footnote-49) |
| 2.1.3. | Support political parties to constructively engage with CSOs, SIEC, INEC, and NASS on the electoral framework and process | On-Track |
| 2.1.4 | Support the operationalization of Youths Manifestos through the Nigeria Inter-Party Youth Forum | On-Track |
| **Output 2.2 Capacity of national and zonal CSOs to engage in constitutional reform enhanced** | | |
| 2.2.1 | Support the NASS to engage with CSOs to review implementation of the legislative agenda | On-Track |
| 2.2.2 | Support the NASS to implement key strategic priorities for the remaining legislative term, including recommendations of the CALABAR dialogue | On-Track |
| 2.2.3 | Provide targeted capacity and skills development support to key NASS committees of the two houses: Rules and Business; Ethics and Privileges; CSOs and Donor Relations; Constitution Review; Women in Parliament/Women Affairs; and the Electoral Affairs Committees | On-Track |
| 2.2.4 | Support NASS to develop and operationalize the Oversight Model Guide for both chambers of the house | On-Track |
| 2.2.5 | Support NASS to formulate and operationalize an ethical regime (code of ethical conduct) for both chambers of parliament | On-Track |

### Component 3: Enhancing Participation by Women, Youth and Other Marginalized Groups

Nigeria is a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and is obligated to ensure that women are able to participate in policy making and are able to enjoy access to equal opportunities with men. The Beijing Platform[[50]](#footnote-50) set a quota of 30 per cent as the so-called “critical mass”, believed to be necessary for women to make a visible impact on the style and content of decision-making. Following on from this, the National Gender Policy was approved in 2006 and provided the impetus for Nigerian women in 2011 to become highly motivated by the promises and measures taken by the federal government that committed to the provision of 35% affirmative action. To this end, the 2011 elections saw a sharp increase in the number of female candidates compared to 2007.

The 2011 election results suggest a regression from the apparent progress that followed the return to democracy in 1999. Only 9% of the candidates for the National Assembly elections in April 2011 were women. Only 13 of the 340 candidates who contested on behalf of various political parties for the office of governor were women. A mere 909 of the 10,037 candidates for available seats were women (9.06%). After only 25 women were elected to the 360 member House of Representatives, Nigeria is now ranked 118 out of 192 countries in terms of gender parity. **Source - Gender in Nigeria Report 2012 / Improving the lives of girls and women in Nigeria / British Council 2012**

**Table 13: Percentage of women participating in the elections since 1999**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Type of Election** | **No of Male Candidates** | | **Increase** | **No of Female Candidates** | | **Increase** | **Total Number of Candidates** | |
|  | 2007 | 2011 |  | 2007 | 2011 |  | 2007 | 2011 |
| **Presidential** | 24 | 35 | 46% | 1 | 5 | 400% | 25 | 40 |
| **Gubernatorial** | 471 | 646 | 37% | 14 | 73 | 421% | 485 485 | 719 |
| **Senate** | 737 | 805 | 9% | 61 | 92 | 51% | 798 | 897 |
| **House of Representatives** | 2,190 | 2,220 | 1% | 137 | 224 | 64% | 2,327 | 2,444 |
| **Total** | **8,837** | **9,218** | **4%** | **516** | **921** | **78%** | **9,353** | **10,193** |

The number of females elected since 2009 had been steadily increasing until 2011 when the number of women reduced by about 1%. The reason for this drop is unclear. To this end, DGD II sought to address the issue of women’s participation in the electoral process and dedicated €7,155,594[[51]](#footnote-51) to enhancing participation by women, youth and other marginalised groups.

**Figure 8: Percentage of women in the National Assembly**

The component is split into five areas: 3.0) Technical Assistance; 3.1) Legal Reform and Women’s Empowerment; 3.2) Pool of women aspirants for elective offices at various levels enlarged; 3.3) CSOs capacity to advocate affirmative action enhanced and; 3.4) Capacity of women holding elected public office enhanced.

**Figure 9: Output Budget for Component 3 over the two phases**

One of the main indicators for this particular component is that “measures should be adopted by government and political parties to reform laws to mainstream gender and women empowerment”. A lot of work has been done in this area, and one of the key gains was DGD II bringing women’s groups together and developing the 5 main key points. This allowed women to galvanise support on the same issues and present the so called “woman’s Charter which has five main points:

1. Inclusion of 35% affirmative action for women in the Constitution

2. To change or modify the language used in some expression in the Constitution

3. Residency/Citizenship/indigenship

4. The socio economic empowerment of Nigerian women

5. Non Discrimination against women” and advocating for its implementation.

The project is able to boast that four out of the five points have been thus far accepted. Furthermore, in 2012 a total of 7 reimbursable grants for USD$100,000 each were given to different female organisations emanating from the different parts of the country to carry out gender mainstreaming in the constitutional review process. Despite these efforts, the effect on the National Assembly has not been enough to sway them to accept Affirmative Action in the review process. Although it is not completely off the table, the likelihood of it becoming accepted is not very strong.

Having said that, gender has also been mainstreamed throughout the project, and thus various other effects have trickled down to the other areas of the project. There have been efforts to develop a gender policy in INEC, which is now in its last stage of verification. Nevertheless, the final draft has taken over a year to finalise due to the restructuring of INEC, which has had an overwhelming effect on some deadlines. The Commission apparently developed a schedule on the Gender Policy which is working with and DGD is providing support to. The drafting started with extensive consultations with INEC personnel. In terms of methodology, INEC personnel participated in all the stages through consultation, filling out of questionnaires and focused group discussions. The validation of the policy is now in its final stages. Nevertheless, the long process of establishing the policy and the fact that only now it is being validated may leave little time to instil gender mainstreaming within the Commission and for it to have the desired effect. Furthermore, probably due to the restructuring within INEC, some of the interlocutors from INEC claim that they were not directly involved with the drafting process as much as they had wanted to be and therefore feel they do not own the document as it stands now. A final reading with CSOs was due to take place on 14 April 2014 to validate the policy. It is paramount that all staff are trained on the policy and that INEC staff understand why it is important to mainstream gender in all aspects of their work.

As one can note from the table below, some of the activities are still pending or have been classified as only partly achieved as it is highly unlikely that they will achieve the result foreseen in the ProDoc. Nevertheless, it is important that gender mainstreaming and enhancement of gender and women’s participation in the electoral process will work in incremental steps - follow through is essential, and the small inroads achieved to date should be recognised.

**Figure 10: Status of Intended Results Phase I – Component 3**

**Table 14: Status of the Intended Results Phase I– Component 3**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Intended Results** | | **Results status** |
| **Output 3.1. Legal Reform and Women’s empowerment initiatives to promote affirmative and women’s empowerment in politics and elections undertaken** | |  |
| 3.1.1. | Facilitate and support targeted legal reforms and affirmative action to increase women’s participation in politics and decision-making working with NASS and political parties | On Track |
| **Output 3.2. Pool of women aspirants for elective office at various levels enlarged** | | |
| 3.2.1. | Support skills and capacity development for women as candidates and party leaders | On Track |
| 3.2.2. | Promote public awareness on gender equality and women’s empowerment through community conversation (grass root efforts) and media outputs and campaigns and outdoor activities (cinema, drama, dance and music) as part of voter and civic education, initially and specifically targeting local elections | On Track |
| **Output 3.3. CSOs capacity to advocate affirmative action enhanced** | | |
| 3.3.1 | Develop GTU strategic plan and facilitate engagement with national assembly | Partially Achieved |
| 3.3.2 | Facilitate and promote engagement between key stakeholders and NASS on affirmative action related electoral law reforms | Partially Achieved |
| **Output 3.4 Capacity of Women holding elected public office enhanced** | | |
| 3.4.1. | Undertake skills and capacity development for women elected to public office, through peer mentoring and coaching facilitated by selected “role models” and “change champions.” | Achieved |
| 3.4.2 | Support training of women legislators to carry out their roles of law-making, oversight, and representation of the interest of Nigerian women. | Achieved |

**Table 15: Status of the Intended Results Phase II – Component 3**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Intended Results** | | **Results status** |
| **Output 3.1. Legal Reform and Women’s empowerment initiatives to promote affirmative and women’s empowerment in politics and elections undertaken** | |  |
| 3.1.1. | Promote affirmative action advocacy and multi-stakeholder dialogue on women, PWDs and Youths in politics and elections to inform on-going constitutional and electoral reforms | On-Track |
| 3.1.2. | Support INEC to implement its Gender Strategic Plan and policy priorities | On-Track |
| 3.1.3 | Support INEC to develop, multiply and disseminate voter education materials that specifically target PWDs, youth and women | On-Track |
| 3.1.4 | Promote coordination platforms to empower the umbrella disability organization (JONAPWD) engage effectively with INEC and SIECs | On-Track |
| **Output 3.2. Pool of women aspirants for elective office at various levels enlarged** | | |
| 3.2.1. | Support capacity and skills development for women candidates and women party leaders through IPAC and other relevant platforms | On Track |
| 3.2.2. | Promote targeted grassroots civic education on women in politics and elections | On Track |
| 3.2.3. | Promote   the use of ICT platform to support  women in political space for advocacy and Mobilization | On-Track |
| **Output 3.3. CSOs capacity to advocate affirmative action enhanced** | | |
| 3.3.1 | Provide targeted capacity and skills development support to CSOs and other stakeholders involved in affirmative action-related advocacy | On-Track |
| 3.3.2 | Facilitate engagement and collaborative platforms with Ministries of Women Affairs and Youth Affairs as needed | On-Track |
| **Output 3.4 Capacity of Women holding elected public office enhanced** | | |
| 3.4.1. | Provide targeted training and capacity development support to elected women leaders | On-Track |

### Component 4: Strengthening the Channels of Civic Engagement

Component four is split into 8 different outputs and has a total of €7,696,123.90.[[52]](#footnote-52) The component works on strengthening both civil society and the media. These include 4.0 Technical Assistance; 4.1.1. Zonal networks and individual CSOs strengthened; 4.1.2. Civil Society engagement in Democratic Reforms and Monitoring supported; 4.1.3. Public awareness and implementation of Freedom of Information Act (FOI) facilitated; 4.1.4. Civil society capacity to carry out election observation enhanced; 4.1.5. Civil society capacity to carry out civic education enhanced; 4.2.1 Capacity of the Media to monitor and report on democracy and election related issues strengthened; 4.2.2. Capacity for Media Monitoring strengthened.

**Figure 11: Output Budget for Component 5 for the two phases**

A total of 11 grants were awarded for a total amount of $ 736.595,88 to civil society. The rest were afforded assistance by direct implementation. All of the CSOs who were recipients of either direct implementation projects or grants were very appreciative of the support they had been afforded by DGD. They were especially appreciative of the establishment of the CSOs roster, and felt that being assessed was important, and furthermore, receiving training on procurement procedures helped their capacity and enabled the CSOs to put forward bids. Nevertheless, there were some delays in the payment of funds, and CSOs considered the fact that they could not be pre-financed as a problem although they were aware that there was currently no alternative.

Many CSOs complained about the stringent reporting requirements and felt that it took them away from their other work, both in time and in human resources, and indeed reduced the amount of time they had to spend on the project under DGD II. They considered that it would be more efficient if the reports were quarterly in order to not take essential staff away from other duties and felt that the administrative fees were too low. CSOs also felt that the amounts available were not always representative of the market and that many had to reduce their fees well below established prices in order to obtain the grant.

The training on procurement and how to bid for proposals was seen to be very efficient and particular appreciation was echoed for the fact that the project assisted them at all stages of the process and that it was transparent. Furthermore, the establishment of the roster meant that the procurement times were cut down and therefore made it more efficient and less time consuming to launch requests for proposals.

On the negative side, some CSOs expressed their disappointment at the setting up of the grants, as it discouraged creativity on the side of CSOs, as the type of project was already carved out, and CSOs just had to present how they would carry out the activities. It was felt that this could have an effect on the process, as many CSOs have better insight of what is needed in their respective zone, and therefore the launching of pre-determined projects limited the scope somewhat. A mix of the two types of mechanisms would be ideal.

**Figures 12: Status of Intended Results for Phase 1 –Component 4**

**Table 16: Status of the Intended Results Phase I– Component 4**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Intended Results** | | **Results status** |
| **Output 4.1.1. Zonal Networks and individual CSOs strengthened** | | |
| 4.1.1.1. | Support CSOs assessment to identify zonal level CSOs and support capacity development program focused on research and monitoring using train-the-trainer and peer learning approach | Achieved |
| 4.1.1.2 | Support zonal CSOs to undertake and advocacy on deepening democracy at the local level | Achieved |
| **Output 4.1.2 Civil Society engagement in Democratic Reforms and Monitoring supported** | | |
| 4.1.2.1 | Support individual situation room members on relevant areas of research and monitoring | Will no longer be implemented |
| 4.1.2.2. | Support publication of regular newsletters, social media and traditional media campaigns on elections and democracy | On-Track |
| **Output 4.1.3. Public awareness and Implementation of Freedom of Information Act (FOI) facilitated** | | |
| 4.1.3.1 | Support public advocacy, education and capacity building for CSO groups, public and relevant private institutions and members of the public on the provisions of the FOI Act and its attendant benefit to all stakeholders | Achieved |
| 4.1.3.2 | Support quarterly roundtables between media and civil society on challenges to the FOI Act implementation – usages, challenges, progress etc | Achieved |
| **Output 4.1.4. Civil Society capacity to carry out election observation enhanced?** | | |
| 4.1.4.1 | Support CSOs efforts to undertake election observation, including through training, data collection and analysis during election | Achieved in the states where elections have taken place |
| 4.1.4.2. | Support CSO documentation and analysis of lesson learnt from election observation and democracy monitoring in general | On-Track |
| **Output 4.1.5. Civil Society capacity to carry out civic education enhanced?** | | |
| 4.1.5.1 | Undertake surveys to assess public understanding of democratic values and adjust interventions to respond to changing trends and needs | On-Track |
| 4.1.5.2. | Support the review, design and implementation of voter/civic education working closely with NOA, CSO and the media | On-Track |
| 4.1.5.3 | Establish an innovative small and medium grant scheme available to CSOs, CBOs, NGOs and associations to conduct voter education and public information activities on the deepening democracy values and principles | Achieved |
| 4.1.5.4 | Enhance CSO collaboration with INEC and other actors on civic and voter education including development of materials based on various channels of communication (print, electronic and new media) and targeting a broad spectrum of voters, but more specifically women, PWDs and first time voters | Achieved |
| **Output 4.2.1. Capacity of Media to monitor and report on democracy and election related issues strengthened** | | |
| 4.2.1.1 | Support capacity building for media practitioners’ forums and networks to report on election and democracy issues, such as gender, inclusive participation, legal reform, media reform (mainly private media), election related conflict management and democratic values | On-Track |
| 4.2.1.2 | Analyse and document lessons learnt in media coverage of elections in Nigeria, and specifically undertake a baseline study on the use of social and new media to promote electoral transparency and accountability in the country | On-Track |
| 4.2.1.3 | Train media practitioners on effective and issue based coverage of elections; ethical reporting, election violence, the conduct of live interviews, television debates, analysis of political party manifestos, etc | Achieved |
| 4.2.1.4 | Production of Radio/TV programs (including jingles) to sensitize the public on elections; creation of online media interactive forum using media such as SMS, MMS, Facebook, blogs, website etc for information sharing and interaction. | On Track |

**Table 17: Status of the Intended Results Phase II – Component 4**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Intended Results** | | **Results status** |
| **Output 4.1.1. Zonal Networks and individual CSOs strengthened** | | |
| 4.1.1.1. | Support targeted skills and capacity development of state-level CSOs – based on the CSO capacity assessment findings | On-Track |
| 4.1.1.2 | Support zonal CSOs to undertake and advocacy on deepening democracy at the local level | On-Track |
| **Output 4.1.2 Civil Society engagement in Democratic Reforms and Monitoring supported** | | |
| 4.1.2.1 | Support state-level CSOs to advocate for, monitor, and report on local-level democracy and good governance | On-Track |
| 4.1.2.2. | Support publication of regular newsletters, social media and traditional media campaigns on elections and democracy | On-Track |
| **Output 4.1.3. Civil Society capacity to carry out election observation enhanced?** | | |
| 4.1.3.1 | Provide targeted skills and capacity development support, and facilitate CSOs to plan for, undertake, collate findings and report on election observation | Achieved |
| 4.1.3.2 | Support CSOs to document, interrogate, share, and disseminate lessons learnt from election observation as well as local-level democracy monitoring | On-Track |
| **Output 4.1.4. Civil Society capacity to carry out civic education enhanced?** | | |
| 4.1.4.1 | Provide targeted skills/capacity development support, and facilitate faith-based organizations, Unions of teachers and other state-level professional groups to carry out voter education | On-Track |
| 4.1.4.2. | Facilitate the Inter-Agency Committee to engage with collaborative platforms for voter education curricular and materials development | On-Track |
| **Output 4.1 5. Public awareness and Implementation of Freedom of Information Act (FOI) facilitated** | | |
| 4.1.5.1 | Support the strengthening of FoI structures and coordination in Ministry of Justice, selected MDAs and CSOs | On-Track |
| 4.1.5.2. | Support public advocacy, education and capacity building for CSO groups, public on FOI | On-Track |
| **Output 4.2.1. Capacity of Media to monitor and report on democracy and election related issues strengthened** | | |
| 4.2.1.1 | Support the articulation of the media code of ethics and code of professional media conduct in elections | On-Track |
| 4.2.1.2 | Support targeted skills and capacity development of media practioners, forums and networks | On-Track |
| 4.2.1.3 | Promote innovative media programming on the electoral process including radio drama, SMS etc | On-Track |
| 4.2.1.4 | Promote gender and conflict-sensitive media reporting on the electoral process | On Track |
| 4.2.1.5 | Promote innovative options that optimize usage of ICT and new media as well as community radio to facilitate electoral transparency and public education | On-Track |
| **Output 4.2.2 Capacity for Media Monitoring Strengthened** | | |
| 4.2.2.1 | Facilitate comprehensive media monitoring during candidate nomination, campaign, E-day, and immediate post-election periods | On-Track |

# Means and Costs

**Budget/Financial Management**: The project has a duration of approximately three and a half years with a committed budget of approximately USD$53 million[[53]](#footnote-53). According to the original budget, a total of USD$ 63,475,787.82 was predicted which is approximately USD$10 million short of the committed funds and means that a further USD$34,718,191.92 would need to be disbursed to cover all costs as outlined in the original budget. The total amount committed and approved within the Basket Fund for the project was US$53,210,641 and is distributed as shown in the Table below.

**Table 18: Contributions to the Donor Basket – Committed**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Donor** | **Committed in Original Currency** | **Committed US$** | **Actual Disbursed[[54]](#footnote-54)** |
| **EU** | €19,100,000 | 25,131,579 | 16,823,341 |
| **DFID** | £6,000,000 | 9,345,795,[[55]](#footnote-55) | 3,992,311 |
| **DFTAD** | $6,000,000 | 5,899,705[[56]](#footnote-56) | 3,182,762 |
| **KOIKA** | 230,000 | 230,000 | 0,00 |
| **UNDP** | 12,603,562 | 12,603,562 | 4,529,182 |
| **Total** |  | **53,210,641** | 28,757,596 |

The monies allocated per component differ slightly between project management and all the other components apart from component 1, which accounts for almost 47% of the total budget[[57]](#footnote-57). After project management which is below the regulated 10% of costs, the component on gender and other marginalised groups has the lowest amount of money apportioned to it, with 12% of the funds, in comparison to 16 and 17% for components three and four; nevertheless, these figures differ slightly with the introduction of the new work plan 2014/2015.

**Figure 13: DGD II – Expenditure in USD projected to the end of Project**

As of April 2014, a total of USD$ 18,021,607 has been spent which is equivalent to almost 34% of the committed funds. The largest proportion spent so far has been on component four, whereby nearly five million of the anticipated USD10,126,478.00 has been spent.

**Figure 14: DGD II – Expenditure per component as of 24th April 2014**

**Figure 15: Percentage of funds spent per component as of 24th April 2014**

With the introduction of the **New work Plan 2014/2015, the total budget anticipated for this period is USD$34,347,084 which if all monies are spent will total approximately USD50m which is well below the anticipated USD$53m of the project. Nevertheless, it is unclear if the new budget also takes into account the technical assistance as forecast in the original budget per component for 2014/2015 (USD$2,000,174.39), as well as the overall support costs of 7% and the remaining funds** which have not yet been spent on all of the outstanding activities which were outlined under Chapter eight (especially given the fact that many of the activities seem to be still on-going).

**The table below illustrates how much money was originally allocated per component and output, and how much has been spent to date.[[58]](#footnote-58) The table also outlines the original budget proposed for phase II of the project and the new proposal as established in the new work plan 2014/2015**.[[59]](#footnote-59)

**Table 19: Overall budget for Phase I and II of DGD II**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Output** | **Phase I Budget** | **Spent to date** | **Phase II Budget (Original)** | **Phase II Budget (As per New Work Plan 2014/2105)** |
| **Pillar O / DGD Project** | | | | |
| 01. Project Management | 1,650,231.80 | [[60]](#footnote-60) | 1,836,023.06 | 1,549,839.00 |
| 02. Missions and Monitoring | 158,684.21 |  | 158,684.21 | 143,888.00 |
| 03. DGD Communications, Website, Publications, International Days: Documentary | 211,578.94 |  | 52,894.73 | 357,991.00 |
| 04. Staff Learning, seminar etc | 137,526.31 |  | 137,526.31 | 45,239.00 |
| 0.5 Rent, Utilities and overheads | 476,052.63 |  | 476,052.63 | 304,566.00 |
| **Total** | **2,634,073.90** | **2,944,818.00** | **2,661,180.96** | **2,401,523.00** |
| **Component 1: Promoting Credible, Transparent Electoral Processes** | | | | |
| 1.0 Technical Assistance | 1,385,553.71 |  | 1,576,337.05 |  |
| 1.1 Strategic Planning, Policy and Operational Capacities of INEC and SIECs strengthened | 2,115,789.47 |  | 1,576,337.05 | 4,160,634.00 |
| 1.2. Electoral Systems (Voter registration) and Processes (tallying and transmission) improved voter through ICT | 1,057,894.73 |  | 6,347,368.42 | 1,693,600.00 |
| 1.3. Legal and Policy Framework for Elections Improved | 2,115,789.47 |  | 1,057,894.73 | 169,334.00 |
| 1.4. Professional Capacity of INEC and SIECs enhanced | 4,231,578.94 |  | 5,289,473.68 | 2,641,722.00 |
| **Total:** | **10,906,606.34** | **3,609,918.00** | **16,915,810.73** | **10,195,290.00** |
| **Component 2: Improving the Democratic Quality of Political Engagement** | | | | |
| 2.0 Technical Assistance | 514,617.80 |  | 514,617.80 |  |
| 2.1 Capacity of Political Parties Strengthened | 1,798,421.05 |  | 1,586,842.10 | 2,956,515.00 |
| 2.2 Improved Effectiveness of Targeted National Assembly Committees/Processes | 1,798,421.05 |  | 1,111,052.63 | 1,159,127.00 |
| **Total:** | **4,111,459.90** | **3,801,414.00** | **3,212,512.53** | **4,115,642.00** |
| **Component 3: Enhancing Participation by Women, Youth and other Marginalised Groups** | | | | |
| 3.0 Technical Assistance | 211,575.06 |  | 211,575.06 |  |
| 3.1. Legal Reforms and Women’s empowerment initiatives to promote affirmative and women’s empowerment in politics and elections undertaken | 634,736.84 |  | 4,231,578.94 | 1,940,181.00 |
| 3.2 Pool of women aspirants for elective offices at various levels enlarged | 846,315.78 |  | 740,526.31 | 900,891.00 |
| 3.3 CSOs capacity to advocate affirmative action enhanced | 528,947.36 |  | 528,947.36 | 634,800.00 |
| 3.4. Capacity of women holding elected public office enhanced | 740,526.31 |  | 740,526.31 | 1,533,215.00 |
| **Total** | **2,962,101.38** | **2,687,237.00** | **6,453,154.01** | **5,009,087.00** |
| **Component 4: Strengthening Channels of Civic Engagement** | | | | |
| 4.0 Technical Assistance | 329,160.06 |  | 329,160.06 |  |
| 4.1.1. Zonal Networks and individual CSOs strengthened | 1,798,421.05 |  | 793,421.05 | 1,044,608.00 |
| 4.1.2. Civil Society engagement in Democratic Reforms and Monitoring Supported | 370,263.15 |  | 264,473.68 | 628,936.00 |
| 4.1.3. Public awareness and implementation of Freedom of Information Act facilitated | 1,057,894.73 |  | 317,368.42 | 964,076.00 |
| 4.1.4. Civil Society capacity to carry out election observation enhanced | 0,00 |  | 528,947.36 | 1,470,790.00 |
| 4.1.5. Civil Society capacity to carry out civic education enhanced | 740,526.31 |  | 634,736.84 | 1,360,808.00 |
| 4.2.1. Capacity of the Media to monitor and report on democracy and election related issues strengthened | 740,526.31 |  | 740,526.31 | 2,886,724.00 |
| 4.2.2. Capacity for Media Monitoring Strengthened | 634,736.84 |  | 846,315.78 | 1,269,600.00 |
| **Total:** | **5,671,528.48** | **4,969,220.00** | **4,454,949.53** | **9,625,542.00** |
| **Overall Total:** | **26,285,770.01** | **18,921,607.00** | **33,750,239.35** | **34,347,004.00** |

From the table above, one will note that Output 1.2 has been reduced by more than USD$5million, which accounts for the shift in focus on voter education on the voter registration process rather than provision of services to the voter registration and provision of transmission of results. It is felt by the team that more funds could be funnelled through this output or the component as a whole, as INEC will need vital support in assuring that the voter education is as comprehensive as possible.

With regards to component three, there is a reduction of approximately USD$1 million to gender, however this could be attributed to the fact that funds were spent on advocating for the affirmative action last year, however as this particular action has not yet had the desired results and given its importance to aiding the progress of women in Nigeria, extra funds could be used to carry this initiative, especially at the local level, to ensure that political parties at least incorporate affirmative action into their manifestos. Finally, it will be noted that component four has additional funds of approximately USD$5million[[61]](#footnote-61) whereby most outputs have an increase in their budget. Nevertheless, given the proximity of the elections and the essential role that CSOs play in disseminating information, further funds could be attributed to voter education to ensure a better coverage across the country as well as ensuring that different types of activities can be implemented in order to reach out to as broad an audience as possible.

The allocation of the rest of funds appear to be proportionate to the ends required, With over 46% of the committed funds still to be paid to the project, it is essential that international partners disburse the funds as soon as possible so that there are no unforeseen delays in implementation should the project want to work within the budget of committed funds.

# Impact

## Overall Impact of the Project

There are two expected CPAP outcomes: Outcome 1: To build national election management bodies (INEC, SIEC) capacity and promote sustainable electoral processes, improve public awareness and confidence, and boost civic responsibilities; and Outcome 2: To deepen democracy in Nigeria, and this aims to develop the capacity of National (federal and state) institutions, networks and processes (both government and private) to contribute to the further entrenchment of democratic governance. The overall expected outputs of the project are “to support key democratic institutions and processes and to contribute to deepening democracy and fostering of credible elections.”

In order to gauge the overall impact on these results, perhaps the proof in the pudding will not be completely apparent until the elections have taken place. The 2015 elections are expected to be more credible than in 2011, however Nigeria still has a long way to go before all the challenges of creating a conductive environment to credible, transparent and inclusive elections are overcome. The aim of the project is to construct the necessary building blocks amongst the varying electoral stakeholders to foster a more enabled environment however as it has been reiterated in this report, the project is at risk of various external factors, and the fostering of credible elections cannot be the sole responsibility of the project.

The aim of this particular evaluation is to assess the impact so far and to what extent the envisioned results in the ProDoc and work plans may be attained. As has been seen under chapter nine, the percentages of outputs under the original ProDoc that have achieved their required results so far are 47% (24 out of 37 activities). The entry of the second phase (Voting Phase) of the project with a different set of activities to reflect this shift will go towards substantiating the gains already achieved and will continue to build the relevant institutions to better sustain democracy in the future. The project has lent support to various institutions, such as INEC, SIEC, NASS, IPAC and different members of Civil Society and Media. There is no doubt that without the project, many of these entities would have not been able to build their capacity and knowledge around the electoral process. Through the project they have been harnessed with the opportunity to not only make a potential positive impact on both the electoral process but also to “develop their institutions and processes that are more responsive to the needs of ordinary citizens, including the marginalized, built internal mechanisms to strengthen their respective mandates as well as promoting democratic institutional development .

## Impact of the Project on the wider democratic objectives

By and large, DGD has had a **positive impact** on the democratic governance objectives. DGD supports and enables INEC to contribute positively to the electoral reform which if approved will have a positive effect on not only the 2015 elections but also on future elections thereafter. The cross cutting issues of reform which has enabled many of the key actors to forward their manifestos and submissions to the National Assembly is a significant achievement and has not only built the capacity of the organizations involved in writing the submissions but has had the positive effect of bringing different actors around the table to better coordinate and collaborate in their efforts. Furthermore, gender which is also a cross cutting issue has made some inroads and has in fact impacted onto the National Conference whereby women have now been included, and certain organizations were able, with their skills acquired through DGD, to submit recommendations to the process which has the potential to contribute to deepening democracy.

## Project Design

In general the design of the project was well conceived and relevant and looks to be achieving the majority of its intended results. Most of the outcomes have either been achieved or are on track; however it is difficult to quantify the benefits derived that relate to the specific outcomes. Furthermore, the project had foreseen possible risks related to the success of the electoral process by mitigating these through programmed activities such as ensuring that key actors including political parties, CSOs and INEC to come around the table to discuss upcoming issues and how they may be addressed. **The importance of bringing the different actors to dialogue cannot be underestimated and this should continue to be strengthened as the project goes into the phase leading up to the elections. The pertinence of the electoral reform over the upcoming process is known, and the project has galvanized as much support as possible to ensure that different actors opinions were shared with the National Assembly.**

Nevertheless, the National Conference has put electoral and constitutional reform on the backburner and thus has the likelihood of delaying the process or even derailing some of the inroads already gained. At the time of writing, there are only 10 months left before the 2015 general elections, thus providing a very small window for the amendments to the electoral law and constitutional review to be applied. In the scheme of things, it may be too close a call, and the desired impact the amendments are meant to have may not reap all the benefits intended.

Furthermore, although the project aimed to tackle many of the weaknesses of the process, a project of this scale which is limited in size, cannot expect to have a profound impact at all levels, especially at State, Local Government and ward levels, whereby the project has little or no access. To this end, the design and the appropriateness of some of the activities under individual components to reach the intended outcomes does not necessarily address all the ensuing issues identified by stakeholders, and even those that were identified may have a limited impact. Furthermore **the indicators to gauge the intended outcomes were not always SMART**[[62]](#footnote-62). The indicators tended to be too vague, and very few benchmarks were given in order to ascertain success. For example under component three, it stated that the percentage of women who were in the primaries could be an indicator, however it did not mention whether this needed to be more than 2011, or not. Furthermore, the design of some of the activities especially with regards to women, youth and the media tended to address the symptoms of the problem rather than tackling the underlying causes.

## Impact of Timelines

To date, there have been no real serious issues with timelines as such. As has been aforementioned, there have been some delays in the release of funds for various activities but this has not impacted on the activities. However, should this happen in the second phase of the project, it may have the effect of impacting on the process if long delays are suffered in implementing activities. **Activities under the second phase of the project are time bound and therefore it is important to mitigate any possible** Furthermore, some of these delays especially with regards to voter education on the review process were delayed as the actual process of review was stalled. The implementation of these activities has now suffered a second setback due to the taking place of the National Conference.

Despite the project stating that the policy is on track, the fact that the finalisation of the INEC gender is only ready 9 months prior to the elections, may have a lower impact on the process as expected. There is now very little time to build up the buy-in of the policy and to strategize to enable the best effect. The Commission is now in operational mode and must do their best to adhere to the policy end ensure that the strategy is designed and approved at the earliest convenience.

Furthermore, this could also be said for the strategic plan, despite it being approved almost over a year ago, INEC does admit to having some delays and there is not complete buy-in from all actors within the Commission. It is essential that the monitoring and evaluation expert is employed as soon as possible to make sure that the strategic plan is being implemented to its maximum effect.

## Disbursement of Funds

As a direct result of the early establishment of the project, the flow of the funds to date has not been a problem. The overall budget for DGD II is US$ 53,210,641. In the first year of implementation USD$ 12,753,752 were disbursed and in 2013, US$14,503,844 was disbursed and up until the 24th April 2014 a further US1,500,000 has been disbursed making a total of approximately US$ 28,757,596, which is equivalent to just over 54% of the total funds committed. To date a total of US$18,102,607 has been spent. Both the UK and UNDP still have to disburse over two thirds of their money, which if not done soon could lead to delays in the project.

**Table 20: Disbursement of Donor Funds 2012/2014**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Development Partner** | **European Union** | **DFTAD** | **DFID** | **KOIKA** | **UNDP** |
| **Total amount committed in USD[[63]](#footnote-63)** | 25,131,579 | 5,899,705 | 9,345,795 | 230,000 | 12,603,562 |
| **Amount Disbursed in 2012** | 6,943,492 | 3,009,027 | 1,569,859 | 230,00 | 1,231,375 |
| **Amount Disbursed in 2013** | 9,879,849 | 983,284 | 1,612,903 |  | 1,797,807 |
| **Amount disbursed in 2014** | None as at 24th April | None as at 24th April | None as at 24h April | N/A | 1,500,000 |
| **Total Amount Disbursed to date** | 16,823,341 | 3,992,311 | 3,182,762 | 230,000 | 4,529,182 |
| **Total Amount pending Total** | 8,308,238 | 1,907,394 | 6,163,033 | 0.00 | 8,074,380 |

The graph below demonstrates how much of the disbursements have been carried out to date. As one will note, **both the UK and UNDP have a large proportion to allocate** (34% and 35% respectively). In conversations with UNDP, it is unclear as to when they will disburse the remaining 44% of the funds. **It is essential that all partners maintain their commitments; otherwise this may seriously hamper the implementation and the impact on the project.**

**Figure 15: % of disbursement of funds as of 24th April 2014**

## Cross Cutting Issues

The inclusion and emphasis of gender and electoral reform as a recurring theme throughout the project is paramount to enabling the electoral process to be seen as more credible. Mention was made of other themes such as institutional support, elections-related violence, and inclusive participation (addressing issues of women, youth and People Living with Disabilities). The themes of electoral reform and inclusive participation have indeed cut across all four components and have all had a positive impact on the process so far and the agencies working on these issues. Election related violence and even institutional support have been more limited to specific interventions. Election Related violence has hardly cut across the components and very few events have taken this into account. With regards to institutional support, the project has endeavoured to support the different key actors; however institutional support has been strongest with INEC and IPAC and to a lesser degree the building of capacity of CSOs to undertake procurement processes.

## Gender

Gender was mainstreamed throughout the project under all the components, which has led to various positive outcomes. A gender policy has been drafted within INEC and is due to be discussed and validated in the month of April. Despite its potential impact on all aspects of the process, the gender policy although drafted in February 2013, underwent some changes and INEC expressed its disappointment in the drafting of this policy. It is highly probable that the restructuring of the INEC unduly influenced these claims, as some of the staff claim that they were not properly involved in the process and that its drafting has taken too long and the momentum was somehow lost on the way.

**Table 21: Women Elected to public office in Nigeria 1999-2011**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **1999** | | **2003** | | **2007** | | **2011** | |
| **Office** | **Seats Available** | **Women** | **Seats Available** | **Women** | **Seats Available** | **Women** | **Seats Available** | **Women** |
| **President** | 1 | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |
| **Senate** | 109 | 3 | 109 | 4 | 109 | 9 | 109 | 7 |
| **House of Representatives** | 360 | 7 | 360 | 21 | 360 | 27 | 360 | 25 |
| **Governor** | 36 | 0 | 36 | 0 | 36 | 0 | 36 | 0 |
| **State House Assembly (SHA)** | 990 | 24 | 990 | 40 | 990 | 57 | 990 | 68 |
| **SHA Committee Chairpersons** | 829 | 18 | 881 | 32 | 887 | 52 | 887 | - |
| **LGA Chairpersons** | 710 | 13 | 774 | 15 | 740 | 27 | 740 | - |
| **Councillors** | 6368 | 69 | 6368 | 267 | 6368 | 235 | 6368 | - |

**Source Gender in Nigeria 2012 – British Council**

## Capacity Building

A key component of the technical assistance was to “strengthen the organizational, management and operational capacities of INEC and to a limited extent the SIECs to enable these key institutions to better plan, prepare, conduct, manage and supervise the elections in 2015”. There is no doubt that INEC has been enabled to strengthen its operational capacities and the impact has been **largely positive**; however, in some instances there has been little follow on, or continued support for the implementation of for example the code of conduct for political parties for political parties or the INEC Strategic Plan. It is essential that plans that are drawn up or for example the Women’s Charter are given further support to disseminate the information thereof and sufficient means are given to track the respective progress.

## National Ownership

“Efforts to increase country ownership of the development process is a central pillar of the aid effectiveness agenda”[[64]](#footnote-64) and principles of *alignment and harmonisation* support the principle of *ownership* in the Paris Framework, enabling donor and partner countries to effectively operationalize and support enhanced ownership.

The design and implementation of the project despite being a direct implementation (DEX)[[65]](#footnote-65) project aimed to enhance national ownership and leadership. This is demonstrated by the response from all the stakeholders especially that of INEC and to a certain extent some of the CSOs. All interlocutors praised the project for being flexible and attentive to its needs. Furthermore, the ProDoc was drafted in direct consultation with the beneficiaries and the 2014 road map has a truly national stamp on it. Many commented on the fact that DGD is responsive to their needs and is a project that is demand driven. This ultimately has a positive impact on the institutions whereby they are able to gauge their needs and receive technical assistance thereto.

**The need for due diligence and the mechanisms available to provide technical assistance have proven to be effective**. Furthermore, at the behest of CSOs, DGD II undertook a series of training workshops to improve the capacity of the CSOs under their roster to partake in the UNDP competitive process by providing them with training on procurement procedures and how to bid for requests for proposals. This has had a positive impact on the CSOs, not only ensuring that they are better able to bid for proposals competitively but has also increased their knowledge in the procurement process and allows them to better manage their proposals for other organisations.

Furthermore the reporting requirements, which are considered to be too stringent by many of the CSOs has enhanced their report writing skills although perhaps diverts staff from other important activities which they undertake outside the scope of the project. Some of the CSOs complain that they are unable to cover the administrative costs incurred with implementing projects/activities under DGD II as the grants available only cover 7% of the costs which is not deemed to be sufficient by the CSO’s as in order to fulfil the DGDs requirements, they have to take staff from other projects in order to comply with these reporting obligations.

Finally, although the capacity assessment of the CSOs has proven to be beneficial, stringent requirements to receive grants and monies from UNDP led projects may disenfranchise a number of more locally based CSOs from participating in the process despite perhaps being better placed to undertake the chosen activities in the rural areas. Small-localised CSOs sometimes are able to have a greater impact as they are closer to the people and have better outreach, however unfortunately many of these CSOs are unable to bid for projects for lack of know-how and their inability to comply with the eligibility requirement to become a member of the roster.

### Analysis of the Components

The Program Results and Resource Framework outlined 47 indicative activities[[66]](#footnote-66) to be undertaken under the four different components. As has been stated previously, **the majority of the activities in each group under the four components have been carried out or are currently being undertaken and have or will result in achieving their expected outcomes.** Notwithstanding this, some of the group activities have had or will have varying impacts on the process and although many of them reached their established indicators, **the overall goal was not necessarily reached or was in fact distorted**. Given the limitations of this report, the evaluation will only examine various group activities under each component to demonstrate the varying impacts these activities have had on the process and its wider environment.

#### Output 1.3 - Legal and Policy Framework for Elections Improved

**Indicative Activity: Support INEC to promote and facilitate electoral reforms in collaboration with NASS – improving on the experiences and lessons learned from the implementation of the 2010 Electoral Act.**

The impact of this activity is yet to be measured; as the NASS is still deliberating over the submissions and it is unclear to what extent the recommendations made by the INEC have been taken on board. Nevertheless, the exercise to submit a legal proposal and to actually have the NASS consider it is an achievement in itself. The discussion to finalize the submission involved different actors, and has resulted in the strengthening of partnerships between different electoral stakeholders and has forged a new way ahead for INEC and its ability to respond to the needs of interlocutors such as political parties and CSOs. The projects indicator of ensuring that the elections are in conformity with international standards may be slightly out of the scope of the project, as it will depend on whether the NASS accept the submissions. Nevertheless, through the cross cutting issue of reform, the projects technical assistance to the standing committees has had a positive impact and has enabled all the relevant actors to come together to discuss electoral reform.

#### Output 1.4.2 - Professional Capacity of and collaboration between INEC and SIECs enhanced/ Sub output: Capacities of select SIECs including collaboration with INEC improved

The former strategic review of 2012 of the DGD I emphasized the importance of ensuring capacity was extended to the SIECs. This was taken on board by the project and various initiatives have been undertaken to extend this capacity to the SIECs. An important element of this is to enhance collaboration between the INEC and SIECs, which has resulted in a number of events, which have culminated in the strengthening of the two entities whereby they share information and lessons learned.

Gender training has also been given to all desk officers in the field, which has had a positive impact, although it is unclear as to whether this training has been further extended to the staff working in the individual SIECs. The Evaluation Team conducted a questionnaire, which was sent to all 36 States. The team received a total of 15 questionnaires[[67]](#footnote-67) back and was able to meet with 11 of the States personally. All respondents commented on the positive impact that the various workshops and training sessions had had on their work and understanding of the electoral process, and they all feel that they are better linked to the INEC, however this was sometimes dependent on personalities, and there are some States where this link is not as strong.

Some of the SIECs claimed that they had not yet received specific training; especially those recently founded SIECs and looked forward to being trained in the future, but had participated in a number of workshops. Almost all of the SIECS who replied or who were interviewed stated that they would like more training, especially with regards to voter education, ICT and voter registration. They all particularly highlighted the importance of promoting a conductive environment for elections through vigorous voter education, and believed that it was key to reducing post-election violence. Many of the SIECs also stated that they would require more support on convening the National Conference. The SIECs also would like to be financially independent from the State Governments and seek the clout of the project to help them achieve this (as was done with INEC in 2010).

### Component 2: Improving the Democratic Quality of Political Engagement

#### Support political party internal mechanism for promoting affirmative action and support to women, youth and PWDs

As has been stated in other parts of the report, the actual impact on supporting political party internal mechanism has not been as strong as envisioned in the ProDoc. The project has no doubt contributed to bringing the political parties around the table and the parties spoken to all confirmed the importance of promoting affirmative action in these three areas. Nevertheless there is still some resistance from incorporating these ideals formally and although most agree that it should be done, there is no established agreement especially with regards to a minimum quota of female participation This is of course reflected in the overall resistance to women’s political participation. Political parties wish to win elections, and due to the cultural/socio context, society is not yet ready to favour a female candidate over that of a man. To this end, although in principle the parties do agree to the quota, many feel that it is not able to implement the quota due to fears of losing the elections if they field a female candidate. The project has thus started dialogue between women leaders and leadership of parties on the one hand and INEC and Political parties on the other hand, to agree on voluntary measures to be implemented across parties. It is fundamental therefore to not only assure that these dialogues takes place, but a more rural approach needs to be taken, and thus a bottom up approach is needed in order to ensure these gains.

#### Support to national and zonal CSOs to hold stakeholders consultations and collate input into the Memoranda for NASS and ad hoc committees on constitutional reform

One of the strongest parts of the project has been its ability to **galvanize support from different interlocutors around key issues around the constitutional and electoral review**. The bringing together of different persons from various organizations has enabled different sectors of society to speak as one voice, and to agree on key issues to advocate for. This was especially true for the women’s organizations, which agreed on a woman’s charter that established a five-point strategy. With regards to assuring that affirmative action is implemented this is still an uphill battle, nevertheless due to the ground gained in regards to women’s issues in the review process, an **unintended but positive impact** on women’s rights, was the ability of women’s groups to promote the participation of at least one woman from every state in the National Conference. Unfortunately, affirmative action did not trickle down to the appointment of the headship of the committees, which only had four out of 20 women as chairpersons.

The review process is still on-going, and the various CSOs which were chosen to carry out activities under the Request for Proposals have suspended their activities until the National Conference is over. The taking place of the National Conference has relegated the constitutional review process to the backburner, and little time remains for the laws to be amended in time for the next elections. A small window of opportunity still remains, but the outcome of the National Conference may or may not influence how much time before the National Assembly has before it will pass the amendments. Should they come too late, this will not have the desired impact on the next bout of elections for 2015.

### Component 3: Enhancing Participation by Women, Youth and Other Marginalized Groups

#### Facilitate and support targeted legal reforms and affirmative action to increase women’s participation in politics and decision-making with NASS and Political Parties.

The project has had a positive impact on some areas of the reform process especially with regards to the Women’s Charter and also disabled rights. The Disability Law has recently been approved and it appears that it will go through as Law. INEC has also established a disability desk. With regards to women, although perhaps more work needs to be done especially with regards to women’s participation in political parties and their influence in party politics, many inroads have been achieved. A gender policy in INEC is about to be approved, however for it to have the desired impact, it is essential that all staff undergo a gender mainstreaming training in order to obtain buy-in and full understanding of mainstreaming the process. Although the gender policy is a major stride, the delay into its implementation may mean that it will have a limited impact on the upcoming electoral process, as there is very little time available to develop operational strategies to ensure maximum female participation.

As was noted in the Chapter on effectiveness and efficiency, the number of female candidates in 2011 actually increased substantially, nonetheless the number of women actually winning seats decreased. Much work has been done throughout this project, however not enough has been executed in order to have the desired effect. The impact will be minimal if a more localised and grass root strategy is not employed. While it is important to encourage women to stand for representation at national level, it is equally if not more important to ensure women’s political participation at local level. This will enable women to undergo training and preparation for national politics and will also boost women’s ability to perform successfully when they are indeed elected at the national level.

### Component 4: Strengthening the Channels of Civic Engagement

#### Support public advocacy, education and capacity building for CSO groups, public and relevant private institutions and members of the public on the provisions of the FOI Act and its attendant benefit to all stakeholders

This particular output has been **very successful**, and a several stranded pronged approach was adopted. The first was to put together various implementation levels, strategy meetings were held to bring together various groups whereby the sector was mapped. Effective implementation was discussed, and activities were designed. These included training and capacity building, using also litigation, the new media and new technology. Various groups used the law as part of their work. A mentoring programme was also compiled where 12 CSO networks from around the country were mentored in the use of the Act. Prior to the trainings, many CSOs did not understand the relevance of the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act to their work until these groups were formed whereby they were able to make the connection.

# Sustainability

A key component to any project which aims at enhancing further entrenchment of democratic governance is its ability to ensure sustainability after the closure of the project. DGD II was to run in parallel and build upon the capacity already attained under the previous DGD I. After the review in 2012, DGD II was designed in a way to provide in-depth support to the key institutions that have the ability to contribute and deepen democracy, and as a result should lead to fostering credible elections. The cross cutting themes of gender and electoral reform have most definitely had an important impact on the process, but perhaps some were missing from the project which could endanger the overarching credibility of the elections. These could include more legal training for INEC as it is not yet clear whether an Election Tribunal Commission will be set up, and they do not have the capacity to undertake a heavy caseload without further capacity. More emphasis on voter education and mitigation measures to reduce or prevent electoral violence could also be provided.

The principal focus of an average election support project is to deliver the elections and therefore not all elements of the project could be said to be sustainable. Nevertheless, **this is where DGD II’s strength lies, as it is very much geared to building institutions capacity to promote credible and peaceful elections and encourages dialogue at all levels to build consensus and establish forward looking strategies to improve the process and to deepen democracy.**

In order to measure the overall sustainability of the project, it is useful to consider certain areas that are used to gauge sustainability: **Policy Support Measures, Choice of Technology, Socio-Cultural Matters, Institutional Approach, and external factors.** These factors can be individual in nature, but their effects on the sustainability of a project can sometimes be interlinked.

## Policy Support Measures

The influence of **policy support measures** on sustainability is very pertinent. The EMBs for example have been recipients of donor support for many years and there is no doubt that capacity has been built, yet as the evaluation will examine below, it is important that policy support measures are adhered to in order to ensure sustainability. In the case of the INEC and the SIECs, it is essential that they have a supported structure and are enabled funds to carry out elections and maintain offices, as well as having an established and varied voter education strategy.

The importance of voter education cannot be understated, and it is an issue, which came up again and again during the evaluation. Since the election in 1999 with the beginning of the Fourth Republic the EU EOM as well as other actors have pointed out in all their report (1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011) the importance of strengthening voter education in many of the geographic areas. This is especially pertinent in the rural areas.

There has never been a common strategy for voter education. The big donors usually contract smaller NGOs or INGOs and most of the activities tend to be piecemeal. The NGOs usually produce small booklets and flyers and the language used is usually quite academic assuming a highly educated audience.

Furthermore, voter education strategies are normally devised too late, and are only developed in the last months of the elections. INEC has yet to develop any particular strategy for the 2015 elections. Voter education as well as civic education should be an imminent part of civil society training since it is a key issue in any democratic structure. The aim to translate texts into at least the main languages (12) is laudable but this normally results in a low impact. There are a number of other ways to reach the society other than booklets and flyers. Nigeria is a country where‚ travelling theatres are held in high esteem. Former governments use this opportunity to announce government programmes like birth control or “Operation Feed the Nation”. To this end, it could be recommended to use this type of means in order to do public outreach especially at the village level.

In addition, to get messages across, intensive use should be made of organizations like market traders Societies’ or NURTH (National Union of Road Transport Workers). The advantage is as well that these societies will become allies and make democratization their case as well. Use should be made of radio and TV whereby they should be obliged by law to give some time in their programme for the election and the political parties. If the parties have to pay radio- and TV Stations it will only be possible for three or four parties to raise the money.

Since all the main organizations working on the electoral process have announced that they want to engage in voter education, it is important for all partners to devise a strategy avoiding overlapping and to ensure a maximum impact.

## Choice of Technology

The type of technology selected is important, nevertheless, as DGD II is no longer dealing with voter registration, it will perhaps be up to the project to work closely with IFES to ensure that the type of equipment used is indeed adequate and is sustainable, with regards to its effectiveness, availability and cost.

## Socio-Cultural Matters

DGD II was very conscious of taking into account the different influences that socio-cultural matters could have on the project. The number of Women in Nigeria who are represented in decision making bodies is minimal and not at all in line with regional or national standards. Nigeria is a signatory to CEDAW and has established a National Gender Policy; however this has had little effect on women being enabled to partake in politics. Women face many barriers to access their civil and political rights due to socio-cultural, religious and economic limitations. The patriarchal nature of society, along with the high levels of poverty and illiteracy among women reduces their access even further.

In comparison to the elections in 2007, 2011 showed a decline, not in absolute numbers, but in the percentage of women elected to the National Assembly. The same trend was apparent in gubernatorial aspirants and contestants (See table 13). Despite the National Gender Policy, the State and civil society led sponsored initiatives failed. Furthermore, despite many political party manifestos claiming to be gender sensitive, their implementation was minimal.

Although the project endeavours to address some of these at the policy level (such as a drafting of a gender policy in INEC, the support afforded to the Gender Technical Group within in the National Assembly and the project’s struggle to promote affirmative action) the efforts need to filter down into the lower levels at the State, Local Government and Ward. The initiative in November 2012 to select six NGOs (one from each geopolitical zone) in order to provide support for women’s participation and mainstreaming of gender equality in the Constitutional review process‘ is absolutely plausible. This has allowed the NGOs to work with a longer (2015) perspective and in the long term that is what is needed.

The project is increasingly endeavouring to expose localized CSOs to ensure women’s rights are at the forefront of their agendas, and although it is imperative for affirmative action to be approved at the national level, it is equally important to concentrate on women at the local level, taking on a bottom – up approach. This would not only prepare women better for running in the national elections, but will also ensure that women‘s ability to have a voice at local level and to influence the process in a more profound way. Furthermore, although gender is being tackled by DGD II, a project of only three years duration may not expect to make large gains, as the underlying causes of women’s non participation is not tackled by DGD II. The mind-set of the locals, both the public and political parties at the local level need to shift in order to have a larger and more potential impact.

Meetings, conferences, workshops and capacity training for women at the grass root level is needed, since it will form a broad basis and avoid establishing a political elite who soon might have their interest in their own wellbeing. **In order for any gains to be sustainable, the Project still has a daunting task ahead of it and must go down to the grass root and activate women at ward level. In order to have a deeper and a desired impact on the process, more local interventions have to be made.**

Furthermore, the building the capacity of aspirant female candidates should start now and not a few months prior to the elections, and consideration should be given for international partners to somehow support the Women’s Trust Fund in order for them to have access to funds during campaigning.

## Institutional Approach

In order to ensure a shift in mind set, an institutional approach needs to be taken. DGD II has supported the restructure of INEC, which is a first step in creating a durable and sustainable institution. Nevertheless, the Commission needs support to ensure the proper and successful implementation of its Strategic Plans. The support also afforded to IPAC has enabled them to be better organised and to lay the foundations for an integrated and representative organisation.

With regards to the other institutions, such as the media and other groups and the National Assembly, the approach is not necessarily institutional driven but is issue driven. Some of the organisations have been supported with strategic plans and have received invaluable experience in networking and building their strategies around particular issues. In the medium term such initiatives can be sustainable, nevertheless, there are reports that after elections, many of the CSOs especially are unable to survive, as the money dries up and they are no longer able to undertake activities, as their internal structures remain the same despite having gained invaluable experience.

The same could be said of the National Assembly who requested more support to the Secretariat to better exercise their oversight and legal drafting role and felt that important gains would be lost as the project concentrated on parliamentarians who more than likely will not be elected in the 2015 elections, and thus much of the ground work that had been done during the lifetime of the project will be lost. Having said that, the amendments to the Constitution and the electoral law, if approved, will be sustainable in the law.

Concerns with regards to the capacity of the NASS staff have been recognised and the project has reacted to this and has recently signed a letter of agreement with the National Institute for Legislative Studies (NLIS) an organ of the NASS established for the sole purpose of capacity development of the NASS – to implement some activities in relation to law making oversight.

## External Factors

The enormous poverty, especially in the North, is not a condition where democracy can thrive. The fight to survive is overshadowing anything else. The conflicts between the so-called settlers/migrants who have left their homes because of the extreme poverty in their region and the indigenous population are mainly about integration in social, economic and political life. These conflicts have a long lasting dimension and date back to even before colonial times. They are assumed to have mainly an ethnic and religious dimension but this is mainly peripheral.

The native communities are in the vast majority Christians or traditionalists, while the majority of the settlers are Muslims. Both groups have used religion as a mobilizing force in order to suit their ethnicity. In reality all conflicts had and still have cumulative grievances. Even before Nigeria’s independence in 1960, political classes were involved in the prosecution of these conflicts, if they were not even responsible for creating the conflicts themselves in that the main reason for the conflicts is about the right to control political power at the local government council. They also point to that the ‘Settler consciousness’ is an evident factor and closely related to violence. Both sides have gained from their political ruling class whether at State or at Federal level but always to the disadvantage of the other group. This was especially evident in the Middle Belt in Plateau, Kaduna and Nasarawa States and caused a high death toll numbering thousands.

With the establishment of the LG Jos North during the Babangida regime the Muslim population, having the strong belief of being the majority in the LG, saw this as a step to introduce the Sharia in the State although the Christian population formed the majority. When the results were made public and the Christian contestant was declared the winner, it was called from the mosque that the elections had been rigged and now they should fight the Christians - which they did. It resulted in the death of hundreds of people.

The argument as to who is the owner of the land has led to many conflicts with numerous people being killed. This was a problem in many parts of the country and was not fought only between different ethnic groups but also within the same peoples. Nevertheless,

* New platforms for conflicts have arisen with the introduction of a democratic system in 1999. Already the primaries of the political parties are usually connected with violence and even more so during the elections. Furthermore, with the introduction of the Sharia in all Northern States including the Middle Belt (MB) (with the exception of Plateau, Adamawa, Taraba, and Benue States) an increasing agitation for the Sharia in Plateau State is taking place, which has a violent dimension and resulted in religious/ethnic cleansing in a number of places, especially in the LG Jos North. This may show that external factors not from within but from outside the States play a significant role. Despite the inauguration of peace committees, reconciliation committees, appeals for peace, establishments of commissions of Inquiry, committees of elders, eminent persons, coming in of military, creation of special police forces, work of (I) NGOs, a State of Emergency on Plateau State, religious based initiatives, research by institutions, a plethora of publications with suggestions about conflict resolutions was all in vain. With the activities of Boko Haram (an Islamist brotherhood), the common poverty in the core Northern States, and the pressure of new waves of immigrants from the Sahelian hunger catastrophe areas, the situation in the MB, especially in Plateau State has and will increase(d).

* At the same time, the MB States are facing a partly forced “Islamization campaign” which has led to the establishment of ethnic militias in dominant Christian areas. The political establishment, more engaged in the fight for power and the access to financial resources, has not been able to make a positive input in a peace process apart from several inaugurations of ‘Commissions of Inquiry’, which either have not been made public nor taken the evidence against the perpetrators into account and taken them to court. Nobody has ever been sentenced for his role in the conflicts though proven evidence exists. Attempts by the government to resolve the conflicts have failed and have even created more potential conflict areas. The main reason for this is that governmental institutions are suspected to act in favor of the one or the other group. Everybody knows the background of a politician and is interpreting any political decision as being in favor of his/her group/supporters. In such a scenario the belonging to a certain group might result in a life or death situation.

Unfortunately, the true state of affairs could escalate into a social revolution if preventive measures are not taken in time. It seems as if the Nigerian government is not able or willing to take drastic measures in order to quell the violence. Even another problem might arise: There are strong indications that Northern Nigeria might be a future stronghold for Al-Queda and other groups with an Islamist background. This has already and will have a strong influence on the political and social situation in the country and could have implications for the overall success of the project and its sustainability.

# Conclusions

The evaluation concludes that in general the project was well designed and is relevant and took into account the **extensive consultation with key stakeholders both at the design stage of the project as well as the updating of the current work plan**. Key issues such as the empowerment of civil society, and the media, as well as the promotion of the participation of marginalized groups such as women, youth and persons living with disabilities are key to enhancing democracy and are the foundations of the DGD II. The projects’ focus on the electoral reform has been necessary to ensure that all groups were included in the process which gave INEC, and civil society alike the opportunity to be involved and to submit their own amendments representing the different voices of Nigeria including the marginalized and those who are directly involved in the elections. **DGD IIs’ input to the reform process was further strengthened by the important work that was carried out with individual committees of the NASS and has contributed to the submissions being acknowledged and in their main accepted by the National Assembly.**

The project has further **contributed to the building of INEC, including in ensuring mechanisms, which facilitate their work and their organizational ability to conduct elections**. This is also true of IPAC, whereby the project was able to support the drafting of their strategic plan, as well as a code of conduct for all political parties. One of the **major strengths that the project can boast is its interconnectedness which has allowed the project to build networks across the board which in turn has enabled all the key stakeholders in the elections to consult widely** with each other and enabled **essential networks to be built** as well as ensuring that key institutions such as INEC, NASS and IPAC **forged important and essential links** with civil society and the media.

In developing the work plan for the second phase of the project, DGD II was cognizant of the importance of reaching out to grass root organizations as well as the importance of including a conflict analysis of the situation to facilitate the working of the project. Nevertheless, **it should be noted that although the project is aware of these two aspects of the process, i.e. the need for more local support as well as the analysis of possible conflicts within the process, the project might be somewhat limited in what they can do in these two areas.**

The projects’ aim to reach out to grass root organizations is key, however, given the short amount of time prior to the elections and the stringent criteria that CSOs must abide by in order to be considered to be part of the roster, **some local CSOs may be overlooked and unable to comply with the requirements to receive funds from the project that would enable a more localized approach to be adopted.** It would be advantageous to work with other providers of technical assistance in order to gauge whether networks can be increased by working with all the stakeholders working on elections. Furthermore, this link with other providers of services is essential to ensure that the “donor darlings” are not the only recipients of funds and that a wide spectrum of civil society and other organizations are being supported during the process.

The 2011 elections witnessed the “bloodiest” elections to date, and given the current internal conflicts, there is grave concern about the impact of current conflicts and the lacuna of voter education at the grass roots on the potential for violent outbursts to occur subsequent to the elections, and in some cases perhaps ensuring that elections do not take place in some areas. There are a number of actors working on conflict analysis, and these should be fed into the work of the project as well as the project undertaking its own conflict analysis. Once again, **it is essential that all stakeholders work together and share information as widely as possible in order to ensure that the most prompt and efficient mitigating measures are set up.**

Furthermore, the important gains that have so far been achieved **with regards to gender**, although important, may risk not having the desired outcome as time is running short, and it is essential to adopt **a very localized approach to ensuring that deeply rooted patriarchal beliefs towards women** and their political participation are eroded. In 2011, the number of female candidates increased substantially, however due to these patriarchal beliefs and the money centered politics of Nigeria, women were unable to surpass more than 6.5% of the seats which is even less than in 2007. The reason behind this lack of support for women is manifold, and a project of DGDs size may not be able to address all of these reasons in such a short time.

In addition, the evaluation acknowledged all of the stakeholders concern surrounding efforts to undertake a comprehensive voter education campaign. All interlocutors expressed concern about the lack of funds for this important task and **emphasized the essential role that voter information and information on the process could contribute to not only being better prepared for the electoral process but also for the potential to reduce conflict, especially post election violence**. Key providers of services do not have large amounts of funds to dedicate to voter education, and therefore all key providers of technical assistance should come together to pool their knowledge and resources in the best way possible. **It is important for INEC to lead the voter education campaign and for support to provide thereto.**

The importance of collaboration between all election stakeholders as well as the international partners is essential, and DGD II should take the lead in renewing and enhancing cooperation and collaboration with key providers of electoral services, such as DFID, USAID, IFES, NDI and IRI in **order to ensure maximum benefits are derived from all projects concerned.** **The efficiency and effectiveness of all projects concerned could all benefit from the diverse approaches and effective and cordial ways should be sought to enhance the best interests of deepening democracy in Nigeria.**

All beneficiaries of the project rated **DGD as being responsive, reactive flexible and demand** driven. In order to assure that the project continues to be result driven, **adjustments to the reporting should be made and the production of a monitoring and evaluation framework is key**. Some of the international partners would ideally like to see more results managed based reporting whereby the project’s capacity to measure at output and outcome level is enhanced rather than primarily focusing on activities.

To date a total of 24 of the 47 initially planned activities under the first phase have been achieved and the remaining are generally on track. The project is also on track to achieve the majority of the targets as outlined in the new work plan 2014/2015. Nevertheless, given the design of the indicators, the evaluation team concludes that the project may not reach all the indicators proposed in the original ProDoc as there are external factors, such as electoral violence, reluctance to promote affirmative action due to patriarchal beliefs and the heavy influence of politics over the electoral process which is likely to skew some of the key results of the project.

# Recommendations

## General Recommendations

**Monitoring and Evaluation and Monthly Reporting:** In general the project management is in compliance with standard UNDP Practices. According to the DGD II Road Map the project has streamlined M & E into all project activities to ensure best-practice reporting of progress toward identified outcomes. However, these are not presently reflected in the monthly reports that the evaluation team received. It is important that monthly activity reports develop a more honed results-based culture. In reports it is always a challenge to report on activities rather than reporting on results or the effects of completed activities. In order to aid this process, it is essential that a monitoring and evaluation specialist comes on board as soon as possible and an efficient Monitoring and Evaluation matrix is designed and adhered to. The reporting requirements should also adhere to this matrix. Monthly reports should where possible reflect what has been achieved and list the indicators of success. It should also highlight the challenges and areas of inefficiency and poor results. According to results-based management, quality criteria for results include the following five areas: 1. Completeness; 2. Balance (good and bad); 3. Consistency; 4. Substantiveness and reliability; and 5. Clarity. Although this criterion does not necessarily refer to monthly activity reports, monthly activity reports should be able to include these points to the extent possible in order to facilitate the writing of quarterly reports and annual reports and will have the overall purpose of identifying any challenges or obstacles for the intended outcomes to be achieved in a timely manner.

**Risk Management:** The Prodoc identified three types of risks, ie 1. Political and security; 2. Electoral Risks and; 3. Management Risks. As the elections draw closer and the current security situation especially in the North but even in the Capital Abuja deteriorates, the possibility of political and security risks impacting on the overall process and the outcome of the project are increasingly high. As was stated in chapter 8.3 of the report, UNDP does not always have the political clout to intervene or to even gauge the political or security situation as well as in other countries where a UN political mission is also in-country. According to the DGD II Road Map, the project intends to conduct periodic contextual analysis integrating political trends and conflict analysis. This is apparently to provide timely information and assessment of emerging trends during the wider election campaign period. This reporting mechanism with its inbuilt early warning systems will allegedly allow for timely detection of developing crisis and immediate intervention. Reports would be fed into the Steering Committee and should inform the project and donors of issues emerging and of the need for a rapid response intervention.

It is indeed a useful tool to ensure that these issues are sufficiently examined at the project level. Nevertheless, such efforts should be strongly coordinated with other entities with a solid background in security and knowledge of the country. The situation room is one key tool as well as CLEEN who are doing an election analysis of every state and at geopolitical zone which is funded by Mc Arthur Foundation. Other actors should also be consulted and consultation should be in absolute coordination with INEC. DGD II is the biggest contributor to the electoral process outside of the Government, but note should be taken that the success or failure of other similar projects can impact on DGD, as will any hindrances to the elections taking place themselves. To this end, as is highlighted under the section of Collaboration Between International Partners, it is essential that key resources are used and different sources sought for information in order to gauge the needs of the project in the face of the already identified political and security risks. Furthermore, it is important not to only feed the information gathered by the project to the steering committee but also to outside sources to ensure synergy and to enable cohesion between all the parties for maximum impact of any ensuing mitigation measures which need to be taken.

**Collaboration between International Partners:** The need for strengthened coordination and collaboration has been highlighted in the evaluation. The evaluators could not trace any particular areas of concern with regards to duplication; nonetheless, it does appear that there seems to exist some underlying tensions between the DGD project and other leading providers of electoral technical assistance such as USAID and DFID. International partners expressed that they would like to see more collaboration and coordination between the election projects and there are concerns that no single agency can have the desired impact on the electoral process unless events and activities are coordinated and are complimentary in nature.

INEC also expressed concern that many of the key events did in fact overlap, and that scheduling of key events should be coordinated to avoid the situation of stakeholders having to choose which event to attend.

**Website:** The website does not reflect the plethora of activities that have taken place over the last year. For example the roster only has some 200+ names on it and has not been updated since July 2013. There is no mention of activities taking place after June 2013. Ideally, the website should have links to the IEC Website and more information should be available about the different components.

**Creation of Thematic Group on Voter Education:** Interviews with all interlocutors highlighted the importance of Voter Education and the need for a comprehensive and strategic approach and the importance of reaching the grass roots and the marginalised in order to have maximum impact both on the electorate and to provide the potential of reducing electoral violence. Given the fact that the main providers of electoral support will invest funds and implement activities in the area of voter education, it is essential that the entities pool their resources together in order to compliment activities and to have the maximum outreach possible. INEC discussed the desire to work with other entities whereby they use a wide range of tools such as CSOs, political parties, theatre groups, media etc to disseminate their message. All actors involved in voter education should harmonise the messages and ensure that only INEC approved messages are disseminated. (Please see under other components for more details on areas of possible support). INEC should lead in the creation of a thematic group bringing together all the key actors including international partners and providers of services as well as key electoral stakeholders in order to maximise their efforts.

**Cross Cutting Themes: The DGD Road Map II:** The original ProDoc identified a number of cross-cutting themes that apply through all four components. These include reform, institutional support, conflict management and inclusive participation. In the DGD II Road Map, it suggests that conflict management be extended to a new cross-cutting theme of “peace building, security and conflict mitigation.” Suggestions are to ensure the embedment in the work of the PMU some activities that will provide on-going risk analysis capacity through contextual analysis and some M & E inputs with the longer term assessment of the programme in mind.” While analysis is important, and it is very clear that other organizations can work towards the capacity of the police and other security agents, it would be important to include in all four components activities and workshops which would address peace building strategies, and ensure that for example, in the programmes for voter education such a cross cutting theme is taking into consideration. While an analysis is needed of the situation, concrete steps need to be taken by the project to mitigate against these risks, especially with regards to post-election violence. DGD II could turn to other UNDP projects such as that based in Zanzibar under the Election Support Project, component 6 which strived to ensure that the Electoral Management Bodies and other key stakeholders were supported in the promotion of a secure and peaceful environment during the electoral process.” This involved key meetings with community and religious leaders as well as political parties, although some of these activities are already on-going, the project should work towards to strengthen these activities to optimize benefit and a sustained impact on the overall process.

**Table 22: Recommendations for Project Management**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Recommendation** | **Responsible Parties** | **Timeline** | **Performance Targets** | **Output** | **Outcome** |
| **Project Management** | | | | | |
| **Monitoring and Evaluation and Monthly Reporting:** | | | | | |
| Ensure that a Monitoring and Evaluation Matrix is designed and that a monitoring and evaluation specialist is in-country under a permanent contract | DGD II with UNDP Recruitment | On-going till end of project | A comprehensive M & E framework designed and implemented | Drafting of a M & E Framework /Matrix and recruitment of an M & E specialist to work in-country | The Project is better able to monitor the results of the project and to identify challenges as and when they arise |
| Restructure the monthly and quarterly reports to reflect a more results based approach | DGD II | On-going till end of project | Reports should highlight results of the on-going programme using indicators provided in the Prodoc and should highlight challenges and areas of inefficiency and poor results | Results based monthly and quarterly reports produced | Project will better able to identify challenges and obstacles to achieving the targets in time and the project will become more results orientated. |
| **Risk Management** | | | | | |
| Ensure that Risk Management is strengthened and coordinated with key stakeholders to the process | DGD II under the leadership of INEC and other key stakeholders in the process | Immediate till the end of the electoral process | To ensure that the project is well informed on possible risks to the process and the outcome of the project | Proper horizontal &and vertical coordination and information seeking mechanisms which feed information from and to the project | The project is better able to mitigate risks |
| **Collaboration Between International Partners** | | | | | |
| Strengthen collaboration and coordination between other international partners and the Project DGD | DGD with Agencies such as DFID and USAID | On-going till the end of the project | To create better synergies between all electoral projects to derive maximum impact | Renewed and strengthened dialogue with all main stakeholders for the provision of technical assistance services | The potential impact on the process is intensified, avoids duplication and key partners work on areas where their strengths lie |
| **WEBSITE** | | | | | |
| Ensure that the website is consistently updated | DGD II | On-going till end of Project | To improve the outreach of the website and to make more comprehensive and updated information available | Better and more informative website | The website can be used as a principal source of information |
| **THEMATIC WORKING GROUP** | | | | | |
| Create a Strategic Thematic Group on Voter Education led by INEC | INEC with the support of DGD | Immediately till end of elections | To enable a more synergised and strategic approach towards voter education | Creation of a working thematic group meeting on a regular basis in order to strategize on voter education approaches | A more informed electorate improving the credibility and transparency of the process and potentially mitigating some areas of electoral violence |
| **CROSS CUTTING ISSUES** | | | | | |
| Review the impact of cross cutting issues such as gender, reform and conflict analysis across all components and ensure that all component heads include how they are being mainstreamed in monthly reports | DGD II with the lead by INEC and Component Heads | Immediately till end of elections | To reduce the amount of conflict related events as compared to 2011 elections | The mainstreaming of key cross cutting issues across the project and ensuring that these are reflected in reporting and all activities leading up till the election | The project will ensure that important aspects of key cross cutting issues impact on all parts of the project and contribute to a more peaceful, transparent and credible electoral process. |

## Component one:

**Implementation of Strategic Plan:** The implementation of the strategic plan has been somewhat stalled due to the restructuring of the INEC and the momentum lost in its implementation due to many of the drafters of said plan leaving the Commission. The INEC has admitted that they are behind in some areas of the plan and do not yet possess a monitoring and evaluation mechanism to track its implementation. The DGD project hopes to employ a person part time to design an M & E Framework and to support INEC in its implementation. Less than 10 months remain prior to the elections, therefore it is essential that the implementation of the plan is strengthened and all activities relating to the project are implemented and monitored properly. For those activities that fall outside the remit of the Project but are included in the plan, it would be useful for the project to help the commission to keep track of these activities and to ensure that the implementing partners lending support to them are aware of the future M & E plan and assure adherence thereto.

**Consider providing legal assistance to the legal department:** It is unlikely that an elections tribunal will be set up prior to the next elections, which will mean that INEC will have to deal with a huge caseload. It is essential that they are provided with resources and further capacity on how to cope with this workload, including a proper database to record the cases, and to receive training on the election related law.

**Strengthen and Support Gender Unit and Gender Desks:** Both INEC and the SIECs all have a corresponding gender desk and focal point and all have received training on gender and elections. While training of the gender focal points is important, it is essential that integration of gender at all levels of the work of the Electoral Commissions is assured. In order to do this, all staff (or at least heads of department) should receive training on gender mainstreaming and why it is important to the electoral process. Once the gender policy is endorsed, the gender desk should set up an internal meeting on how best to strategize to implement the policy and what contribution each department can make to ensuring that the policy is implemented and has the desired impact. Buy-in from the EMBs is important. With only ten months remaining before the elections, a strategic plan needs to be finalised and different departments should ensure that gender is mainstreamed into all aspects of their work. Under no circumstances should the gender unit stand alone, gender concerns need to cut across all areas of the implementation of the electoral process.

**Voter Education Strategy:** INEC is keen to ensure that voter education is strengthened for the 2015 elections but do not have the financial or human resources to assure maximum outreach. Different stakeholders are working on voter education at varying levels of the country and adopt different approaches. Sometimes voter education is carried out by individual CSOs or even political parties, however a uniform message is not delivered and materials are used which are not always approved by the Election Commission. To this end, it is important to devise a strategy which has the possibility to outreach to the grassroots and that each entity working on voter education can somehow come together to collaborate and maximise their efforts. Overlap of efforts is foreseen here, therefore it is important to coordinate what is being done in the field, and what type of tools are being used and those that should be used for such a strategy. Furthermore it is important, where possible, to ensure that voter education is tailored to the local needs, and that one strategy is not devised at national level and thus filters down to the state levels. Where possible, local means such as travelling theatres and other resources, should be used to disseminate the message. This can be done with the use of discretionary grants whereby different entities are awarded individual grants based on their own individual proposals. It is important to ensure that geopolitical realities are included, and therefore the project should avoid disbursing grants based on an already established request for proposal.

**Table 23: Recommendations for Component I**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Recommendation** | **Responsible Parties** | **Timeline** | **Performance Targets** | **Output** | **Outcome** |
|  | | | | | |
| **IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGIC PLAN** | | | | | |
| Ensure continued support to INEC in implementing their Strategic Plan and to devise a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation strategy | INEC and DGD II and possible other partners lending support to the implementation of its activities therein | Immediate to end of project with special emphasis on timelines for the upcoming period prior to elections | Successful implementation of the strategic plan according to established timelines. | Support to devising a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation framework as well as training of INEC Staff to ensure adequate tracking of the plan | INEC improves on efficiency |
| **Gender policy** | | | | | |
| Strengthen the support to the gender desk to ensure proper and strategic implementation of the gender policy | Gender Units with the support of DGD II | On-going | Gender is successfully mainstreamed across all departments of the election commission | Support to INEC and SIECs on training key members of staff on gender policy as well as support to strategic sessions on how to mainstream gender into the everyday work of the commission | INEC becomes more gender sensitive and the elections are more gender sensitive |
| **VOTER Education** | | | | | |
| Devise a voter education strategy with INEC and possibly the SIECs for conducting local elections and general elections and ensure that this is in line with other international partners’ programmes to ensure complementarity and maximum impact | INEC with support of DGD II and other key stakeholders | Immediate to end of general elections | Voter education is more strategic and targets marginalised groups and outreaches to the grass roots | Devising of a strategy which cuts across all sectors and uses different tools for maximum outreach | Electorate is more informed which should lead to more credible and transparent elections. |
| **SUPPORT LEGAL CAPACITY** | | | | | |
| Support INEC to build their legal capacity | DGD II and INEC | As soon as possible | INEC is better able to cope with the caseload of election cases | Provision of training and possible resources to facilitate work on legal issues in conjunction with the elections | INEC is better able to cope with the caseload and this will contribute to a more efficient delivery of judgements and may quell post election violence and add credibility to the process |

## Component two:

**Support to IPAC in implementing its Strategic Plan:** The project has supported IPAC in producing a strategic plan however, IPAC still needs support to implement said plan. DGD II could provide support on how to track implementation and ensure that an adequate monitoring and evaluation framework is established. It could also be useful to suggest the drafting of a gender and disabled policy for those working directly with IPAC

**Support Political Party Structures/IPAC at state level:** IPAC would like to strengthen its outreach to the state levels as at the moment it considers that it is difficult to ensure that the code of conduct or other key decisions made at international level translate into positive action at the state level and beyond. To this end, IPAC requires further resources and support to strengthen their mandate at the lower levels which will have more chance of influencing policies such as affirmative action on women, youth and people living with disabilities for example.

**Support IPAC to participate in international for a:** In order to strengthen the capacity of IPAC, it is essential that they are exposed to other best practices in the region, whereby they could forge new and useful networks as well as engage in exchange visits which would strengthen their knowledge and capacity and allow them to develop new strategies to be adapted to the Nigerian context.

**Support to IPAC and Political parties to disseminate the code of conduct at local level:** As of May 2014, some political parties have already embarked on election campaigns. Therefore it is essential that the code of conduct is disseminated to a wide an audience as possible. It is important that all political parties at all levels are familiar with the document and that civil society, the media and even the general public have knowledge of the code of conduct in order to hold the political parties accountable thereto. IPAC does not have the funds to disseminate the code of conduct, therefore activities similar to those that were embarked upon to disseminate information on the freedom of information Act could be used in order to sensitise the key stakeholders of its content.

**Increased Support to the National Assembly:** Subsequent to signing the recent Letter of Agreement with NLIS, it is important that Secretariat staff are provided with key basic training on legal and budgetary oversight as well as supporting the NASS analysing laws from a gender perspective. With the term of the current National Assembly expiring in 2015, the Project could help support the drafting of an introductory curriculum for all new comers to the National Assembly in order to equip them with key and basic skills at the commencement of their legislature.

**Table 24: Recommendations for Component Two**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Recommendation** | **Responsible Parties** | **Timeline** | **Performance Targets** | **Output** | **Outcome** |
| **SUPPORT TO IPAC** | | | | | |
| **STRATEGIC PLAN** | | | | | |
| Support IPAC in implementing its strategic plan as well as developing an M & E Framework | DGD II and IPAC | As soon as possible | To enable IPAC to work according to an organisational framework | Support to IPAC in tracking the strategic plan as well as development of a M & E framework | IPAC is more organised and is better able to work according to its mandate |
| **SUPPORT TO INCREASE PARTICPATION AT LOCAL LEVEL** | | | | | |
| Support IPAC to increase its outreach at local level | DGD II, Political Parties and IPAC | As soon as possible and at least at State Level | To have IPAC offices established in each State | Support to IPAC to establish offices or representatives at State level | IPAC is better able to penetrate at the state level ensuring that all principal decisions taken at national level filter down to the State level and beyond |
| **SUPPORT TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERNATIONAL for a** | | | | | |
| Enable IPAC to participate in international for a both inside and outside of the country | DGD II and IPAC | Participation of at least two events in the life of the project | Sponsor IPAC members to participate actively in international fora | Resource support to attend events and to help in preparation for said event(s) | IPAC members are more familiar with best practices in the region and are able to contribute actively to international for a and debate |
| **DISSEMINATION OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT AT LOCAL LEVELS** | | | | | |
| Provide resources and support to aid in the dissemination of the code of conduct at local levels | DGD II, IPAC, Civil Society, Media and Political Parties | Over the course of 2014 prior to the start of election campaign | To hold various workshops and distribute information on different types of media on the code of conduct | Support in resources for dissemination of code of conduct as well as support to information workshops | The code of conduct will be more known by all concerned parties, and the general public, media and civil society can hold the political parties to account for violation of said code |
| **INCREASED SUPPORT TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY** | | | | | |
| Support the NLIS develop a curriculum for parliamentarians which includes training on the role of a parliamentarian, legal oversight, & budgetary oversight. It should also include how to draft gender sensitive laws and budgets. | DGD II with NLIS | Prior to the new legislative term | Creation of a recognised curriculum for new parliamentarians | Curriculum | Newcomers to the parliament as well as secretariat staff are better able to exercise their duties and are able to ensure gender sensitive policies |

## Component three: Women, Youth and People with Disabilities

**Invest in more local support to women’s groups to promote affirmative action:** Important inroads have been made with regards to women’s political participation, however not enough has been yet done to have a deep impact on the process. It is essential that affirmative action advocacy as well as the dissemination of the five-point women’s charter is disseminated across the nation. Important ground has been made at the national level, but pressure has not yet emanated from the grass roots or local governmental levels. The women’s charter needs to be used as a key document and therefore needs to be further disseminated at all levels and even if all the points are not accepted, civil society should continue to advocate for women’s female participation at all levels. This advocacy should also aim to include men and religious and community leaders in order to ensure that men also buy-in to women’s political participation and mind-sets are eventually changed.

**Consider supporting religious and community leaders to sensitise female political participation at all levels:** Conducting various round tables as well as workshops, especially geared towards religious and community leaders and influential male figures is important to enabling that women’s political participation is accepted. In other Islamic countries, such as Afghanistan, the Election Authorities along with UNDP worked with the local religious leaders to issue a Fatwa to ensure female political participation in the upcoming elections. Similar initiatives could be explored.

**Identify key female aspirants and provide training on how to conduct an effective campaign with both political parties and the general public**: Many women were able to candidate themselves at the last elections, however they were not elected as candidates. To this end, women must be enabled to conduct effective campaigns both amongst their political parties and also amongst the general public. Women should be identified well in advance and afforded capacity support on how to conduct an effective campaign. This needs to take place well in advance of the upcoming primaries to ensure that women are offered the best chance possible of being selected by their political parties and then consequentially by the voters themselves.

**Galvanise support amongst CSOs, Ministry of Women’s Affairs and other entities to support the Women’s Trust and to aid female candidates in their campaign**: Support should emanate from the State, LGA and Ward level is possible. Certain CSOs and other entities could receive training on different strategies for better campaigning, including on how to write and present speeches, how to present platforms, fundraise, and how to approach other important persons to galvanise support. The use of different media including the social media to campaign to galvanise support should also be included in the workshops. These key entities could then impart workshops in all six geo political areas of the country and endeavour to reach out to as many women as possible. The women’s network and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs should reach out to their networks in order to encourage candidates.

**Engage women’s rights experts to aid INEC in implementing and developing their gender strategy:** It is essential that different women’s groups and experts are linked with INEC in order to ensure proper development of an effective strategy to ensure female participation at all levels of the electoral process. This should also involve key dialogue on how to protect women from electoral violence and how to reduce electoral violence against women so as to encourage their full participation in the electoral process.

**Engage women’s, youth and disability rights experts with political parties to promote and encourage affirmative action:** The project needs to explore all avenues to ensure that political parties are implementing affirmative action at all levels of political parties. Many of the rights experts and organisations have a strong outreach to different groups across the country, and these networks should be utilised and political parties should be provided link with these.

**Table 25: Recommendations for Component Three**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Recommendation** | **Responsible Parties** | **Timeline** | **Performance Targets** | **Output** | **Outcome** |
| **Component three: Women, youth and people with disabilities** | | | | | |
| Invest in more local support to women’s groups to promote affirmative action | DGD II, Women’s Groups, Media and Political Parties | As soon as possible | To enable women’s groups at local level to be able to advocate for affirmative action | Support to CSOs on advocacy for affirmative action | Women groups are better sensitised to women’s affirmative action and are able to advocate at local levels for women’s rights. |
| **Support to religious and community leaders to sensitise female political participation at local level** | | | | | |
| Conduct various sensitisation initiatives to engage religious and community leaders on the importance of female political participation. | DGD II, civil society and media | Over the upcoming period prior to the elections and its campaign | To increase female participation in the elections at all levels and to ensure better acceptance of female political participation in the society as a whole | To conduct workshops and roundtables to sensitise specific religious and community leaders | Religious and community leaders are more prone to advocate for women’s political participation and become the spokespersons for women and the importance of them participation in the electoral process. |
| **Identify key female aspirants and provide Training on how to conduct effective campaigns** | | | | | |
| Identify key female aspirants and provide training on how to conduct an effective campaign with both political parties and the general public | DGD II in collaboration with political parties and CSOs familiar with possible aspirants | As soon as possible and well before the primaries take place | To increase the quality of female aspirants and their chances of winning primaries as well as the general elections | Provision of training | More women will be prepared to conduct efficient campaigns |
| **Galvanise support amongst key institutions to encourage support for the Women’s Trust Fund and provide support for women to campaign** | | | | | |
| Conduct dialogues with different entities working on women to encourage support for the Women’s Trust Fund and to develop a locally based training programme around the country for female aspirants | DGD II in collaboration with key institutions working on women | As soon as possible and well before the primaries take place | To ensure that women are afforded with support to financing and carrying out their campaigns | Provision of a series of roundtables and dialogues | Women are able to enjoy a more equal playing field with regards to participating as candidates in the electoral process |
| **Engage Women’s Rights experts to aid INEC in implementing their gender policy and to develop a gender strategy for the upcoming elections** | | | | | |
| Ensure sufficient dialogue between INEC and other women’s groups to ensure effective implementation and development of a gender strategy | DGD II with INEC and other groups | As soon as possible and for the duration of the electoral process | To ensure that INEC is fully implementing their gender policy and to assure that all activities and policies implemented by INEC are gender sensitive | Facilitate links between INEC and the relevant stakeholders | The electoral process is more gender sensitive and the participation of women in all areas of the process is enabled. |
| **Engage Women’s, Youth and disability rights experts with political parties to encourage affirmative action in the parties** | | | | | |
| Provide dialogue forums with different rights experts with political parties to encourage and promote affirmative action | DGD II with Political parties and other relevant groups | As soon as possible and for the duration of the electoral process | To promote the use of affirmative action in political parties at all levels | Facilitate dialogue forums with different rights experts and political parties | The electoral process should be more inclusive of women, youth and persons living with disabilities. |

## Component four: Civil society and the Media

**Outreach to more localised CSOs needs to be undertaken in order to galvanise the extent of the reach into the local areas to have a better impact:** Promote the use of discretionary grants to enable localised CSOs to carry out activities. Many of the grass root CSOs may not be able to comply with the criteria under the roster. However, small discretionary grants could be considered for them to carry out activities to improve their competence and to increase the outreach to the more hard to reach zones. These types of grants could also be offered to theatre groups and others in order to conduct small events on voter registration.

**Monitoring of voter education activities conducted by civil society organisations should be established:** A number of grants and awards have already been distributed however it is essential that the project is enabled to ensure proper monitoring of the activities and the impact that they had over the process. This could include on-sight monitoring, as well as pre-established questionnaires to be filled out by certain beneficiaries of voter education. Monitoring should not be only assured by reporting by the individual organisations, but outreach needs to be made to the beneficiaries to ensure quality results from the activities.

**Media should be supported in tracking violations of the code of conduct during the campaign and their legal capacity should be strengthened to carry out monitoring:** The media should receive essential training on the code of conduct of the political parties and be enabled to enter dialogue with the political parties to effectively monitor their conduct on national media. Their legal capacity should also be supported as many of the state owned media houses lack basic capacity to conduct enquiries and monitor campaign violation.

**Table 26: Recommendations for Component four**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Recommendation** | **Responsible Parties** | **Timeline** | **Performance Targets** | **Output** | **Outcome** |
| **Component four: civil society and the media** | | | | | |
| **Outreach to more localised CSOS** | | | | | |
| Issue discretionary grants to small grass root CSOs as well as small groups to carry out voter education activities. | DGD II and small CSOs and groups | In the lead up to the elections | To encourage a more localised approach towards voter education | Issuance of discretionary grants | More persons are sensitised to the elections and outreach is achieved at a more localised level |
| **Monitoring of voter education activities conducted by civil soceity organisations** | | | | | |
| The project should develop mechanism to effectively monitor activities conducted by CSOs | DGD II | As soon as possible | To encourage better transparency and effectiveness of disbursement of funds | Development of measurable indicators to assess the success of implemented activities | It would allow the project to gauge the progress of voter education activities. |
| **MEdia should be supported in tracking violations of the code of conduct during the campaign and legal capacity supported** | | | | | |
| The media should receive essential training on the code of conduct and be supported to conduct dialogues with political parties at local level | DGD II, media and the Political Parties at the local level | As soon as possible | To enable the media to better able to monitor violations of the campaign | Training on code of conduct and facilitation workshops between media and political parties | The media and political parties enjoy a more collegial relationship and media is better able to monitor the violations of the campaign |
| Media should be supported to increase their legal capacity and how to documents violations | DGD and State media houses | As soon as possible and prior to the start of the campaign | To improve the legal capacity of the State media houses | Provision of training on legal documentation | The media is better enabled to document violations and hold the political parties accountable |

annexes



# Annex I – Electoral Support Projects funded by other entities

**Deepening Democracy in Nigeria Phase II – DFID**

#### Output 1: A well-administered election, independently observed, with full participation of women and young people, and measures in place to mitigate the risk of violence.

#### Output 2: Increased NASS responsiveness in law-making, representation and over-sight by improving the quality of the information provided and utilised

#### Output 3: A better informed, broader and more engaged electorate, in particular women, youth and people with disabilities

**IFES support for electoral reforms over a period of 5 years.**

Output 1: Improved, effective, professional and credible elections conducted by EMBs;

Output 2: Improved professionalism and knowledgeable EMB staff administering credible elections,

Output 3: Improved INEC-implemented voter education campaign.

**NDI Support to Election over the next five years**

Output 1: Election observation strengthening in a systematic manner

Output 2: Management and financial management of CSOs

Output 3: Enhancing the participation of most marginalized groups such as Women, PWDs and Youth.

# Annex II – Terms of Reference for the Project Steering Committee

Terms of Reference for the Project Steering Committee (PSC)

**Overall Responsibilities and Mandate of the PSC**

1. Make consensus management decisions for the project, including approval of annual project plans and revisions. In order to ensure UNDP’s ultimate accountability, PSC decisions shall be made in accordance with standards that ensure best value for money, fairness, integrity, transparency, and effective international competition. In case a consensus cannot be reached, final decision shall rest with UNDP representative in the PSC or their nominee.
2. Ensure Quality Assurance and implementation of the evaluation process and products using evaluations for performance improvement, accountability, and learning. Project reviews by this group shall be made at designated decision points during the running of the project, or as necessary when raised by the Project Director. For the day-to-day management, this role is delegated to the PMU.
3. Review decisions made by the Project Director when tolerances (normally in terms of time and budget) have been exceeded.
4. Based on the approved Annual Work Plan (AWP), the Steering Committee shall review and approve/authorize any major deviation from approved AWP.
5. Ensure that required resources are committed.
6. Arbitrate on any conflicts within the project or negotiate a solution to any problems between the project and external bodies.
7. Provide high-level coordination with government and other stakeholders.
8. Provide overall strategic and policy guidance, taking oversight of the programme and ascertaining what overall progress is being made in its rollout
9. Review and approve various recommendations made by the Technical Committee (described below) during the course of project implementation.

**Project Steering Committee Members’ Responsibilities**

1. **The Executive** which is the National Planning Commission (NPC) and UNDP Nigeria Country Office.

Responsibilities:

1. Take ultimately responsibility for the project, supported by the Senior Beneficiary and Senior Supplier
2. Ensure that the project is focused and coherent throughout its life cycle on achieving its objectives and delivering outputs that will contribute to higher-level outcomes
3. Ensure that the project gives value for money, ensuring a cost-conscious approach to the project, balancing the demands of beneficiary and supplier.
4. Set tolerances in the AWPs and other plans as required
5. Monitor and control the progress of the project at a strategic level
6. Ensure that risks are being tracked and mitigated as effectively as possible
7. Brief the Partners and UNDP Outcome Board and relevant stakeholders about project progress
8. **Senior Suppliers** are the EU, CIDA, DFID, UNDP and other partners providing funding and technical expertise through the JDBF. The Senior Suppliers’ primary function is to provide guidance regarding the technical feasibility of the project. The Senior Supplier shall have the authority to commit or acquire supplier resources.

**Specific Responsibilities:**

1. Ensure progress towards the outputs remains consistent especially from the suppliers’ perspective.
2. Promote and maintain focus on the expected project output(s) from the point of view of supplier management.
3. Ensure that the supplier resources required for the project are made available in a timely manner.
4. Contribute supplier opinions on steering committee decisions on whether to implement recommendations on proposed changes.
5. Arbitrate on, and ensure resolution of, any supplier priority or resource conflicts
6. Assume responsibility for Quality Control together with the Executive and Senior Beneficiary (ies).

The **Suppliers’ Quality Assurance Role Responsibilities** is to:

1. Advise on the selection strategies, design and methods to carry out project activities
2. Ensure that any standards defined for the project are met and used to good effect
3. Monitor potential changes and their impact on the quality of deliverables from a supplier perspective
4. Monitor any risks in the implementation aspects of the project
5. **Senior Beneficiary** in the project is INEC

Responsibilities of the Senior Beneficiary:

Working with other beneficiaries, INEC will perform the following responsibilities:

1. Validate the needs of the project
2. Monitor and ensure that the solution will meet those needs within the constraints of the project (quality standards, time and cost).
3. Monitor progress against targets and quality criteria

# Annex III – List of People Met

| **Name** | **Position** | **Organization** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Alan Munday | First Secretary – Head of Section / National And Regional Development Co-operation – Political Governance and Democracy | European Union Delegation to Nigeria and ECOWAS |
| Olawumi Laolu |  | European Union Delegation |
| Bernardo Cocco | Deputy Country Director | UNDP |
| Moutarda Deme | PMU  *(Project Director)* | UNDP Project |
| Rose Plang | Procurement Analyst UNDP | UNDP |
| Bareyei Johnson | Chief Information Technology Officer  International Cooperation Department | National Planning Commission |
| Akpanyung B.O. | Director, International Co-operation Department | National Planning Commission |
| Dr Y. A Awyonka | Senior Project Officer | National Planning Commission |
| Mohammad King Ibrahim | Desk Officer | National Planning Commission |
| Monye Anthony Media |  | National Planning Commission |
| Barr Ebere Ifendu | National Women Leader | Labour Party |
| Toyin Adewale Gabriel  Kabura Zakama | Media Expert  CSO Expert | DGD  DGD |
| Mufuliat Fijabi | National Expert Gender | DGD |
| Bolade M Eyinla | National Elections Expert | DGD |
| Catherine Weiss | Political Advisor | DFID |
| Barr. Ebere Ifendu | National Women Leader | Labour Party |
| Hon Chairman Prof.  Attahiru M Jega | Chairman |  |
| Profesor Ibeanu | Chief Technical Advisor | INEC |
| Mohammad J Kuna | Special Assistant to the Chairman | INEC |
| Musa Adamu | Department Human Resources | INEC |
| Abubakar Kolo | Planning and Monitoring Directorate | INEC |
| Chuta Chijindu | TEI Training | INEC |
| Bala I Sluttu | VEP Department | INEC |
| Augusta C Ogakwu | Secretary | INEC |
| Tagwai Abdul | Finance and Accounts | INEC |
| Ushama M.A. | Voter Registration | INEC |
| Waziri A Zannah | Alternative Disputes Resolution | INEC |
| Richter Alabraba | Human Resources | INEC |
| Richard Inuti | Training | INEC |
| Oghuma N Irene | Alternative Dispute Resolution | INEC |
| Oluwole Osaze Uzzi | VEP | INEC |
| Aluko Victor | VEP | INEC |
| Yeppeni Sylvanus | VEP | INEC |
| Nwosu Eugene | ICSP | INEC |
| Okechuwu Ndeche | Planning and Monitoring | INEC |
| Blessing Ndeche | Planning and Monitoring | INEC |
| Kayode o. Oladimeji | Director Electoral Operations | INEC |
| Ibrahim K Bawa | Ag Director Legal | INEC |
| Maryam Iya Musa | Deputy Director | INEC |
| Sulayman O Ibrahim | AD Legal | INEC |
| Audra Degesys-Lykos | Elections and Democracy Officer | USAID |
| Nino Nadiradze | Office Director, Peace and Democratic Governance Team | USAID |
| Tony Ojukwu Esq | Director Protection and Investigation | National Human Rights Commission |
| Okwa Morphy | Assistant Director (Monitoring) | National Human Rights Commission |
| Jasper Veen | Resident Director | NDI |
| Machill Maxwell | Elections Programme | NDI |
| Robina Namussi | Resident Country Director | IRI |
| Emeka Diru | Programme Assistant | IRI |
| Ijeoma Pamela Ugwueze | Assistant Programme Officer | IRI |
| Carter James | Programme Officer | IRI |
| Troy | Political Parties | IRI |
| Uloma Osuala | Deputy Country Director | IFES |
| Seray Jah | Senior Capacity Building Manager | IFES |
| Obaje Ukeh | Voter Education Manager | IFES |
| Dr Madani B Thiam | Counsellor and Head of Development Cooperation | Government of Canada |
| Bridget Drake | M & E Specialist | Transitional Monitoring Group (TMG) |
| Mina Ogbanga | Executive Director | Centre for Development Support Initiatives |
| Nebechi Ugwuozor | Executive Director | Poverty in Africa Alternative (Poriwaa) |
| Mike Opia | Executive Director | Centre for Development and Civic Education |
| Arigbabu Salaiman | Executive Director | Heda Resource Centre |
| Abiola Akiyode- Afolabi | Executive Director | Women Advocacy Research Document Centre (UNARDC) |
| Felicia Onibon | President/CEO | Change Managers Info Network |
| Amina Salimi | Team Leader / CEO | Oyster Consulting |
| Oby Nwankwo | Executive Director | Civil Resource Dev and Doc Centre (CIRDDOC) |
| Joy Ngozi Ezeilo | Executive Director | Women’s Aid  Collective (WACOL) – Faculty of Law, University of Nigeria |
| Saudatu Mahdi | Secretary General | Women’s right Advancement and Protection Alternative (WRAPA) |
| Peter Ameh | National Chairman | PPA/IPAC |
| Chief Sam Eke | National Chairman | CPP/IPAC |
| Chief Ogbueth | National Public Secretary | UPP/IPAC |
| Barr Chidi Ike | National Organizing Secretary | ID |
| Hon Ganiyu D Galasima | National Secretary | ACDN/IPAC |
| Dr Yunusa Tanki | National Chairman | NPC/IPAC |
| Gloria Ukpang | Chairman | Akura Ibon SIEC |
| Moses Ogbe | Chairman | Delta SIEC |
| Hon A M Kundak | Chairman | Bauchi SIEC |
| Dr U A Ajibagda | Chairman | Kwara SIEC |
| Dr Mrs H U Bihat | Chairman | Kaduna SIEC |
| Prof Olugbenga Iye | Chairman | Oyo SIEC |
| Rt Hon Bar Amaechi Mwoka | Chairman | Imo SIEC |
| Dr Boniface D Eneh | Chairman | Enugu SIEC |
| Abnebaka Laws Malwinfashi | Chairman | Katsina SIEC |
| Hon Justice A. F. Adeyimka | Chairman | Lagos SIEC |
| Segun Emmanuel |  | TIAGA |
| Ayisha Osori |  | National Women Trust Fund |
| Cynthia Mbamalu |  | Youth Initiative for advocacy Growth and Advancement |
| Ruth Oyediya Kalu |  | Life Care Outreach |
| Ekaete J Umoh |  | Family Centered Initiative for Challenged Persons |
| Samson Itodo |  | YIAGA |
| Akin Akingbubu |  | IMESO |
| Motunrayo Alaka |  | WSCIJ |
| M.M Sada |  | NBC |
| Edetaen Ojo |  | Media Rights Agenda |
| Lanre Aiogundade |  | International Press Centre |
| Stella Jibrin |  | Nigeria Press Council |
| Asabe Baban |  | NAWAS |
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# Annex V – EU EOM Recommendations

**Status of Recommendations by the EU EOM 2011**

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| **Legal Framework** | **Status** | **DGD Input** |
| Amendment to ensure appointment of INEC Chairperson, National Commissioners and REC nominated and appointed through an independent process | Recommendation in INECs submission | Support to INEC and other actors to submit amendments to the Constitutional/Electoral Reform |
| Constitution should be amended to allow for independent candidates to run for office | Recommendation at NASS | Support from DGD |
| Constitution should be amended to provide for establishment of a Constituency Delimitation Commission, A Political Parties Registration and Regulatory Commission and an Electoral Offences Commission | Political parties registration is under IPAC/INEC has submitted recommendation to have an electoral offences commission | Support from DGD |
| Future amendments to election legislation should be enacted sufficiently in advance of elections | The amendments are currently on hold because of the National Conference, it is not clear whether amendments will be done within a six month timeframe | DGD supported different entities to submit amendments/suggestions both at national level and at state level. |
| The authority and responsibility of each level of election administration should be explicitly defined in the Constitution and the Electoral Act | It does not appear to be in the proposed amendments to the electoral legal framework |  |
| Section 180 (2A) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, should be revised in order to disallow any candidate whose role at the election has been adjudged by the Courts/Tribunals as fraudulent to take part in the re-run election | It does not appear to be in the proposed amendments to the electoral legal framework |  |
| Section 87(10) of the Electoral Act 2010, as amended, should be expunged or revised, as it is in contradiction with Section 87(9) of the Act and its outs the jurisdiction of the courts in relation to political party primaries and general elections for failure to comply with provisions of the Act | It does not appear to be in the proposed amendments to the electoral legal framework |  |
| Electoral Act should provide specifically for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) that would address the issue of voluminous and protracted litigation. The constitutions of political parties should include the ADR procedure clearly to avoid emasculation of party members. | It does not appear to be in the proposed amendments to the electoral legal framework | DGD has helped INEC with ADR processes as has IFES |

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| **Election Administration** | **Status** | **DGD Input** |
| Further improve transparency of the process official results should be published broken down to polling unit level. Electoral Act should include provisions for publication of results | Originally support to the results process was foreseen to promote this in the ProDoc | This was to be dealt with by DGD but will now be handed over to IFES |
| Demarcation of electoral boundaries has not been updated since 1996. Proper analysis of the recent population growth and a review of electoral constituencies should be planned and implemented for the 2015 elections. | A National Committee Chaired by INEC National Commissioner Engr Nuru Yakubu is already constituted to handle this issue and it's expected to submit a report in July/August 2014. It is doubtful though if the process can be concluded before the 2015 elections |  |
| INEC should timely inform on the details of postponed and cancelled elections, both at federal and state level. | Not applicable to this evaluation |  |
| INEC should devise a more robust and swifter internal results verification mechanism to be put in place before the official proclamation of the winners | Originally support for the results process was foreseen to promote this in the ProDoc | This was to be dealt with by DGD but will now be handed over to IFES |
| An independent audit should be undertaken of INEC Staff performance at all levels. The Commission should be able to reward professionalism and commitment. It should also review appointment policies, removing underperforming employees and legally prosecuting those who committed electoral offences. | INEC is currently looking at staff levels however it is doubtful if they have the software and resources to do this efficiently |  |
| Improved learning programmes should be put in place for timely training of all election staff. | Should be considered |  |
| As an independent exercise, an independent audit of election results should be undertaken. Randomly chosen polling units, ballot papers, results and collation forms should be reviewed to identify errors, deficiencies and malpractice, if any. | This was not done, however INEC did recently audit a state election and are following up on the results of the audit |  |
| INEC should ensure a much greater compliance with the election procedures at all levels to minimize inconsistency in their implementation. Therefore, systems should be put in place to ensure institutional cohesion and sound intra-INEC communication to adequately and timely inform all employees | Should be considered by DGD |  |
| Strengthening of procurement, logistics, and operational capacity, and thorough planning should be a priority for INEC. The setup of an operational plan with input from the different areas and strong internal coordination needs to be further development. Additionally, procurement should be transparently publicized | DGD has recently put out a posting for a logistics officer | DGD will support a logistics as well as a procurement officer |

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| **Election Administration** | **Status** | **DGD Input** |
| INEC both at Federal and State level should continue with the positive trend of holding official periodical consultative meetings with stakeholders, particularly with political candidates, candidates and CSOs. However, more efforts should be undertaken to involve representatives of domestic and international observers. | This is being continually strengthened with the support of DGD | Supported by DGD |
| Taking into account that only INEC Headquarters deals with accreditation, it is necessary that timely and clear procedures for accrediting domestic observers and journalists are developed, and implemented for smooth distribution of the accreditation badges to the field. | The Accreditation process is essentially designed to preclude multiple voting as it is carried out at the same specified time nationwide. The accreditation process for the next governorship elections in Ekiti (21 June) and Osun (9 August) states, as well as the February 2015 general elections will be done through electronic verification whereby a handheld voters' card reader will used to validate an individual's biometric identity as contained in the chip-based voters card before he/she will be allowed to vote. Please note the Constitution forbids electronic voting, but not electronic verification.  Furthermore, there is a proposed amendment to the electoral law which states that each political party should notify the local government of the names of candidates they wish to field as polling agents at least 14 days ahead of the election including two passport sized photographs |  |

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| **Election Administration** | **Status** | **DGD Input** |
| INEC should consider designing and implementing special mechanisms to allow election officials, security and other staff drafted for election responsibilities to register and vote in future elections. | Undoubtedly, many people in this category do register in their respective places of abode, but their capacity to vote is circumscribed by being deployed beyond the polling unit where they registered. Although the INEC Chair has publicly announced that their ability to vote will be accommodated in the 2015 General Election, there is really no concrete steps towards the realization of this pronouncement. Allowing them to vote before the election day will require amendment to the Constitution and the Electoral Act and as yet they are not foreseen in the submitted amendments. |  |
| Through a proper and long term planning, it would be advisable to reassess the cost of elections and possibly reduce it, while keeping adequate resources to INEC to organize the elections. | INEC has been allocated 47 billion naira despite asking for 120 billion which is needed to conduct the elections | While this recommendation is an important one, until INEC strengthens the credibility and transparency of the elections, more monies from international partners will be needed |
| **Voter Registration** |  |  |
| INEC should envisage improving the quality of the voters’ register by eliminating double registration entries and making adjustments. Updating the register should be continuous process. The Electoral Act provision of closing the update of the register 30 days before the election date should be adhered to. | Originally foreseen in the Prodoc by DGD | This will now be performed by IFES |
| **Political Parties** |  |  |
| In order to enforce the provision for campaign expenditure detailed in the Electoral Act 2010, as amended, political parties should develop internal transparent bookkeeping procedures |  | DGD is supporting political parties to develop internal structures although no training on internal bookkeeping has been prescribed. |

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| **Voter Education** | **Status** | **DGD Input** |
| INEC should revise and strengthen its voter and civic education programmes. INEC should develop an overall strategy that takes into account the focus of the educational campaign and the target groups, including special designed programmes for first time voters and women. The strategy should also include the development of the messages, their testing and the identification of the appropriate delivery mechanism. | This is very important; Evaluation Team feels not enough is being done to consolidate this. INEC has a plan to carry out better voter education, however it is essential that all key players team up together to make the strategy as robust as possible | DGD will support voter education activities on voter registration especially with regards to women, PWDs and Youth. |
| **The Media** |  |  |
| With regards to state-owned broadcasters, it would be advisable neither the President of the Federation nor the Governors are entitled to appoint the Director General and the Board | Recommendation not accepted |  |
| Additionally financial independence of the state-owned broadcasters from the State and Federal Governments should be sustained and capacity building for editors-in-chief would be needed prior to the election period, following the lines of best journalism practice and the international, and regional standards | Training is taking place of different persons by DGD | DGD II Component IV supports this |
| In close cooperation with INEC, NBC should establish efficient media monitoring units in all the states and introduce a media monitoring system that meets international standards and allows controlling broadcasters’ compliance with the legal provisions. Similarly, NBCs law enforcement capacity should be strengthened by the creation of a capable legal department within the institution. Furthermore, NBC’s independence should be amplified, by making public the appointment procedure of the Director General and the Board | Training has been carried out by DGD on the media and media monitoring will begin in June 2014 |  |
| NBC Should share information on paid adverts with INEC in order for the latter to foster its control on the compliance of political parties’ expenditures with the legal provisions, since the paid adverts in the mass media are among the most costly campaign elements | According to the media this would be quite difficult to implement |  |
| It would be advisable to prohibit “paid-for” live transmissions of campaign rallies in the broadcast media, and in general the political debate culture should be strengthened. It would also be advisable that Federal and State Government-owned broadcasters allocate a significant proportion of their prime-time programmes to election debates and comparative analysis of political parties’ programmes | DGD is currently carrying out training to improve the quality of the political debate |  |

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| **Media** | **Status** | **DGD Input** |
| The Freedom of Information Bill should be passed and duly implemented to provide a higher degree of transparency, and accountability of the public sector. | Approved and DGD supporting its dissemination | DGD has supported vigorously the dissemination of this ACt |
| In order to broaden the diversity of the information sources available to the electorate, it would be advisable to facilitate the licensing of community radios, especially in the rural areas. | Supported by DGD | Activities on-going |
| A Federal government-oriented programme for the promotion of print and e-media should be initiated, facilitating the distribution of newspapers and access to Internet in public places, such as libraries. Such programmes should be in the major local languages alongside with English | Supported by DGD (more info in final report) |  |
| **Women Participation in the Electoral Process** |  |  |
| The Government should strengthen efforts to implement the National Gender Policy which provides for a minimum of 35 percent representation of women at all levels of political participation | Vigorous efforts have been supported by DGD in this regard however there is a strong rejection by many interlocutors to enable women to get the 35% quota officially | Gender is mainstreamed across the whole of DGD and vigorous efforts have been made to support affirmative action across the board including amongst women’s groups, the NASS and political parties. |
| **Petitions and Appeals** |  |  |
| Reasonable, specific and adequate time limits should be included in the Constitution for the timely and effective filing, hearing and determination of pre-election petitions. | Recommendation put forward by INEC and other actors | Submission of recommendations supported by DGD |
| The Law should ensure that the complaints system is transparent and publicly accountable. Consolidated records of complaints, responses, decisions and outcomes should be made available by INEC or the Judiciary for public scrutiny. | If a election tribunal is not established, INEC will find it very difficult to do this, as there does not exist another financial or human resources, furthermore the legal department requires more training |  |
| The Electoral Act should provide a process for political parties, candidates and voters to lodge complaints and appeals from the adoption and implementation of INEC guidelines. This process should also allow for complaints and appeals arising from the violation by INEC of electoral legislation. | Does not appear to figure in the amendments to the electoral reform |  |
| The Electoral Act should be amended to allow voters, domestic observers or other national election stakeholders to file election complaints and petitions in all areas of the election process. | Does not appear to figure in the amendments to the electoral reform |  |

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| **Follow-up and Public Support** | **Status** | **DGD Input** |
| Authorities at all level should make clear their commitment to continue electoral reform through an inclusive and transparent process. They should make all efforts to communicate and involve all stakeholders including political parties, civil society and the media. An action plan should be agreed after assessing the 2011 electoral process in order to sustain the gains of these elections and prepare the 2012 Governorship elections and the 2015 General Elections. Seminars and international conferences should be considered in order to keep up the momentum. | This was the impetus behind the DGD II, it has vigorously supported different stakeholders in the process and has enabled them to submit their proposals to the NASS |  |

# Annex VI – National Conference 2014

**Issues to be covered during the Conference**

1. Political restructuring of the country
2. Forms of Domestic Governance
3. Good Governance
4. Judicature/Judicial system
5. Democratization
6. Political parties, Godfatherism and the challenges of Internal Democracy
7. National security and security challenges
8. State creation and merger of states
9. Education
10. Health
11. Science, Technology and Development
12. Restoring national ethics, morals and core values
13. Religion, Secularism and the secularity of the Nigerian State
14. Agriculture, Food Security and Rural Development
15. The Environment
16. Defence
17. Tenure of public officials: President, Governors, etc
18. The INEC and the challenges of conducting free and fair elections
19. Population and credible National Census
20. Land Use Act
21. Role of Traditional Rulers and institutions in governance at national and local levels
22. The Economy
23. Oil and other Mineral Resources Management Exploration and Sharing Mechanism
24. Revenue Generation and Mobilization
25. National Youth Service (NYSC)
26. Gender issues
27. Youth Unemployment and Development issues
28. Physically challenged persons and National Development
29. Investment in sports
30. Boundary Adjustment
31. National Inland Waterways issues
32. Election mayoralty, Administrative/Legislative Structures for FCT, Abuja, Special Status for Lagos
33. Pension matters and Rights of Senior Citizens
34. Federal Character

**No-go areas in the Conference**

President Goodluck Jonathan directed that the following areas should be avoided by the Conference:

1. Threat to Unity
2. Dissolubility of the nation

**COMMITTEES**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Devolution of Power** | **Co-Chairmen** | **Obong Victor Attah**  IGP Ibrahim Coomasie (rtd) |
| **Political Restructuring** | **Co-Chairmen** | **Hon. Mohammed Kumalia**  Gen. Ike Nwachukwu |
| **National Security** | **Chairman**  **Deputy Chairman** | **IGP Gambo Jimeta (rtd)**  Chief Albert. K. Horsfall. |
| **Environment** | **Chairman**  **Deputy Chairman** | **Senator Florence Ita-Giwa**  Miss Yadoma Bukar Mandara |
| **Politics and Governance** | **Co-Chairman** | **Professor Jerry Gana**  Chief Olu Falae |
| **Human Rights and Law Reforms** | **Chairman**  **Deputy** | **Justice G. A. Oguntade (rtd)**  Prof Auwaalu Yadudu |
| **Social Sector** | **Chairman**  Deputy Chairman | **Iyom Josephine Anenih**  Professor Ruqaiyatu Rufa’I |
| **Transportation** | **Chairman**  Deputy Chairman | **Senator Musa Adede**  Prof. Ralph Osanaiye |
| **Science, Technology and Development** | **Chairman**  Deputy Chairman | **Dr Daniel Maddo**  High Chief Raymond Dokpesi |
| **Agriculture has** | **Chairman**  Deputy Chairman | **Umaru Muhammed Hadeija**  Mrs Ifeoma Idigbe |
| **Civil Society, Labour and Sports** | **Chairman**  Deputy Chairman | **Mrs Bola Ogunrinade**  Comrade Issa Aremu |
| **Public Service** | **Chairman**  Deputy Chairman | **Engineer Ebele Okeke**  Ambassador Adamu Aliyu |
| **Political Parties and Electoral Matters** | **Co-Chairmen** | **Dr Iyorcha Ayu**  **Senator Ken Nnamani** |
| **Foreign Policy and Diaspora Matters** | **Chairman**  Deputy Chairman | **Prof Ibrahim Gambari**  Prof Lawrence Ekpebu |
| **Land Tenure and National Boundary** | **Chairman**  Deputy Chairman | **General A. B. Mamman**  HRH Oba Michael Gbadebo Adedeji |
| **Economy, Trade and Investment** | **Chairman**  Deputy Chairman | **Mrs Bola Shagaya**  Mr Fola Adeola |
| **Energy** | **Chairman**  Deputy Chairman | **Senator Rashid Ladoja**  Engineer Bello Suleiman |
| **Religion** | **Co-Chairmen** | **Bishop Felix Ajakaiye**  **Alhaji Nurudeen Lemu** |
| **Public Finance and Revenue Generation** | **Chairman**  Deputy Chairman | **Alhaji Adamu Aliero**  Senator Azu Agboti |
| **Citizenship, Immigration and Related Matters** | **Chairman**  Deputy Chairman | **Dr Muhammed  Abdullah**  Mrs Chidinma Uwajumogu |



1. Although organizations such as the Commonwealth played down the rigging and concluded with a fairly positive statement compared to observer groups such as the EU EOM [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/16/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Source – Human Rights Watch [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. This included Akura, Delta, Bauchi, Kwara, Kaduna, Ondo, Imo, Enugu, Katsina and Lagos States [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. A Transition period was established from May to December 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/16/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800Human Rights Watch [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. EU EOM Final Report 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. International Crisis Group – Policy Briefing – Africa Briefing No 81 – Lessons from Nigeria’s 2011 Elections [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. The National Gender Policy was finalized and adopted by the Federal Government of Nigeria on 15 August 2008, largely due to the efforts of a part of NGOs and civil society groups. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Please see section under Section 6. – Programme Design and Implementation [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. UNDP & Electoral Assistance – 10 years of Experience. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. See the Registration and Election Review Committees Report [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The **United Nations Development Action Framework** (**UNDAF**) is a programme document between a government and the [United Nations Country Team](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=United_Nations_Country_Team&action=edit&redlink=1) that describes the collective actions and strategies of the [United Nations](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations) to the achievement of national development. The UNDAF includes outcomes, activities and UN agency responsibilities that are agreed by government. The UNDAF shows where the United Nations can contribute most effectively to the achievement of national development priorities. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. I.E. the provision of operational support [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. According to Professor Okey Ibeanu, Chief Technical Advisor to INEC, [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Approximately USD$ 282m [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Please also note that USD$24m was also awarded to NDI for carrying out a 5 year programme with the following three objectives:- 1.Election observation strengthening in a systematic manner; 2. Management and financial management of CSOs and: 3. Enhancing the participation of most marginalized groups such as Women, PWDs and Youth. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. The Joint Basket Fund, USAID and DFID funded projects. Please see annex II for full details of the projects supported by USAID and DFID [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. This was particularly pertinent in the Election Support Project to Tanzania which had 6 separate components including support to the media, political parties, the Election Commissions both in mainland Tanzania and in Zanzibar, the strengthening of women and other marginalized groups as well as enhancing security within the elections. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. RBM is a management strategy by which all actors, contributing directly or indirectly to achieving a set of results, ensure that their processes, products and services contribute to the achievement of desired results (outputs, outcomes and higher level goals or impact). The actors in turn use information and evidence on actual results to inform decision making on the design, resourcing and delivery of programmes and activities as well as for accountability and reporting.

    (Source http://www.undg.org/docs/12316/UNDG-RBM%20Handbook-2012.pdf) [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Given the limited scope of the evaluation, the DGD II project which activities had been achieved to date and which ones were allegedly on track but not yet completed [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Please note that in the original ProDoc the intended Outputs are reflected in Output Targets [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. International best practice dictates that changes to electoral law should happen no later than 6 months prior to an election in order for the amendments to be properly implemented by the relevant authorities. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Please note that a substantial increase in women were fielded as candidates in 2011, however the actual number of women who won seats fell by 1% and is still very low by regional and international standards. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. The number of women in the 1999 elections was under 2.5%, in 2003 5%, in 2007, 8% and in 2011 this dropped to around 6.5% [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Source: www.hrw.org [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. UNDP works through Letters of Agreement with government partners. UNDP Procurement Support Office has just concluded work on a new procedure that recognises CSOs as implementing partners with more flexible processes. The organization recognizes that the engagement of NGOs/CSOs as Responsible Parties solely based on a full-fledged cost-and-quality-based procurement process does not always allow projects to ensure required nimbleness in the delivery of support to beneficiaries, and can hamper productive cooperation with NGOs/CSOs. UNDP’ Procurement Support Unit continuously updates the engagement modalities with CSOs. The upcoming new policy provides different approaches that are appropriate to different NGOs/CSOs. Even the engagement of CSOs through procurement process will feature different methods. The new policy is more flexible as it caters different engagement options, room for negotiation and capacity building.   [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. The evaluation team only gained a document outlining some 250 CSOs [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. SIECs conduct Local Government Elections [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Source: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2011/04/nigerias_elections_3> [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. The project intends to work with the National Orientation Agency in the Lal Government Areas [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. P. 28 of ProDoc [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. This includes USAID, DFID, EU, DFTAD and others involved in providing support to the electoral process. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. This has also been further delayed due to the National Conference [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. At the time of writing, April 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. The roster available online only lists some 250 CSOs, and the list received by the evaluators did not list the full 600. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. This does not include the grants awarded to the media [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Although the evaluation team was unable to examine to what extent this Act is now being used. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. USD$ 27,822,417.06 approximately [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. USD$ 317,368.42 [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Some of the questionnaires were filled in by the same SIECs who were present in the focus group meeting. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. However a number of meetings have taken place in Kaduna, including the 2014 INEC/SIECs experience and knowledge sharing interaction. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. This is on-going, and although the relationship has been strengthened, INEC would like to see it further strengthened in order to have the desired impact. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. FOSIECONs [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Peer- review mechanism [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Nevertheless, this particular activity is supported with only USDS211,600, therefore the support would only be with regards to design of a strategy and not to carry out the strategy. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. USD$ 7,376,604.02 approximately [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. The institute has been established and has commenced trainings. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. The institute has been established and has commenced trainings. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. The Economic and Social Council endorsed a target of 30 per cent of women in positions at decision-making levels by 1995. This was further supported by the Beijing Platform of Action. The figure of 30 per cent forms the so-called “critical mass”, believed to be necessary for women to make a visible impact on the style and content of decision-making. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. USD$ 9,415,255.38 Approximately [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. In USD$ 10,126,478.81 [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. The original output budget per component foresaw a budget of €48,241,598.82 which at a rate of 0.760 is the equivalent of 63,475,787.92 [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. The Canadians supported the project with the equivalent of CAD$6,000,000 [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Amount to be confirmed [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Amount to be confirmed [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. According to the original budget [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. It is worth noting that these figures are up to 24th April 2014, and therefore might include expenditure of activities undertaken in 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. The evaluation team was provided with a budget in Euros, calculating the budget at the rate of 0.760, it comes to a total of USD$63,475,786.21 which is approximately USD$ 10 million dollars more than has been committed. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Please note that all areas shaded in blue were because no financial data was available to the evaluation. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. These numbers are not exact; as it is not clear as to how much of the budget has already been spent on the new work plan 2014/2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic and Time Bound. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Figures are approximate values in USD. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. “The Democratic Dimension of Aid Prospects for democracy building within the contemporary international architecture of development cooperation”. *Literature Review for International IDEA* (paper) by Lisa Horner and Greg Power, Global Partners and Associates, March 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. It should be noted that most electoral assistance projects are Direct Execution (DEX)/ Direct Implementation (DIM). [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Please see section on Efficiency and Value for Money for a full description of these group activities. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Questionnaires were received from all the States mentioned in footnote 6 and from Kebbe, Kaduna, Yobe and Benue State. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)